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SUMMARY 
 
Over the years sectional ownership satisfied the psychological need of many South 
Africans to acquire home-ownership and it is currently estimated that there are more 
than 780 000 sectional title units throughout South Africa.  The concept of sectional 
ownership consists of three elements, namely individual ownership of a section 
(residential or commercial); joint ownership of the common parts of the sectional title 
scheme and membership of the body corporate which governs the sectional title 
community.  Sectional ownership is therefore a unique statutory institution with its 
own characteristics. 
 
An imperative of every sectional title scheme is to strive for financial stability, 
happiness and harmony in an intensified, diverse community where the objects of 
ownership, the individual units, are physically interdependent.  The Sectional Titles 
Act 95 of 1986, as amended, therefore imposes numerous financial and social 
obligations on sectional owners.  These obligations require each owner to give up a 
certain degree of freedom that he might otherwise enjoy in separate, privately owned 
property.  Ultimately the success of a sectional title scheme will depend upon the 
necessary co-operation and support of its members for compliance with these 
obligations.  Since non-compliance can destroy the financial stability and social 
harmony in a sectional title scheme, effective procedures for the enforcement of 
these financial and social obligations are essential.  Accordingly, effective sanctions 
are a sine qua non for a financially viable and socially successful sectional title 
scheme. 
 
This thesis provides a critical analysis of the various financial and social obligations 
that are imposed on sectional owners, as well as the measures available for their 
enforcement.  It will become evident that the sanctions in the South African sectional 
title legislation for non-compliance with these obligations are conspicuously few and 
far between.  It is generally accepted that the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 does 
not have sharp enough „teeth‟ to deal effectively with the non-compliance of these 
obligations.  Consequently, the thesis will also focus on sanctions that are used in 
foreign jurisdictions to enforce sectional owners‟ financial and social obligations, with 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
iii 
 
the aim to identify sanctions that may be adopted in the South African context to 
render the enforcement of these obligations more efficient and effective.  In 
conclusion it will be recommended that the only manner in which financial stability 
and social harmony can be restored in a troubled sectional title scheme is to 
introduce legislation which allows the body corporate as a last resort to exclude a 
persistent offender who makes it impossible for the other sectional owners to share 
the sectional owners‟ community with him or her temporarily from this community.         
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OPSOMMING 
 
Met die verloop van tyd sedert die eerste deeltitelwetgewing in 1971 in Suid Afrika 
ingevoer is, het deeleiendom die droom van menige Suid-Afrikaners verwesenlik om 
eiendomsreg van „n eie woning te verkry.  Huidige statistieke dui daarop dat daar 
meer as 780 000 deeltiteleenhede in Suid Afrika is.  Drie elemente word in die begrip 
„deeleiendom‟ saamgevat, naamlik individuele eiendomsreg van „n deel (residensiëel 
of kommersiëel), mede-eindomsreg van die gemeenskaplike gedeeltes van „n skema 
en lidmaatskap van „n regspersoon.  Deeleiendom is dus „n unieke statutêre 
instelling met sy eie ongewone karaktertrekke. 
 
Die belangrikste doelwit van elke deeltitelskema is om finansiële stabiliteit, geluk en 
harmonie in „n geϊntensifeerde, diverse gemeenskap waar individuele 
eiendomseenhede, fisies interafhanklik is, te bewerkstellig.  Die Wet op Deeltitels 95 
van 1986, soos gewysig, onderwerp deeleienaars daarom aan verskeie finansiële en 
sosiale verpligtinge wat meebring dat elke deeleienaar „n sekere mate van vryheid 
moet prys gee wat hy andersins sou geniet het as hy eienaar was van „n huis op „n 
private erf.  Die uiteindelike sukses van „n deeltitelskema is grotendeels afhanklik 
van die samewerking en ondersteuning van sy lede wat betref die nakoming van 
hierdie verpligtinge.  Omdat nie-nakoming die finansiële stabiliteit en sosiale 
harmonie kan versteur word doeltreffende maatreëls vereis vir die afdwinging van 
hierdie finansiële en sosiale verpligtinge.  „n Deeltitelskema kan slegs met sukses 
bestuur word indien op doeltreffende sanksies gesteun kan word.   
 
Hierdie tesis fokus op „n kritiese analise van die verskeie finansiële en sosiale 
verpligtinge waaraan deeleienaars onderhewig is, en die maatreëls wat aangewend 
kan word om hierdie verpligtinge af te dwing.  Daar sal aangetoon word dat die 
sanksies in die Suid-Afrikaanse deeltitelwetgewing vir die nie-nakoming van hierdie 
verpligtinge gans te min, en boonop uiters ondoeltreffend is.  Daarom word 
algemeen aanvaar dat die „tande‟ van die Wet op Deeltitels 95 van 1986 nie skerp 
genoeg is om die nie-nakoming van hierdie verpligtinge doeltreffend te straf nie.  
Gevolglik sal die tesis ook fokus op sanksies wat in buitelandse regstelsels 
aangewend word om die finansiële en sosiale verpligtinge van deeleienaars af te 
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dwing.  Die oogmerk hiermee is om buitelandse sanksies te identifiseer wat met vrug 
in die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks aangewend kan word ten einde die nie-nakoming van 
hierdie verpligtinge doeltreffend hok te slaan.  Ter afsluiting sal voorgestel word dat 
finansiële stabiliteit en sosiale harmonie in „n erg ontwrigte deeltitelskema slegs 
herstel kan word indien wetgewing aangeneem word wat die regspersoon toelaat om 
„n deeleienaar wat ondanks waarskuwings dit vir mede-deeleienaars onmoontlik 
maak om saam met hom of haar in dieselfde deeleiendomsgemeenskap te leef 
tydelik van die skema te verwyder.     
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
1 1 General background 
 
According to the common law principle of superficies solo cedit (omne quod 
inaedificatur solo cedit) a landowner is also the owner of any building erected on it.1  
Therefore, it was not possible for any person to own an individual flat as distinct from 
the entire building because a building was seen as a unit.  Consequently, ownership 
extended over the building in its entirety.2  The Sectional Titles Act 66 of 1971 (the 
old Act), however, introduced an entirely new concept in providing for actual 
ownership of units in a sectional title scheme with various additional rights and 
obligations.3  The Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 (the Act) maintained the conceptual 
framework4 for sectional titles although registration procedures were streamlined and 
new mechanisms created to deal with some practical problems encountered with the 
old Act.5 
 
Today the concept of sectional ownership consists of three elements, namely 
individual ownership of a section (residential or commercial); joint ownership of the 
common parts of the sectional title scheme; and membership of the body corporate 
which governs the sectional title community.6  The current estimation is that there 
are more than 780 000 sectional title units throughout South Africa.7  There are a 
number of economic and social reasons why the demand for sectional title 
apartments in South African cities has increased steadily over the years.8  For 
individuals, small families and those who prefer not to be troubled with the upkeep of 
                                                          
1
 GJ Pienaar Sectional Titles and other Fragmented Property Schemes (2010) 22 and CG Van der Merwe & JC 
Sonnekus Sectional Titles, Share Blocks and Time-Sharing Volume 1 Sectional Titles (Service Issue 16 May 
2013) 1-3. 
2
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 1-3. 
3
 G Paddock The Sectional Title Handbook 2ed (1990) vi. 
4
 For the conceptual framework of sectional titles see Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 1-30(14) – 1-30(16) and 
Pienaar Sectional Titles 58. 
5
 For a list of amendments see Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 1-30(17) – 1-30(18). 
6
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 2-3; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The 
Law of Property 5ed (2006) 442-443.  See also CG Van der Merwe “The Adaptation of the Institution of 
Apartment Ownership to Civilian Property Law Structures in the Mixed Jurisdictions of South Africa, Sri Lanka 
and Louisiana” (2008) 19 Stell LR 298 311.   
7
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 1-30(12). 
8
 To view the increase of the annual statistics that are supplied by the chief registrar see Van der Merwe 
Sectional Titles 1-30(11) – 1-30(12). 
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large private gardens, sectional title apartments provide the ideal form of 
accommodation.  They are also easily maintained, provide adequate security and 
are usually conveniently located.9  Furthermore, apartment ownership encourages 
efficient building construction and better utilisation of land resources; it satisfies the 
psychological need of the population for home-ownership; it aims to provide a hedge 
against inflation by making it possible to purchase an apartment instead of renting it; 
it realises the sociological goal of a closer social life and additional amenities; it 
promotes the redevelopment of city centres and contributes to the provision of public 
housing; and it alleviates the scarcity of residential accommodation by creating an 
alternative to the traditional options of buying a house or renting an apartment.10  All 
of the above mentioned reasons increase the acceptance of living in sectional title 
apartments and it is highly likely that its popularity will continue to grow in the years 
to come.  
 
Sectional ownership thus provides residential accommodation and commercial 
premises to thousands of South Africans today.  It is, therefore, important that 
prospective purchasers and sectional owners have a proper understanding of certain 
basic concepts involved in sectional title schemes, but it is even more important that 
they have a thorough knowledge of the rights and especially the obligations 
pertaining to sectional ownership.11 
 
1 2 Research problem 
 
The most important aims of sectional title schemes are to strive for financial stability, 
happiness and harmony in an intensified, diverse community where the individual 
units, the objects of ownership, are physically interdependent.  Sectional owners, 
however, use common facilities and they live in close proximity which entails that 
their ownership needs to be restricted.12  Therefore, although William Pitt, Earl of 
Chatham, may have declared that a man‟s home is his castle, this is not necessarily 
                                                          
9
 Paddock Sectional Title Handbook v. 
10
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 1-10(1) – 1-13.  See also CG Van der Merwe, P Mohr & M Blumberg “The 
Bill of Rights and the Rules of Sectional Title Schemes: A Comparative Perspective” (2000) 11 Stell LR 155 
155-156. 
11
 Paddock Sectional Title Handbook vi. 
12
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-32.  
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true for sectional title schemes.13  The reason for this is that the imposition of 
financial and non-financial obligations (in this thesis non-financial obligations will be 
grouped together under the term „social obligations‟) on sectional owners is essential 
for the efficiency of sectional title schemes. 
 
In terms of the Act a body corporate is required to establish an administrative fund 
sufficient, in the opinion of the body corporate, to cover its expenses.14  The 
sectional owner then has the financial obligation to pay his share of the maintenance 
and administrative expenses by contributing to the administrative fund, from which 
the expenses of managing the sectional title scheme, as well as maintaining the 
common property are met.15  In this regard the Act makes a distinction between the 
payment of ordinary levies,16 special levies,17 and additional levies.18  The money 
collected from these levies is the body corporate‟s only source of funding.19 
 
Bodies corporate do, however, not make financial gains.20  The contributions 
received from sectional owners are merely to recover expenses.  Repeated failure to 
contribute to common expenses may, therefore, hamstring timely maintenance and 
the efficient administration of the sectional title scheme and ultimately wreck the 
scheme.21  The proper maintenance, efficient management and ultimately the 
                                                          
13
 DE Grassmick “Minding the Neighbor‟s Business: Just how far can Condominium Owners‟ Associations go 
in Deciding who can Move into the Building?” (2002) U. Ill. L. Rev. 185 185.  
14
 S 37(1)(a) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
3(1)(a)). 
15
 S 32(3)(c) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 read with s 37(1)(a) and s 44(1)(b); (Sectional Titles 
Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 11(1)(c) read with s 3(1)(a) and s 13(1)(b)). 
16
 S 37(2) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 3(2)). 
17
 Annexure 8 r 31(4B) and ss 37(2A) and (2B) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles 
Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 3(3)). 
18
 S 37(1)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
3(1)(c)). 
19
 The costs of maintenance of the common property rests squarely on the body corporate whereas the costs of 
maintenance of a section and an exclusive use area rests on the specific owner to which the section belongs or to 
whom the exclusive use area is allocated.  See A Kelley “Maintenance in sectional title schemes” (April 2011) 
6-4 Paddocks Press Newsletter 1.  
20
 Where profit is, however, earned from other income like third party rentals or the running of a laundry 
business, and this income is above the exemption amount the body corporate will have to pay tax.  Taxation is 
calculated on 28% of interest and income (other than levies) received over and above the exempted amount of 
R50 000.  See s 10(1)(e) of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (as amended).   
21
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-4. 
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success of a sectional title scheme will thus depend on a steady flow of contributions 
from the sectional owners to the coffers of the body corporate.22 
 
Besides the financial obligations that need to be complied with, there are also 
numerous social obligations that are imposed on sectional owners in terms of the 
Act, the model management23 and conduct24 rules and the common law neighbour 
law concept of nuisance.  For example, he must keep his section in a state of good 
repair;25 not use his section or permit it to be used in such a manner as will cause a 
nuisance to any occupant of any other section;26 not use his section or allow it to be 
used for a purpose injurious to the reputation of the building;27 not make alterations 
which are likely to impair the stability of the building;28 not make alterations which are 
likely to prejudice the harmonious appearance of the building29 and, not without the 
written consent of the trustees, keep any animal, reptile, or bird in his section.30  
Furthermore, he must use and enjoy the common property with due consideration of 
the rights of other occupants;31 not park or leave any vehicle standing on the 
common property without the written consent of the trustees;32 not place or do 
anything on any part of the common property which in the discretion of the trustees 
is aesthetically displeasing or undesirable when viewed from the outside;33 and not 
deposit or throw any rubbish, including dirt, cigarette butts or food scraps on the 
common property.34 
 
A happy and harmonious sectional title scheme will be one where the members co-
operate and comply with the social obligations of a particular scheme.  Less severe 
                                                          
22
 CG Van der Merwe & L Muňis Argüelles “Enforcement of Financial Obligations in a Condominium or 
Apartment Ownership Scheme” (2006) 16 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 125 126. 
23
 Annexure 8 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
24
 Annexure 9. 
25
 S 44(1)(c) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
13(1)(c)). 
26
 S 44(1)(e) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
13(1)(e)). 
27
 Annexure 8 r 68(1)(i) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
28
 Annexure 8 r 68(1)(iii). 
29
 Annexure 8 r 68(1)(iv).  
30
 Annexure 9 r 1(1). 
31
 S 44(1)(d) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
13(1)(d)) . 
32
 Annexure 9 r 3 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
33
 Annexure 9 r 5. 
34
 Annexure 9 r 7. 
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or unintentional breaches of social obligations are susceptible to gentle reprimand 
and friendly admonition, but more serious offences and chronic offenders might 
cause grave disharmony.35  Therefore, to obtain peace and harmony, the Act, the 
model management and conduct rules and the common law neighbour law principles 
impose certain obligations which restrict a sectional owner‟s use and enjoyment of 
his section, exclusive use area as well as the common property, and penalise any 
contraventions.  In addition the developer and the body corporate may also amend 
the model management and conduct rules or enact special rules to cover specific 
matters pertaining to a particular scheme.36   
 
At present many sectional title schemes find themselves in a chaotic financial 
position.  The main reasons for financial instability are, firstly, that some sectional 
owners find themselves in financial difficulty and therefore are unable to pay their 
regular monthly levies and, secondly, because of a recent tendency for some 
sectional owners to refuse to pay levies.37  Such defaulters fail to recognise the 
financial obligations of communal living and see the body corporate as an alien body 
to which no allegiance is owed.  Consequently, the financial affairs of these bodies 
corporate become chaotic which clearly indicates that the margin for allowing arrears 
in levies is extremely narrow.38  At the end of the day one wants to avoid a situation 
where the sectional owners can be held personally liable for the debts of the body 
corporate.39 
 
In South Africa the problem of diminished funding facing bodies corporate has also 
become part of a larger socio-economic problem.  In order to bring home ownership 
within reach of the emerging middle class, a high percentage of mortgage credit is 
supplied by financial institutions (mostly banks) knowing that, most often, employers 
automatically credit mortgage repayments to the account of the mortgage creditor.  
The owners are, however, not made aware of their financial obligations resulting in 
the fact that they do not account for it in their financial planning.  The unfortunate 
                                                          
35
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-3. 
36
 In terms of ss 35(2)(a) and (b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management 
Act 8 of 2011 ss 10(2)(a) and (b)). 
37
 See H Delport “Sectional Title Unit Owners‟ Liability for Payment of Body Corporate‟s Debts” (2005) 26-2 
Obiter 404 404-405 for more specific reasons why sectional owners do not pay their levies. 
38
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-5. 
39
 S 47 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 15)). 
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result is that, although mortgage repayments are up to date, arrear contributions and 
charges owed to the body corporate remain unpaid from the outset and the amount 
of these charges increase from month to month thus creating a spiralling effect.  
Consequently, bodies corporate struggle to perform their maintenance and 
administration functions properly.  The only way to enable these bodies corporate to 
perform their functions is thus to depend on the willingness of the non-defaulting 
sectional owners to contribute more to cover the shortfalls.  This financial 
interdependence can lead to the deterioration of the buildings and eventually slum 
conditions in the building and surrounding areas, where financial institutions are no 
longer prepared to grant loans.  In the interest of all involved in sectional title 
schemes it is, therefore, important that bodies corporate act swiftly and decisively 
against levy defaulters.  Sectional owners should also be warned of the 
consequences of their failure to pay necessary contributions.40 
 
Furthermore, despite the numerous social obligations mentioned above sectional title 
living still triggers aggression and rage in South Africa today.  There are reports that 
vehicles have been scratched or even set alight; a young man shot dead in a 
disagreement with a neighbour; pets have been poisoned; and gunshots fired.41  
Assaults are also on the increase and people of all ages are abused both 
emotionally and physically.  A more subtle form of harassment is becoming common.  
For example, to take revenge on an annoying neighbour, stairs are stomped loudly 
or furniture is moved around during all hours of the day.  Moreover, some sectional 
owners even invite as many of their unruly friends as possible to a private party 
which goes on till late at night.42 
 
From the above, it is evident and somewhat alarming to see that non-compliance 
with financial and social obligations by sectional owners is a common occurrence in 
the South African sectional title context.  Consequently, due to the fact that non-
compliance with these obligations can destroy the financial stability and social 
harmony of a sectional title development, effective procedures for their enforcement 
                                                          
40
 See Body Corporate of Geovy Villa v Sheriff, Pretoria Central Magistrate’s Court, and Another 2003 1 SA 69 
(T) paras 6 and 7 and Van der Merwe & Muňis Argüelles (2006) Duke Journal of  Comparative and 
International Law 126-127. 
41
 M Constas “Sectional Title Rage” (March 2008) 3-3 Paddocks Press Newsletter 1 4. 
42
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-32(1) – 9-33 and Constas (March 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 4. 
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are essential.  Therefore, the implementation of effective sanctions is a sine qua non 
for a viable and harmonious sectional title scheme.43 
 
1 3 Research hypotheses and methodology 
 
The main research hypothesis is that strict compliance by sectional owners with 
financial and social obligations is essential for the maintenance of the common 
property, the preservation of the physical features of the building or buildings, the 
preservation of the harmonious appearance of the scheme from the outside and the 
preservation of the social harmony within a sectional title scheme.  Ultimately, the 
smooth governance of sectional title schemes will depend on effective procedures 
for the enforcement of the financial and social obligations imposed on sectional 
owners.  This thesis will, however, highlight the fact that the sanctions provided for in 
the Act, the model rules and the common law concept of nuisance are limited and 
mostly fall short in enforcing these obligations in practice.  Therefore, it is generally 
accepted that the Act does not have teeth that are sharp enough to deal effectively 
with non-compliance with financial and social obligations in sectional title schemes.44 
  
Financial instability and conflict in sectional title schemes can, however, be avoided 
by giving the Act sharper teeth to enforce sectional owners‟ financial and social 
obligations.  This can be done by following a simple three step approach.  Firstly, the 
importance of these obligations in the sectional title scheme context must never be 
underestimated.  Secondly, the various financial and social obligations must be 
properly identified and understood and their weaknesses must be recognised in 
order to make valuable remarks for its rectification.  Finally, there must be efficient 
and effective procedures for the enforcement of these obligations in order to achieve 
the financial stability and social harmony envisaged by the imposition of these 
obligations.  I am strongly of the opinion that the measures of enforcement contained 
in the Act, the model rules and the common law concept of nuisance are not 
sufficiently robust to achieve the results envisaged by the imposition of these 
obligations.  To rectify this weakness comparative studies will be conducted to 
suggest alternative sanctions to solve this problem.   
                                                          
43
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-7. 
44
 9-39. 
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Legislation that will feature most constantly is the Act.  The Act was amended by the 
Sectional Titles Amendment Act 66 of 1991; the Sectional Titles Amendment Act 7 of 
1992; the Sectional Titles Amendment Act 15 of 1993; the Sectional Titles 
Amendment Act 44 of 1997; the Sectional Titles Amendment Act 29 of 2003; the 
Sectional Titles Amendment Act 7 of 2005; and lastly the Sectional Titles 
Amendment Act 11 of 2010.  However, over the years complaints were made about 
the operation and management of sectional title schemes, tardy collection of levies, 
unfair allocation of levies and unsuitable rules promulgated for schemes.  In 2004 the 
Department of Land Affairs, therefore, appointed consultants with the following remit: 
to separate the provisions of the Act which pertain to registration and survey matters 
from those that pertain to governance and administration matters and to propose a 
mechanism for the resolution of disputes in sectional title schemes.  This eventually 
led to the promulgation of the Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 
(the STSMA), which separated registration and management matters by repealing 
the management provisions of the Act and re-enacting these provisions in the 
STSMA, as well as the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011 (the 
CSOSA) which introduced a new dispute resolution mechanism to replace arbitration 
in terms of the Act.45  Both these acts will be administered by the Department of 
Human Settlements, formerly the Department of Housing, and will only come into 
operation at a date fixed by the President by proclamation in the Government 
Gazette which will necessarily be after regulations under these acts have been 
enacted.46  Even though the latter two acts are not yet in force I will constantly refer 
to them in order to indicate the most important differences with the Act, as well as to 
identify what the position in the near future will be. 
 
As mentioned above, this thesis will also be based on comparative studies.  The 
foreign jurisdiction that will feature most frequently is the Australian state of New 
South Wales.  The position in New South Wales is of utmost importance as South 
Africa has modelled its sectional titles legislation on the New South Wales‟ 
                                                          
45
 Annexure 8 r 71 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 sets out the procedure to be followed for the statutory 
arbitration in sectional title schemes. 
46
 See in general Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 1-44 – 1-45 and CG Van der Merwe “Third Generation 
Sectional Titles” (2012) 4 TSAR 611 611-612 . 
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Conveyancing (Strata Titles) Act 17 of 1961.47  It is also important to note that the 
New South Wales legislator has divided its strata title legislation into two separate 
acts, with one act dealing with survey and land registration matters while another act 
focuses on the management of strata schemes (sectional title schemes).48  The 
United States of America‟s Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act of 2008 (the 
UCIOA) will also feature constantly as an example of modern sophisticated 
legislation stemming from a first world country.  It will be suggested that some salient 
solutions provided in the UCIOA could be transplanted into the South African 
legislation.  These foreign jurisdictions (and others not mentioned above) will only be 
referred to when they are relevant to the position in South Africa and when they offer 
alternative solutions and sanctions that may render the enforcement of financial and 
social obligations more efficient and effective. 
 
1 4 Chapter overview 
 
The thesis consists of eight chapters.  This introductory chapter gave us a general 
background of sectional ownership and its practical importance in South Africa.  
Furthermore, it explained the objectives of the dissertation, the methodology which 
will be used to achieve the objectives, the reason why comparative studies are 
undertaken and a brief discussion of the arrangement of the chapters, which will be 
set out and explained below. 
 
Chapter 2 will focus on the basic concepts that will form the foundation of this 
thesis.49  The aim is to give the reader an overview of the most important concepts 
that will be encountered in the discussion of the financial and social obligations of a 
sectional owner and their enforcement, in order to avoid a detailed discussion of 
these concepts in later chapters which will interrupt the flow of the thesis.  These 
concepts include the following:  sectional ownership versus land ownership;50 the 
                                                          
47
 This Act was repealed and replaced by the New South Wales Strata Titles Act 68 of 1973.  The latter Act was 
renamed the Strata Schemes (Freehold Development) Act 68 of 1973 which, together with the Strata Schemes 
(Leasehold Development) Act 219 of 1986, deals with development related matters pertaining to schemes in 
New South Wales.  Management and dispute resolution mechanisms in schemes are dealt with in the Strata 
Schemes Management Act 138 of 1996. 
48
 Strata schemes are now regulated in New South Wales by the Strata Schemes (Freehold Development) Act 68 
of 1973 and the Strata Schemes Management Act 138 of 1996. 
49
 See 2 2 below.  
50
 See 2 2 1 below. 
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threefold legal relationship the purchaser enters into when a unit is transferred to 
him;51 a „unit‟, „section‟, „common property‟ and „exclusive use areas‟;52 „sectional 
owner‟;53 „participation quota‟;54 „rules‟;55 sectional title community;56 and the levy or 
contribution owed by sectional owners to the body corporate.57  In unpacking these 
concepts, the way each concept fits into the general theme of the thesis will also be 
explained.  As part of this search for underlying principles, the content and purpose 
of relevant legislation, namely the Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act 6 
of 2004 (the Property Rates Act) and the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 
32 of 2000 (the Systems Act) will be explored as well as the impact these acts have, 
particularly on the financial obligations of sectional owners.58 
 
Chapter 3 deals with sectional owners‟ financial obligations in sectional title 
schemes.  The chapter will start off with a discussion of the contributions to the 
administrative fund59 and the mandatory reserve fund in terms of section 3(1)(b) of 
the STSMA.60  We have already seen above, at 1 2, that sectional owners are 
responsible for the payment of different kinds of levies, namely: ordinary levies;61 
special levies;62 and additional levies.63  The difference between these kinds of 
levies will be discussed and analysed64 before detailing when contributions become 
payable and who is responsible for the payment of levies when a unit is transferred 
to a purchaser.65  It shall also be shown that besides the payment of levies owners 
are also personally liable for the debts of the body corporate.66  Lastly, the chapter 
will endeavour to answer whether aggrieved sectional owners may withhold the 
                                                          
51
 See 2 2 2 below. 
52
 See 2 2 3 below. 
53
 See 2 2 4 below. 
54
 See 2 2 5 below. 
55
 See 2 2 6 below. 
56
 See 2 2 7 below. 
57
 See 2 2 8 below. 
58
 See 2 3 below. 
59
 S 37(1)(a) of the Sectional  Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
3(1)(a)). 
60
 See 3 2 below. 
61
 S 37(2) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 3(2)).   
62 Annexure 8 r 31(4B) and ss 37(2A) and (2B) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles 
Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 3(3)). 
63
 S 37(1)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
3(1)(c)). 
64
 See 3 2 and 3 3 below.  
65
 See 3 4 below. 
66
 See 3 5 below. 
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payment of levies67 and whether they are entitled to a refund of contributions lawfully 
levied upon them and paid.68 
 
The lesser measures for the enforcement of financial obligations will then be the 
topic of discussion in chapter 4.69  These measures include the following: levies and 
special levies are recoverable in court;70 the defaulting owner is held responsible for 
all costs of recovery71 and interest on arrears;72 suspension of voting rights of 
defaulting owners;73 an embargo on nomination and election as trustee;74 an 
embargo on the alienation of a unit unless all arrears have been paid;75 attachment 
of movables and rental income of the defaulter;76 emolument attachment orders, 
garnishee orders and administration orders issued;77 and sequestration of the 
defaulter.78  The chapter will illustrate that some of these measures are moderately 
successful in forcing solvent defaulters to pay their contributions but that most of 
them have been proved unsuccessful in practice.  Consequently, this chapter will 
also consider whether the Act should not be strengthened to enforce the financial 
obligations imposed on sectional owners.  For this reason I will make suggestions, 
partly based on comparative studies.79 
 
Chapter 5 will deal with the most severe measure for the enforcement of sectional 
owners‟ financial obligations, namely the attachment and sale in execution of 
sectional title units.  One of the crucial questions in this regard is whether the 
embargo provision in section 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) of the Act, which restrains the registrar 
from registering transfer of a unit until the conveyancer produces a clearance 
certificate, can be construed as a tacit lien, charge or preferent right in favour of the 
body corporate, effectively ranking the body corporate higher than that of the 
                                                          
67
 See 3 6 below. 
68
 See 3 7 below. 
69
 See 4 2 below. 
70
 See 4 2 1 below. 
71
 See 4 2 2 below. 
72
 See 4 2 3 below. 
73
 See 4 2 4 below. 
74
 See 4 2 5 below. 
75
 See 4 2 6 below. 
76
 See 4 2 7 below. 
77
 See 4 2 8 below. 
78
 See 4 2 9 below. 
79
 See 4 3 below 
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mortgagee.80  The chapter will further illustrate that there are certain obstacles that 
await the mortgage creditor when it comes to the attachment and sale in execution of 
sectional title units.81  In this regard I shall examine the constitutionality of the 
execution procedure against mortgaged units in terms of section 66(1)(a) of the 
Magistrates‟ Courts Act 32 of 1944 and rule 45(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court,82 as 
well as the impact of the application of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and 
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (PIE) to mortgaged units that are sold in 
execution.83  Lastly, the relationship between the clearance certificate under section 
15B(3)(b) of the Act, and section 118 of the Systems Act and the Property Rates Act 
will be examined.84 
 
In chapter 6 the focus of the thesis will shift to the social obligations that are imposed 
on sectional owners with regard to their sections, exclusive use areas and the 
common property.85  We shall see that these social obligations are partly based on 
common law neighbour law principles86 but that they mostly stem from the provisions 
of the Act and the prescribed model rules.  It shall also be shown that even though 
the Act forms the basis of a sectional title scheme, it is mainly the management and 
conduct rules that determine how the sectional owner must behave.  Furthermore, 
we shall see that some flexibility is to be found in the ability to amend the prescribed 
rules with special rules which place further obligations on a sectional owner‟s use 
and enjoyment of his section, exclusive use area and the common property.  The 
chapter will then conclude with the argument that social obligations are essential to 
preserve the tranquility and harmony of a sectional title scheme in view of the 
peculiar physical features of the building and the unique community of owners 
gathered almost permanently within the confines of the scheme.87 
 
                                                          
80
 See 5 2 below.  See also in general CG Van der Merwe “Does the restraint on transfer provision in the 
Sectional Titles Act accord sufficient preference to the body corporate for outstanding levies” (1996) 59 THRHR 
367 367-387 ; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-11; and Badenhorst et al The Law of Property 488.    
81
 See 5 3 below. 
82
 See 5 3 2 below. 
83
 See 5 3 3 below. 
84
 See 5 4 below. 
85
 See 6 2 and 6 3 below. 
86
 See 6 4 below. 
87
 See 6 5 below. 
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Although the saying goes „rules are there to be broken‟, non-compliance with the 
various social obligations can destroy the physical features of the building or 
buildings, the harmonious appearance of  the scheme as well as the social harmony 
of a sectional title scheme.  The ability to address non-compliance requires effective 
measures for enforcing owners‟ social obligations.88  This will be the focus of chapter 
7.  Firstly, the special sanctions provided for in the model rules of Annexure 8 and 9 
will be under discussion.89  Secondly, the remedies available outside the confines of 
the Act will be dealt with.90  Here we shall reflect on the use of interdicts to prevent 
disturbances in breach of social obligations.91  We shall also tackle the question as 
to whether or not it is possible to obtain an eviction order against a sectional owner 
who persistently contravenes the social obligations of a particular scheme.92  This 
section will then conclude with a brief examination of the rarely used remedy to keep 
the peace in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955.93  Thirdly, we shall 
examine the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms available in South 
Africa to solve disputes arising from non-compliance with social obligations.94  The 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms that will be discussed include 
negotiation,95 conciliation,96 arbitration97, mediation98 and the new and exciting 
sectional title ombud dispute resolution service which is governed by the CSOSA.99  
From our discussion it will become evident that the sanctions contained in the model 
rules and remedies outside the confines of the Act provide the body corporate with 
even less effective sanctions than is the case with the enforcement of the financial 
obligations.  This chapter will therefore also focus on sanctions that are used in 
foreign jurisdictions to enforce owners‟ social obligations, with the aim being to 
identify alternative sanctions that may be adopted in the South African context to 
render the enforcement of social obligations more efficient and effective.100  The 
comparative study will evaluate the efficiency of various minor sanctions in 
                                                          
88
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-7.  
89
 See 7 2 below. 
90
 See 7 3 below. 
91
 See 7 3 2 below. 
92
 See 7 3 3 below. 
93
 See 7 3 4 below. 
94
 See 7 4 below. 
95
 See 7 4 2 below. 
96
 See 7 4 3 below. 
97
 See 7 4 4 below. 
98
 See 7 4 5 below. 
99
 See 7 4 6 below. 
100
 See 7 5 below. 
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legislation and in model or amended by-laws and rules of a particular sectional title 
scheme101 and conclude with an analysis of two more drastic remedies based on the 
principle that the only manner in which harmony can be restored in a troubled 
sectional title scheme is to exclude a constant offender permanently102 or 
temporarily103 from the scheme. 
 
The concluding chapter, chapter 8, will consist of a critical analysis of the legislation, 
case law and academic analysis in the legal literature discussed in each of the 
chapters.  The conclusion will, however, mainly focus on the argument that the Act 
should be given more effective mechanisms of recourse to enforce the financial and 
social obligations imposed on sectional owners.  The main argument will be that the 
possibility of temporary exclusion, due to its deterrent character, provides the most 
effective measure for the enforcement of financial and social obligations in sectional 
title schemes. 
 
1 5 Value of research 
 
The thesis will prove to be novel and original and will constitute a significant 
contribution to knowledge in this field since it will provide clarity on the financial and 
social obligations imposed on sectional title owners.  Secondly, it will identify 
problem areas in this sphere of the law and show how important it is for the efficient 
running of sectional title schemes that these financial and social obligations are 
understood, and enforced efficiently and effectively.  Lastly, this thesis will also 
identify alternative sanctions that are used in foreign jurisdictions, which may be 
incorporated in the South African sectional title context, to give the Act greater ability 
to successfully enforce these obligations.  Therefore, I believe that this thesis would 
not only make a contribution to the academic field of sectional titles, but that it may 
also provide food for thought for the legislator.  The thesis will also provide attorneys 
and other legal practitioners, managing agents and trustees with valuable 
information and guidelines to identify and solve sectional title issues pertaining to the 
enforcement of the financial and social obligations of sectional owners.
                                                          
101
 See 7 5 2 below. 
102
 See 7 5 3 2 below. 
103
 See 7 5 3 3 below. 
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Chapter 2:  Basic Concepts and Relevant Legislation 
 
2 1 Introduction 
 
Any useful discussion of this topic requires a proper understanding of the following 
basic concepts: sectional ownership versus land ownership; the threefold legal 
relationship the purchaser enters into when a unit is transferred to him; a „unit‟, 
„section‟, „common property‟ and „exclusive use areas‟; „sectional owner‟; 
„participation quota‟; „rules‟; sectional title community; and the levy or contribution 
owed by sectional owners to the body corporate.   
 
The aim of this chapter is therefore to give an overview of the most important 
concepts that will be encountered in the discussion of the financial and social 
obligations of a sectional owner and their enforcement.  This will avoid a detailed 
discussion of these concepts in later chapters which will interrupt the flow of the 
thesis.  In unpacking these concepts, the way each concept fits into the general 
theme of the thesis will be explained.  The examination of underlying principles will 
include an investigation of the content and purpose of other relevant legislation, 
namely the Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act 6 of 2004 (the Property 
Rates Act) and the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (the 
Systems Act), to show the impact these acts have, particularly on the financial 
obligations of sectional owners.         
 
2 2 Basic concepts 
 
2 2 1 Sectional ownership versus land ownership  
 
Sectional ownership differs from traditional land ownership.  Land ownership 
involves a vertical division of land into farms or erven according to a general plan or 
an ordinary sub divisional diagram, while sectional ownership involves a three-
dimensional vertical and horizontal division of the sectional title land and the building 
into sections and common property according to a sectional plan.  Furthermore, the 
boundaries of erven on ordinary diagrams are defined with reference to beacons and 
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co-ordinates while boundaries on a sectional plan are defined with reference to parts 
of buildings, namely: walls; floors; and ceilings.1  The Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 
(the Act) does, however, allow for boundaries to be defined in a manner „prescribed‟ 
where they cannot be defined by a physical feature such as a floor, wall or ceiling.2   
 
According to the traditional definition of ownership an owner is allowed absolute 
powers in dealing with his property.  An owner‟s absolute powers are, however, 
subject to the limitations imposed by public and private law.  Therefore, modern 
ownership does not allow an owner unfettered freedom to use and enjoy his 
property.3  Even land ownership is much less absolute than in the past due to 
restrictions imposed mainly by modern planning and environmental law and the 
constitutional limitations placed on the ownership of land.4   
 
Furthermore, certain peculiar features of sectional ownership merit the imposition not 
only of stricter social obligations on a sectional owner but also social obligations of a 
different kind.  Put differently, these features justify more intensive restrictions on the 
powers and entitlements of a sectional owner with regard to his section, exclusive 
use area and the common property.  These peculiar features include the following.  
Firstly, the object of sectional ownership is title to a part of a destructible building, 
whereas, the object of land ownership is title to a part of indestructible land.  
Secondly, the various apartments in a sectional title building are structurally 
interdependent and not structurally individualised as in the case of freestanding 
houses on separate plots of land.  Thirdly, community life in a sectional title scheme 
is much more intensified compared to the community life of neighbouring 
landowners.  Lastly, sectional owners form a virtually permanent community which is 
only terminated on the dissolution of the sectional title scheme.5  Although this might 
                                                          
1
 CG Van der Merwe & JC Sonnekus Sectional Titles, Share Blocks and Time-Sharing Volume 1 Sectional 
Titles (Service Issue 16 May 2013) 5-3.    
2
 S 5(5)(a) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
3
 For a discussion of how sectional ownership changed common law ownership see PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar 
& H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5ed (2006) 445-446.   
4
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-21. 
5
 For the various peculiar features of sectional ownership see Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-21 and CG Van 
der Merwe “The Adaptation of the Institution of Apartment Ownership to Civilian Property Law Structures in 
the Mixed Jurisdictions of South Africa, Sri Lanka and Louisiana” (2008) 19 Stell LR 298 307.   
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imply a special type of ownership it still remains genuine ownership and therefore 
sectional ownership should be placed on the same footing as the ownership of land.6   
There are two further reasons why sectional ownership should be treated as genuine 
ownership and not merely as a limited real right.  Firstly, when draconian provisions, 
contained in the rules of a sectional title scheme, are incompatible with genuine 
ownership of an apartment, the courts should always have the power to invalidate 
such provisions.  Secondly, one of the main reasons for introducing sectional 
ownership was to satisfy the psychological and social needs of people to have their 
own homes.  If sectional ownership and land ownership are not placed on the same 
level, this aim will be defeated.7   
 
2 2 2 Threefold legal relationship 
 
For a clearer understanding of the rights and obligations of sectional owners who are 
part of a sectional title community, it is important to explain the threefold legal 
relationship a sectional owner enters into when he is registered as a sectional owner 
of a unit in a scheme.8 
 
Registration of a unit in the sectional titles register in the name of a particular person 
means that he becomes owner of the relevant section (residential or commercial), 
joint owner in undivided co-ownership shares with the other sectional owners of the 
common parts of the scheme9 and a member of the body corporate consisting of all 
the persons in whose names units are registered.10  All three of the abovementioned 
elements are inextricably linked in the institution of sectional ownership.   
 
These elements cannot be disposed of separately which means it is impossible to 
sever and alienate one‟s share in the common property while retaining ownership of 
a section and membership of the body corporate.11  Therefore, these elements can 
                                                          
6
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-21 - 8-22.   
7
 8-22. 
8
 See in general Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 2-3; Badenhorst et al The Law of Property 442-443; and Van 
der Merwe (2008) Stell LR 311.   
9
 S 2(c) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
10
 Ss 36(1) and (2) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 
ss 2(1)-(3)). 
11
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 2-3. 
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only be alienated, burdened or otherwise dealt with as an entity.12  Furthermore, the 
fact that they are inextricably linked means that these elements naturally have a 
reciprocal influence on each other.13 
 
Individual ownership of a section and joint ownership of the common parts of the 
premises pertain to the law of property while membership of the body corporate falls 
under the law of associations.  However, we have seen, at 2 2 1, that sectional 
ownership is a unique statutory institution with its own peculiar characteristics which 
means that it would inevitably be in conflict with some of the traditional dogmas and 
principles relating to the law of things14 and the law of associations.15  
 
Various financial and social obligations are placed on sectional owners, not only with 
regard to their sections but also with regard to the common property.  Furthermore, 
bodies corporate determine the amount of money to be raised yearly16 for the 
efficient maintenance and management of the common property.  Due to the fact 
that sectional owners automatically become members of bodies corporate upon 
registration of their units, they are not only liable to pay their proportionate 
contribution but are also required to ratify, with or without amendment, the annual 
financial estimates prepared by the trustees. 
 
2 2 3 Unit, section, common property and exclusive use areas 
 
It is important to explain how the physical parts of the land and buildings in a 
sectional title scheme are divided into units, sections, common property and 
exclusive use areas.  The distinction between sections and common property is 
important because a sectional owner is in general allowed more entitlements with 
regard to his section than with regard to the common property.  Again, a sectional 
                                                          
12
 Ss 16(3) and 36(2) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
13
 CG Van der Merwe “Apartment Ownership” in International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law Vol VI 
“Property and Trust” (1994) s 5-48 and Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 2-3. 
14
 For a detailed discussion of the main differences between traditional co-ownership and the community of the 
common parts of the sectional title scheme see Van der Merwe (2008) Stell LR 309-310.  See also in general 
Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 2-3 – 2-4 and Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership s 5-49. 
15
 For an explanation of the differences between membership of the body corporate and ordinary voluntary 
associations see Van der Merwe (2008) Stell LR 312.  See also in general Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 2-3 – 
2-4 and Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership s 5-49. 
16
 S 37(1)(c) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
3(1)(e)). 
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owner is responsible for the repair and maintenance of his section,17 while all the 
owners have to contribute to the administrative fund to repair and maintain the 
common property in a good condition.18  The distinction between common property 
and exclusive use areas is also important for our purpose due to the fact that 
although exclusive use areas are considered part of the common property, the 
holders of exclusive use areas are responsible for the maintenance of the areas 
under their control19 and to keep these areas in a clean and neat condition.20 
 
The most important entity created by the Act is called a unit.21  From the outset it is 
important to note that a unit should not be confused with a section.22  A unit is a 
composite entity consisting of a section together with its undivided share in the 
common property, apportioned in accordance with the participation quota of the 
section.23  In addition to the creation of this new kind of composite entity, the Act has 
also created a new kind of composite ownership consisting of the ownership of a 
section combined with a co-ownership share in the common property.24  If one, 
therefore, uses the expression „the owner of a section‟ one must remember that this 
must be combined with the co-ownership share in the common property to indicate 
the composite kind of ownership with which the unit is owned.25  
 
As mentioned above, at 2 2 2, the component parts of a unit are indivisible.26  This 
entails that legal transactions encompass the entire unit and, therefore, separate 
transactions cannot normally be concluded in respect of the section and its undivided 
share in the common property.27  The two components may not, for example, be sold 
                                                          
17
 S 44(1)(c) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
13(1)(c)). 
18
 S 37(1)(a) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
3(1)(a)). 
19
 S 37(1)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
3(1)(c)).  
20
 S 44(1)(c) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
13(1)(c)). 
21
 CG Van der Merwe “The Sectional Titles Act in the light of the Uniform Condominium Act” (1987) 20 
CILSA 1 4. 
22
 T Maree Sectional Titles on Tap Volume 1 2ed (2006) 2.3. 
23
 S 1(1) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 sv “unit”. 
24
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 1-30(14).  
25
 G Paddock Sectional Title Survival Manual 6ed (2008) 1-2 – 1-3. 
26
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-3. 
27
 S 16(3) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986.    
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or mortgaged separately28 and the insured value of a section is deemed to cover its 
share in the common property.29  
 
Furthermore, the Act treats a unit in the same way it does a parcel of „land‟30 and no 
longer as „land and urban immovable property‟ as was the situation under the 
Sectional Titles Act 66 of 1971 (the old Act).  Units are now deemed to be land and, 
therefore, ownership of a unit can be registered in a deeds registry; which means 
that the Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1937 and regulations now apply mutatis 
mutandis inter alia with regard to the filing and registering of documents, save as 
otherwise provided in the Act, any other law or if the context indicates otherwise.31  
Furthermore, when it comes to the sale of units, including instalments sales, the 
Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 will also be applicable.32  
 
A section is the separate and private property of a registered sectional owner in a 
sectional title scheme.33  The Act simply and formalistically defines a section as „a 
section shown as such on a sectional plan‟.34  This means that each section in a 
sectional title scheme is the section as indicated on the sectional plan with reference 
to its floors, walls and ceilings and distinguished by a separate number.35  The 
sectional plan must also show the floor area of each section to the median line of its 
boundary walls.36  Moreover, it is expressly provided that the common boundary 
between any two sections or between a section and the common property is the 
median line of the dividing floors, walls or ceilings as the case may be.37  Therefore, 
a section can be defined as a cubic entity which is formed by the walls, floors and 
ceilings of a residential section or non-residential unit, with the median lines of the 
                                                          
28
 Maree Sectional Titles on Tap 2.4. 
29
 S 16(4) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
30
 S 3(4). 
31
 S 3(1).   
32
 See s 1 of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981.  See also Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-4.  
33
 Maree Sectional Titles on Tap 2.1. 
34
 S 1(1) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 sv “section”.  
35
 S 5(3)(d). 
36
 S 5(3)(e). 
37
 S 5(4). 
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floors and ceilings forming the horizontal and the walls forming the vertical 
boundaries of the section.38 
 
Apart from these main components sections can include an adjoining stoep, porch, 
balcony, atrium or projection if shown as part of the section on the sectional plan.39  
Furthermore, a section can also consist of parts of the building or buildings which are 
not contiguous to the main components of a section.40  Examples of such non-
contiguous parts of the building or buildings may include rooms such as laundries, 
storerooms, domestic aid‟s quarters or garages which are not in close proximity to 
the main component.41  The Act, however, requires that these parts must be 
accorded the same number as the sections to which they belong.42  The aim of this 
requirement is to achieve clarity with regard to the exact boundaries of a particular 
unit and its constituent parts.43 
 
It is important to note that even though a section is the exclusive and private property 
of the registered sectional owner there are still limitations that apply to this 
ownership.  Furthermore, the limitations that are placed on private ownership in 
terms of neighbour law apply more rigorously when it comes to sectional title 
property.  This is not only because of the close proximity in which sectional owners 
live, but also because the conduct of a sectional owner is subject to the provisions of 
the Act and the rules of the scheme.44 
 
The floor area of a residential section is used for calculating the participation quotas 
of sectional owners, which then again determines the levies payable by them.45  
There are also various social obligations that are placed on sectional owners with 
regard to their sections.46  These social obligations are set out in the common law 
doctrine of nuisance, the Act and the prescribed model rules. 
                                                          
38
 CG Van der Merwe & M Habdas “Polish Apartment Ownership Compared with South African Sectional 
Titles” (2006) 17 Stell LR 165 170.  
39
 S 5(5)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
40
 S 5(6). 
41
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-10(2).  See also Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership s 5-120. 
42
 S 5(6)) and reg 5(1)(k)(iii) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
43
 Van der Merwe & Habdas (2006) Stell LR 170. 
44
 Maree Sectional Titles on Tap 2.2. 
45
 For the different kinds of levies see 3 2 and 3 3 below. 
46
 See 6 2 below. 
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Common property can be defined either inclusively or exclusively.  An inclusive 
definition enumerates the corporeal parts of the scheme while an exclusive definition 
includes all parts of the scheme except those physical parts which form part of a 
section.47 
 
The Act follows the exclusive definition by providing that the term common property 
comprises the land included in the scheme; the physical parts of the building that do 
not form part of a section; and the land referred to in section 26.48  
 
All land included in the scheme is part of the common property.  Thus the soil 
underneath the building, the land that still needs to be developed and the air space 
around and above the building would be part of the common property.49  
Furthermore, all improvements on the land, excluding sections, but including 
exclusive use areas are also classified as common property.50  More than one piece 
of land may be included in a scheme, and, in the case of two or more pieces of land, 
the different pieces can be non-contiguous provided that the building or buildings to 
be divided into sections must be situated on the same piece of land, or, in the case 
of more than one piece of land, such pieces must be contiguous and notarially tied in 
the applicable deeds registry.51  
 
Common property also consists of such parts of the building or buildings as are not 
included in a section.  These parts normally comprise of the outer shell of 
sectionalised buildings including roofs and foundations; all means of access to 
sections such as entrances, lifts, stairways and passages; installations for common 
services; and separate buildings if shown as common property on the sectional 
plan.52   
 
                                                          
47
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-11. 
48
 S 1(1) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 sv “common property”. 
49
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-11 – 3-12. 
50
 Maree Sectional Titles on Tap 2.4.  Examples of these improvements can include courtyards, plants, parking 
areas, gardens, lawns, drying yards and special recreational facilities such as swimming pools, tennis courts and 
children‟s playground.  See in general Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-12. 
51
 S 4(2) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
52
 CG Van der Merwe “The South African Sectional Titles Act Compared with the Singapore Land Titles 
(Strata) Act” (1999) Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 134 144. 
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Lastly, the Act states that land referred to in section 26 is also part of the common 
property.  This section deals with the extension of schemes by the addition of land to 
the common property, initially to provide amenities and facilities to the members of 
the scheme but since 199753 also for the erection of sectionalised buildings by the 
body corporate.54  This section creates an anomaly in land registration practice due 
to the fact that the additional land is acquired by the body corporate with the written 
consent of all the sectional owners, but is then registered in the name of the body 
corporate.  This is only for registration purposes as the additional land is still deemed 
to be owned by the owners in undivided shares proportionate to their participation 
quotas.55       
 
Common property can, thus, simply be defined as all the land on which the building 
or buildings are situated, together with such parts of the building or buildings which 
are not included in a section.56  Consequently, common property consists of the parts 
of a sectional title scheme that cannot be exclusively owned by one person 
individually.  This requires common property to be jointly co-owned in undivided 
abstract shares by all the owners of sections in a scheme.57  
 
We shall see that apart from the financial and social obligations imposed on 
sectional owners with regard to their sections, the Act and the prescribed model 
rules, as supplemented, also impose financial and social obligations58 on sectional 
owners with regard to the common property in the scheme.    
 
The Act defines an exclusive use area as a part or parts of the common property 
destined for the exclusive use by the owner or owners of one or more than one 
section.59  Although the Act allows for exclusive use areas to be allocated to one or 
more owners, in South African practice they are most frequently only allocated to 
one owner.  Exclusive use areas are usually utilised to provide some or all the 
                                                          
53
 See s 19(a) of the Sectional Titles Amendment Act 44 of 1997. 
54
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-13. 
55
 Ss 26(1) and (2) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 
ss 5(1)(d) and 5(2)).  Furthermore, see GJ Pienaar Sectional Titles and other Fragmented Property Schemes 
(2010) 70-72 for criticism of this anomaly. 
56
 S 1(1) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 sv “common property”.  
57
 Paddock Sectional Title Survival Manual 1-2. 
58
 See 6 3 below. 
59
 S 1(1) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 sv “exclusive use areas”.  
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sectional owners with exclusive parking or garden areas, which are carved out of the 
common property of the scheme.60  These areas are indicated on the block plan or 
the relevant floor plans of the sectional plan depending on whether they are situated 
on the land or in a part of a building which forms part of the common property.61    
 
The holders of these exclusive use rights can thus freely use areas of the common 
property to the exclusion of all other owners.  But this does not, however, mean that 
the body corporate is deprived of its control over the common property where 
exclusive use has been created.  The administration and control of exclusive use 
areas is one of the most intricate spheres of body corporate management.62 
 
Firstly, so-called registered exclusive use areas can be created as independent real 
rights by describing it as such in the sectional plan.  Secondly, so-called rule-based 
exclusive use areas can be created as personal rights by including it in the rules of 
the scheme.63  The uncertainty as to whether both the management and conduct 
rules could be utilised to create rule-based exclusive use areas was clarified by 
section 10(7) of the Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011(the 
STSMA) that stated either the management or the conduct rules may be used for 
this purpose.  Besides the latter examples of exclusive use areas there are also so 
called „historic‟ exclusive use areas created contractually or by an amendment of the 
rules under the old Act.64  These are the only ways in which exclusive use areas can 
be created; they cannot be established informally.65   
 
As independent real rights, registered exclusive use areas can either be reserved as 
such by the developer on registration of the sectional plan or even thereafter but 
prior to the establishment of the body corporate, and then transferred by unilateral 
                                                          
60
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-13. 
61
 Regs 5(2)(b)(vi) and 5(2)(c)(viii) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
62
 H Mostert “The Regulation of Exclusive Use Areas in terms of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986: An 
Evaluation of the Existing Position and Suggested Alternatives” (1997) 8 Stell LR 324 325. 
63
 Ss 27 and 27A of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986.  
64
 The validity of „historic‟ exclusive use areas are recognised by ss 60(4) and 60A of the Sectional Titles Act 95 
of 1986.  Ss 60(3) and 60A(3) then provides a mechanism by which „historic‟ exclusive use rights may be 
converted to independent real rights.   
65
 Maree Sectional Titles on Tap 2.5. 
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cession to some or all individual owners,66 or it can be created by unanimous 
resolution of the body corporate and allocated to some or all the sectional owners.67     
The sectional plan must clearly indicate the purpose for which the exclusive use 
areas would be used68 and these areas must be numbered in a unique way.69  
Exclusive use areas may also be transferred from one owner to another owner in the 
scheme, but not to outsiders.70  
 
For the purpose of this thesis it is important to know who the holders of the rights of 
exclusive use areas are and to which physical areas these rights pertain, for these 
holders are obliged to bear the expenses for the maintenance71 and tidiness of these 
areas.72  The responsibility for these expenses thus forms a part of the financial 
obligations of the particular sectional owners concerned.  Besides these financial 
obligations, the Act and the rules of a sectional title scheme also impose various 
social obligations on sectional owners with regard to these exclusive use areas.73   
 
2 2 4 Sectional owner 
 
The focus of the thesis is the enforcement of the financial74 and social75 obligations of 
sectional owners.  Therefore, it is of utmost importance to know who can be 
regarded as a sectional owner in a sectional title scheme to establish who has 
financial and social duties to comply with. 
 
In terms of the Act the definition of owner in relation to immovable property (the unit) 
includes the following:76 the person registered as owner of a unit; the person 
registered as holder of a unit; the trustee in an insolvent estate; the liquidator of a 
                                                          
66
 Ss 27 and 27(1A) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
67
 Ss 27(2) and (3). 
68
 S 27(1)(a). 
69
 Reg 5(1)(k)(v). 
70
 S 27(4). 
71
 S 37(1)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
3(1)(c)).  See also in general Mostert (1997) Stell LR 338-339. 
72
 S 44(1)(c) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
13(1)(c)). 
73
 See 6 2 below. 
74
 See chapters 4 and 5 below. 
75
 See chapter 7 below. 
76
 S 1(1) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 sv “owner” para (a).  
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company or close corporation which owns a unit; the executor of an owner who has 
died; and the legal representative of an owner who is a minor, of unsound mind or is 
otherwise under a disability. 
 
From the outset it is important to note that trustees, liquidators, executors or legal 
representatives are only considered to be owners in so far as they are acting within 
the scope of their authority.77 
 
In terms of the above enumeration, the first group of owners consists of persons that 
are registered as owners of units.  It does not matter whether such person is a 
natural person, juristic person or even the state.  Furthermore, this means that a 
person, who has acquired a unit by prescription or an expropriating authority which 
has expropriated a unit, would have to register the unit in their names to qualify as 
owner.78   
 
The second group consists of persons registered as holders, and not owners, of 
units.  Persons that would likely qualify as registered holders of units would include 
holders of a registered 99-year leasehold, a registered lease or a usufruct over a 
unit.79  It is, however, important to note that these holders would only be seen as 
owners for specified purposes.  Despite becoming members of the body corporate 
with the same rights and obligations with regard to their sections and the common 
property as any other sectional owner, they do not become co-owners of the land 
and building when the building is deemed to be destroyed in terms of section 48 of 
the Act.  Furthermore, these holders are not entitled to sell the unit.80   
 
Groups three to six consist of a variety of persons namely: trustees, liquidators, 
executors and legal representatives.  None of these persons are actually owners of 
units since they only administer the property on behalf of an insolvent estate 
(trustees), a liquidated company or close corporation (liquidators), or on the behalf of 
a deceased (executors), minor or disabled owner (legal representatives).81  They are 
                                                          
77
 S 1(1) sv “owner” para (a). 
78
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-26. 
79
 3-26 - 3-26(1). 
80
 3-26(1). 
81
 3-26(2).     
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only deemed to be owners because the actual owners are incapable of performing 
the functions expected from sectional owners. 
 
The second part of the definition82 aims to clarify the position of spouses married in 
community of property who own units in a sectional title scheme.  With the abolition 
of the marital powers of the husband, as from 1 December 1993, the provisions of 
Chapter III of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 became applicable to all 
marriages in community of property.  This entails that all spouses who are married in 
community of property now have equal powers to enter into transactions regarding 
their units.  Therefore, the Sectional Titles Amendment Act 29 of 2003 amends the 
definition of owner to refer to „either one or both spouses‟.83  This applies whether the 
unit is registered in the names of both spouses in a marriage in community of 
property or registered in the name of only one spouse and forming part of the joint 
estate of both spouses in a marriage in community of property.84 
 
The STSMA made the definition of owner more readable by defining an owner as the 
person in whose name the unit is registered at a deeds registry under the Act or in 
whom ownership is vested by statute, including the trustee in an insolvent estate, the 
liquidator of a company or close corporation which is an owner, the executor of an 
owner who has died and the representative of an owner who is a minor or of 
unsound mind.85  The definition is then made subject to section 1(2) of the STSMA 
which includes under the definition of owner the holder of a registered lease for 99 
years or longer for the duration of the lease and if the unit is registered in the names 
of both spouses in a marriage in community of property, or in the name of only one 
spouse and forms part of a joint estate of both spouses in a marriage in community 
of property, either one or both spouses. 
 
                                                          
82
 S 1(1) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 sv “owner” para (b). 
83
 S 1(1) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 sv “owner” paras (b)(i) and (ii).  For a detailed discussion of the 
position of spouses after the abolition of the marital powers of the husband see CG Van der Merwe & CS 
Human “Eienaar in die 1992 Wysigingswet op Deeltitels met Spesiale Verwysing na Gades Getroud in 
Gemeenskap van Goed” (1993) 4 Stell LR 311 311-324.  See also in general Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-
26(2) - 3-27. 
84
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 3-26(2) - 3-27. 
85
 S 1(1) of the Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 sv “owner”. 
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The definition under the STSMA differs from the definition in terms of the Act since 
the Act includes under owner not only the person registered as owner but also the 
person registered as holder which could include not only holders of long leases, as in 
terms of the STSMA, but also usufructuaries, usuaries and holders of a right of 
habitation.86 
 
2 2 5 Participation quota 
 
It was shown, at 2 2 2, that sectional ownership is of a threefold legal nature since it 
links ownership of a section with common ownership of the common property and 
with membership of the body corporate.  The importance of the participation quota 
lies in the fact that participation in the latter two aspects is determined by the quota 
allotted to each section.  Therefore, the participation quota is the numerical 
quantification of an owner‟s co-ownership share in the common property as well as 
his say in the management of the sectional title scheme.  It also provides the 
numerical base for determining his financial obligations regarding administrative 
expenses in the maintenance and administration of the common property.87 
 
An equitable formula for the determination of the participation quota is thus a 
prerequisite for the success of a sectional title scheme because it plays a role in 
sensitive issues, such as determining the sharing of common expenses. The 
participation quota allotted to each section thus has the potential of becoming the 
main source of conflict between sectional owners and of ultimately wrecking 
sectional title schemes.88 
 
In terms of the Act the participation quota determines the following matters:89 the 
value of the vote of a unit owner in a case where the vote is to be reckoned in 
value;90 the unit owner‟s undivided share in the common property;91 and the unit 
                                                          
86
 CG Van der Merwe “Third Generation Sectional Titles” (2012) 4 TSAR 611 620-621. 
87
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-3. 
88
 4-3. 
89
 S 32(3) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986, (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 11(1)). 
90
 S 32(3)(a) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986, (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
11(1)(a)). 
91
 S 32(3)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986, (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
11(1)(b)). 
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owner‟s proportional contribution to common expenses92 as well as his proportional 
liability93 for the debts of the body corporate.94 
 
As mentioned above, two of the functions of the participation quota are to 
determine95 the sectional owner‟s proportional contribution to common expenses96 
and his proportional liability for the debts of the body corporate.97  In practice this is 
also the most significant function of the participation quota since an existing or future 
sectional owner will be particularly interested in his estimated contribution to the 
common funds established for the maintenance and repair of the common property 
and for the control and administration of the scheme.98   
 
The old Act stated that a sectional owner‟s relative contribution to common expenses 
would be calculated on the basis of the participation quota allotted to his section.  
This meant that all relative contributions to every type of expense were directly 
related to the relative floor area of a section, which was the only formula employed 
by the old Act.99  The result was then expressed as a fraction of one correct to four 
decimal places.100  However, this basis was too rigid and therefore the Act adopted 
more flexible criterion by drawing a distinction between residential and non-
residential schemes.101  
 
                                                          
92
 In terms of s 37(1)(a) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986, (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 
2011 s 3(1)(a)). 
93
 In terms of s 47(1) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986, (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 
2011 s 15). 
94
 S 32(3)(c) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986, (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
11(1)(c)). 
95
 S 32(3)(c) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
11(1)(c)).  See in general M Uys Voorstelle ter Verbetering van die steeds Onbevredigende Posisie van 
Sakedeeleienaars onder die Wet op Deeltitels, 1986 LLM Thesis University of Stellenbosch (1990) 25-28. 
96
 S 37(1)(a) and reg 4(i) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 
of 2011 s 3(1)(a)(i)-(iv)).  
97
 S 47 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 15).  See 
3 5 below. 
98
 In terms of s 37(1) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 
2011 s 3(1)).   See also Annexure 8 r 31(1) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 and Van der Merwe Sectional 
Titles 4-10.   
99
 CG Van der Merwe “The Allocation of Quotas in a Sectional Title Scheme” (1987) 104 SALJ 70 81. 
100
 An example of such a calculation can be seen in Paddock Sectional Title Survival Manual 7-1. 
101
 See in General CL Van Schalkwyk & CG Van der Merwe “A critical analysis of the role of the developer in 
sectional title developments” (2008) 2 TSAR 222 226-228; see also L Chen The Making of Chinese 
Condominium Law (2010) 57.  
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For residential schemes, as defined in any applicable operative town planning 
scheme, the Act adopts the size of the floor area of a section as the basis for 
calculating a sectional owner‟s participation quota.  Therefore, in terms of the Act the 
quota, for calculating a sectional owner‟s contribution to the common expenses, is a 
decimal fraction correct to four places, which is arrived at by dividing the floor area 
correct to the nearest square meter of the particular section by the aggregate floor 
area of all the sections in the scheme.102  In calculating the floor area of a section all 
the parts of the section must be taken into account.  For example, adjoining 
balconies and non-contiguous garages must also be taken into account when the 
floor area of a section is calculated.103  
 
The formula of relative floor area is, however, too rigid for calculating a sectional 
owner‟s contribution towards the levies in schemes that are not used solely for 
residential purposes.  Maree explains the latter problem as follows:   
 
“In complex schemes it is often evident that certain owners, or classes of owners, will 
enjoy less benefit from certain amenities or parts of the common property than 
others.  Owners of commercial sections probably won‟t use the swimming pool, 
parking bays, or other facilities situated in the residential portion of the scheme.  
Conversely, residential owners derive little benefit from expenses incurred to 
maintain shop fronts, awnings, plazas, toilet facilities and other features of a 
shopping area within a development.”
104       
 
Consequently, the Act wisely left the determination of the participation quota and 
thus the levies for non-residential sections to the discretion of the developer.105  The 
developer is not bound by relative floor area but can take other factors such as 
relative value, location and composition, designated use, interior and exterior design 
and proximity to facilities of a section into account in determining the participation 
quota of a particular section in a percentage expressed to four decimals.106  The 
developer is thus supposed to take the so-called „par value‟ of the section into 
                                                          
102
 S 1(1) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 sv “participation quota” read with s 32(1).  
103
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-5. 
104
 T Maree “Differentiated Levy Structures and Dynamic Levy Adjustments during the Development Stage” 
(January 2005) 15 MCS Courier Newsletter 10 11. 
105
 S 32(2) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986.  
106
 See Van der Merwe (1999) Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 148.   
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account which aims at an equitable allocation based on similar considerations.107  
Unfortunately it is left to the sole discretion of the developer and his legal advisers to 
decide what role each of these factors should play and ultimately determine the 
participation quota of each non-residential section.  It would have been wiser to 
prescribe a definite formula by which these quotas should be determined and to 
have an independent professional appointed to consider whether the developer‟s 
allotment of quotas is equitable.108  Maree also questions whether developers know 
what they are doing when they establish their levy dispensations.109  
 
In the case of mixed-use schemes, being partly residential and partly non-residential, 
the developer must indicate the total percentage of quotas allotted to residential 
sections and this quota must then be divided amongst those sections in accordance 
with the floor area method.110  If the unit allocation is for example 40% residential 
and 60% non-residential, the quota for each individual non-residential section must 
be allocated by the developer in the aforesaid manner.111  
 
We have seen that the participation quota becomes part of the economic interest 
involved in a particular unit and for this reason the participation quota is in principle 
not easily amendable.112  However, the Act expressly provides two ways in which the 
method of calculating levies may be amended.113   
 
Firstly, a developer may make special rules114 when he is submitting an application 
for the opening of a sectional title register.  These special rules may modify a 
                                                          
107
 Pienaar Sectional Titles 82. 
108
 Van Schalkwyk & Van der Merwe (2008) TSAR 228. 
109
 Maree (January 2005) MCS Courier Newsletter 10-15.  In this article Maree provides a formula which 
developers should use to establish a fair and workable levy dispensation.  Maree is of the opinion that a 
developer‟s first task is to assign estimated weightings to the value of amenities which are used or enjoyed 
disparately.  Then the degree of disparity must be estimated.  The end result must be encapsulated in a formula 
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sectional owner‟s liability to make contributions to the common expenses or the 
unpaid debts of the body corporate.115  Developers, assisted by their conveyancers, 
should use this opportunity to establish a fair and workable levy dispensation 
calculated from a carefully prepared scientific formula.116  This formula should also 
be made public to facilitate later alterations.117  Furthermore, if a developer sells a 
unit before submitting his application for the opening of a sectional title register, he 
must disclose the purported change in the relevant contract of sale for the change to 
have the necessary effect.118   
 
Secondly, the body corporate may subsequently effect a similar amendment by 
special resolution,119 provided that the written consent of an owner adversely 
affected by such a change is obtained.  For such an amendment to take place at 
least 30% of the units in the scheme must have been sold or transferred to persons 
other than the developer.120   
 
The second proviso of section 32(4),121 which states that where an owner is 
adversely affected by such a decision of the body corporate his written consent must 
be obtained, seems to re-introduce the requirement of unanimity under the old 
Act.122  If the levy formula is adjusted, it is inevitable that some sectional owners will 
pay less and others more.  This means that somebody would always be adversely 
affected by any change to the levy formula and his consent would be necessary to 
make the change effective. The impracticality of expecting such consent undermines 
the intended objective to facilitate amendment of the levy formula.123  However, a law 
                                                          
115
 S 32(4) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
11(2)(a)). 
116
 For an example of such a formula see Maree (January 2005) MCS Courier Newsletter 12-13. 
117
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-10(1). 
118
 S 32(4) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
11(2)(d)). 
119
 A special resolution can be obtained in one of two ways.  The first is when at least 75% of all the members of 
the body corporate (reckoned in value in number) agreed thereto in writing.  The second manner is when it is 
passed at a general meeting by at least three fourths of the votes (reckoned in value and number) of the members 
of the body corporate present or represented at the meeting.  See s 1(1) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 sv 
“special resolution”.  
120
 S 32(4) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 ss 
11(2)(a) and (c)).  See also Van der Merwe (1999) Singapore Journal of International and Comparative Law 
149.  
121
 Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 11(2)(b). 
122
 S 24(3) of the Sectional Titles Act 66 of 1971. 
123
 Van der Merwe & Habdas (2006) Stell LR 179. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
33 
 
should not be interpreted in a manner which is meaningless or counter-productive.  
Therefore, the best interpretation of the proviso would be that such written consent is 
only required if, objectively, an owner is unfairly or unreasonably disadvantaged by 
the proposed amendment.  Any other interpretation of this proviso will render it 
ineffective, as it is unlikely that any sectional owner will consent to an amendment of 
the levies which would result in an unfavourable apportionment as far as he is 
concerned.124 
 
This line of reasoning was followed in the unreported decision, in Algar v Body 
Corporate of Thistledown125 in the Natal Provincial Division of the High Court.  The 
body corporate passed a special resolution which stated the following: 
 
“…to change the management structure from participation quota to equal share on all 
expenses, except the rates and taxes.”
126  
 
The applicant objected to this special resolution on the ground that he had been 
adversely affected by this change, due to the fact that his annual levy would be 
increased by R605.50.127  The court reasoned that the applicant‟s interpretation of 
the words „adversely affected‟ was too narrow since he only objected to the special 
resolution on the ground that his levy payments would be increased.  The court 
indicated that the legislature replaced the requirement of a unanimous resolution in 
the old Act with the more liberal requirement of a special resolution128 in order to 
achieve a more equitable distribution of the liability of a sectional owner for 
maintenance contributions.  Consequently, the court decided that one must take all 
the facts and circumstances of the case into consideration and not only the fact that 
a particular sectional owner would have to pay an increased levy.129  The court 
pointed out that the scheme, unlike some sectional title schemes which comprise 
units or dwellings to which exclusive use garden areas are allocated, was unique in 
the sense that the vast garden area and the road leading to the units formed part of 
the common property of the scheme that was open to equal use and enjoyment by 
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all the unit owners.  Furthermore, it was unchallenged that unit owners derived equal 
benefit from the expenditure relating to the common property outbuildings, consisting 
of tool sheds, showers, toilets and a kitchen for the labour force employed in the 
complex.  The cost of maintenance for the common areas constituted the major 
component of the annual levies and other expenses were negligible.130  
Consequently, the court found that the special resolution was intended to redress an 
inequitable situation and to ensure that the extraordinary cost of maintaining the 
extensive common property was shared equally amongst the members of the body 
corporate.  Since there was equal use and enjoyment of the vast amenities, the court 
held that the applicant was not adversely affected by the special resolution and that 
his written consent was therefore not needed for the amendment of the quota.131 
 
The liberal interpretation the court gave to the meaning of the words „adversely 
affected‟ might cause a measure of uncertainty since it might lead to endless 
litigation in the courts.  It is, however, submitted that such an interpretation accords 
with the intention of the legislator who wanted to ensure a fair and equitable 
dispensation in the allocation of contributions amongst the various owners.132  
 
Section 11(2) of the STSMA, which deals with the amendment of the participation 
quota, restructured the provisions of section 32(4) of the Act to make them more 
understandable, but the principle remains the same as it was in terms of the Act.133 
 
We have seen that in the case of residential schemes the size of the section is used 
for calculating a sectional owner‟s contribution to the common expenses and his 
proportional liability for the debts of the body corporate.  This formula tends to 
promote certainty in sectional ownership relations.134  However, using floor area as 
the basis for determining contributions to the maintenance, repair and administration 
of the common property is not without criticism.  Some authors argue that cubic area 
rather than floor area should be used as the basis and that only half or less than half 
of the floor area of parts of sections adjoining a section, like balconies and atriums, 
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and the floor area of non-adjoining parts, should be used in calculating the floor area 
of a particular residential section.  Furthermore, not only does the floor area method 
ignore value as a criterion, but also utility.135  Therefore, it is suggested that it would 
be wiser for such contributions to be calculated in terms of the benefit derived from 
each amenity by a particular owner or put differently by the use he makes of 
particular amenities.  The reason for this is that certain owners would be prejudiced 
by the fact that they would have to contribute to common expenses incurred from 
common amenities from which they derive little or no benefit.136  In final analysis the 
question is whether one wants to have certainty or fairness in the distribution of 
contributions in sectional title schemes.  
 
It has already been indicated that relative floor area is too rigid to calculate a 
sectional owner‟s contribution towards levies in sectional title schemes which are not 
exclusively used for residential purposes.  Fortunately, the Act therefore provides 
that the determination of levies for non-residential sections should be left to the sole 
discretion of the developer who can employ any formula of his choice.137  It is, 
however, unfortunate that the Act does not limit the developer‟s discretion in this 
regard.138  The Act also does not require the developer to disclose the formula he 
uses to determine the participation quotas for non-residential sections or by which he 
allots the percentage to residential sections in mixed-use schemes.  Developers can 
thus do what they want and the sectional owners have no remedy against them if 
their allocations are incorrect.139  To overcome this problem the legislator should 
consider the provisions of the United States of America‟s Uniform Common Interest 
Ownership Act of 2008 (the UCIOA) which mentions that developers might designate 
par value to allocate quotas140 and to explain the formula he uses for his 
allocations.141  Another sensible provision of the UCIOA in this regard is that the 
formulas used by a developer to calculate the quota may not discriminate in favour of 
units owned by the developer.142  This would prevent the misuse of formulas to 
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favour developers and it would also limit the possibility of unfair allocations amongst 
the various unit owners.143  It will also provide non-residential owners with the 
formula used by the developer to calculate their contributions to the levy fund, and a 
basis on which they can challenge the quotas allocated to them if they believe that 
they have been prejudiced. 
 
2 2 6 Rules of a scheme 
 
Besides the financial and social obligations that are imposed on sectional owners in 
terms of the Act, the rules of a scheme can also impose such obligations and 
indicate how these obligations should be enforced.  These obligations and their 
measures of enforcement are contained in the prescribed management and conduct 
rules; special rules introduced by the developer or adopted in unanimous and special 
resolutions of the general meeting; as well as house rules adopted by the general 
meeting by means of ordinary resolutions.  A proper consideration and 
understanding of these rules are necessary to grasp the full spectrum of the financial 
and social obligations that are imposed on sectional owners, as well as the nature of 
the measures provided for their enforcement.    
 
The Act contains a model set of management and conduct rules for adoption by 
sectional title schemes.  On application for the opening of a sectional title register at 
a deeds registry, the developer must submit a certificate by a conveyancer stating 
whether the model rules prescribed in terms of section 35(2)144 of the Act namely the 
Annexure 8 and Annexure 9 rules are applicable to the sectional title scheme.  This 
certificate must also contain the rules substituted by the developer for alternative 
rules to the extent that the developer is allowed to amend or substitute the model 
rules.145  These rules may also later be amended by the general meeting (body 
corporate) of the scheme. 
 
Section 10(2)(a) and (b) of the STSMA now states that rules substituting, adding to, 
amending or repealing the prescribed management or conduct rules by the 
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developer or by unanimous or special resolution of the body corporate, must first be 
approved by the chief ombud.  In order to synchronise the registration of the 
sectional plan and the opening of the sectional title register with the approval of the 
rules by the chief ombud, the draft rules will obviously have to be approved first.  The 
advantage of this regulation is that developers and practitioners will have to focus on 
preparing proper rules to accommodate the particular characteristics for their 
sectional title schemes in order to avoid unwanted delays in the registration 
process.146 
 
Once a body corporate is established by the registration of a unit in the name of a 
person other than the developer,147 the rules submitted by the developer regulate the 
control, management, administration, use and enjoyment of sections and the 
common property.148  The rules as they are or later amended by the general meeting, 
bind the body corporate, all sectional owners and other occupants of sections149 and 
must be enforced by the trustees.  Furthermore, the body corporate is obliged, on 
application, to make the rules in force available for inspection to any sectional owner, 
to any holder of a registered real right in or over a unit, or to any other person 
authorized in writing by such owner or person.150 
 
A distinction must be drawn between two kinds of prescribed or model rules namely 
management and conduct rules.151  The prescribed management rules in Annexure 
8152 mainly deal with administration matters such as the election, meetings, powers 
and duties of trustees;153 the convening of and the procedure at general meetings;154 
and the legal position of managing agents.155  Furthermore, the management rules 
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also contain some provisions on non-administrative matters such as improvements 
to the common property.156  The prescribed conduct rules in Annexure 9157 on the 
other hand, regulate a sectional owner‟s conduct with regard to his section and the 
common property.  Matters that are regulated by the conduct rules include the 
keeping of animals, reptiles and birds; refuse disposal; vehicles on the common 
property; damage, alterations or additions to the common property; the outside 
appearance of the building; signs and notices; littering; laundry; storage of 
inflammatory material, and other dangerous acts; letting of units; and the eradication 
of pests.158  Therefore, broadly speaking the management rules deal with aspects of 
management, administration, determination of levies, powers of trustees, meetings 
and voting while conduct rules, on the other hand, seek to regulate the day to day 
social behaviour of the owners.159 
 
It is also important to note that there is a specific hierarchy between the provisions of 
the Act and the management and conduct rules.  Firstly, the provisions of the Act will 
prevail over any conflicting provision in both the management and conduct rules.  
Secondly, the conduct rules are subject to the Act as well as the management 
rules.160  
 
We have seen that the management and conduct rules must be lodged with the 
sectional title plan.  Although the Act allows developers to create special rules, most 
developers simply lodge the prescribed management and conduct rules.161  
Certain162 of the management rules may not be changed by the developer when he 
is submitting an application for the opening of the sectional title register.163  When it 
comes to the prescribed conduct rules, however, the developer has complete 
freedom to insert his special rules in this category.164 
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After the establishment of the body corporate the management and conduct rules 
may be amended by the members of the body corporate in general meeting.165  
Management rules can only be changed by means of a unanimous resolution166 
while conduct rules can be changed by means of a special resolution.167   
 
The body corporate must notify the registrar of deeds of any rules amended, 
repealed or substituted by the body corporate,168 and such amendment, repeal or 
substitution comes into operation on the date of filing such notice at the deeds 
registry.169  In the case of an amendment, addition, substitution, or repeal of the rules 
by the body corporate, the registrar of deeds is not required to examine or note such 
substitution, amendment, addition or repeal against any initial certificate by the 
developer, or any notice or existing rules, to determine whether such amendment, 
addition, substitution or repeal is in accordance with the provisions of the Act or 
regulations.170   
 
Section 10(5) of the STSMA introduced the new requirement that all amendments of 
the management and conduct rules must be approved by the chief ombud, which 
process involves the following: a notification of an intended amendment of the rules 
lodged with the chief ombud in the prescribed form;171 an examination of the 
intended amendments by the chief ombud and his personnel to determine whether 
they are reasonable and appropriate for the scheme;172 and a certificate of approval 
of the amendments issued by the chief ombud and the filing of the amended rules in 
the office of the chief ombud.173 
 
In terms of section 10(5)(d) of the STSMA the amended rules will come into 
operation either on the date of the issuing of the certificate of approval or on the 
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opening of the sectional title register, whichever is the latest.  Section 10(5) of the 
STSMA can be seen as a welcome improvement to the provisions of section 35(5) of 
the Act which provides that amendments of rules must be lodged with the registrar, 
and which contained no provisions as to the safe custody of such rules.  In practice 
this led to careless supervision and the resultant loss of numerous sectional title 
schemes‟ rules in the various deeds offices.  However, to achieve the desired results 
in terms of section 10(5) of the STMSA the personnel of the chief ombud would have 
to be expertly trained to become adept in the approval of sectional title scheme rules 
in order to avoid mistakes and future delays in the sectional title registration 
process.174 
 
The most important limitation upon the creation and amendment of rules by the 
developer or body corporate is that the rules must be reasonable and equally 
applicable to all owners of units used for substantially the same purposes.175  This 
would, in principle, mean that different rules may apply to commercial units than 
those that apply to residential units.  However, when there are only residential units 
the same rules must apply.176  Section 10(3) of the STSMA also provides that the 
management and conduct rules must be reasonable and apply equally to all owners 
of units but omits the phrase after units „put to substantially the same purpose‟ which 
implies that the rules themselves must make such a distinction where applicable.177     
 
In many sectional title schemes so called „house rules‟ are also adopted by the body 
corporate or the trustees to further regulate the management of the scheme.178  
Although the Act does not expressly provide for house rules, it is generally accepted 
in practice that house rules may be adopted in general meeting or formulated by the 
trustees to regulate trivial matters in the control, administration and management of 
the common property.179   
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The enforcement of house rules is, however, problematic because of the following 
considerations.180  Firstly, the body corporate and the trustees are creatures of 
statute.  Therefore, the powers of the body corporate and the trustees are derived 
either expressly or by necessary implication from the Act, read with the regulations 
thereunder.  Neither the Act nor the regulations contain provisions that allow the 
body corporate or trustees to create house rules, which mean that they do not have 
the power to create such rules.  Secondly, the content and amendment of the 
prescribed rules are very well controlled, which suggests that the creation of informal 
house rules is not permissible.  Thirdly, the Act preserves the model rules made 
under the old Act, but only to the extent that they are not irreconcilable with the 
management rules of the Act.  This clearly suggests that the legislature wanted to 
make model rules which should not be deviated from easily.  Fourthly, a body 
corporate has general powers of management, administration and control over the 
common property of a sectional title scheme.  These general powers do not apply to 
sections in a sectional title scheme.181  Therefore, the creation of house rules to 
govern the conduct of owners in sections cannot be justified by these general 
powers of the body corporate.  Lastly, some provisions in the Act and regulations 
enable the trustees to enforce the management and conduct rules as amended.182  
For example, the body corporate is allowed reasonable access to units for the 
purpose of ensuring that the rules are observed.183  The wording of the Act with 
regard to these powers is specific and cannot, therefore, be construed to confer 
similar powers with regard to house rules. 
 
Therefore, due to the fact that house rules cannot be regarded as domestic statutes 
of bodies corporate, their enforceability is problematic184 and are thus „worse than 
useless‟.185  However, some rules prohibit certain conduct of sectional owners except 
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with the written consent of the trustees.186  Wood-Bodley suggests that this creates 
two instances where house rules may be valid and enforceable.187  Firstly, where it is 
proper to construe the house rule as an exercise by the trustees of their powers of 
control over the common property and, secondly, where it is proper to construe the 
house rule as a permission given by the trustees.  Examples of such house rules 
would be that no person under a certain age shall use the swimming pool unless 
supervised by an adult or where the rule defines areas on the common property on 
which parking is permitted.  He therefore argues that there can be no objection to 
house rules of this kind since they amount to no more than the exercise of the 
trustees‟ powers of control over the common property under the Act, or the granting 
of consent in terms of the rules. 
 
2 2 7 Sectional title community 
 
A sectional title scheme consists of a community of people of different ages, 
opinions, views, cultural backgrounds and beliefs.  Furthermore, the close proximity 
in which they live, especially in high-rise buildings, is bound to lead to problems and 
disputes.188  Moreover, sectional ownership consists of both individual and collective 
elements due to the fact that a sectional owner has individual ownership of his 
section, while he collectively also has an undivided share in the common property 
and facilities of the scheme.189  Therefore, individual needs will always to some 
extent be in conflict with community interests.  Van der Merwe and Muňis-Argüelles 
describe and then suggest a solution for this conflict: 
 
“The aim of a condominium is to strive for happiness and harmony in an intensified, 
diverse community where the objects of ownership, the individual units, are 
physically interdependent.  Since unit owners live in close proximity and use facilities 
in common, the most extensive freedoms inherent in their ownership or fee simple 
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need to be restricted.  Each owner must give up a certain degree of freedom that he 
might otherwise enjoy in separate, privately owned property.”
190    
 
This suggests that harmony can only be obtained if a sectional owner‟s unrestricted 
use and enjoyment of his section and the common property are restricted by social 
obligations imposed by law on individual sectional owners. Furthermore, financial 
obligations to place sufficient funds in the coffers of the body corporate to undertake 
works of repair and maintenance would require sufficient sanctions to enforce these 
obligations.191  Without efficient enforcement measures there would be chaos instead 
of harmony in a sectional title scheme.   
 
2 2 8 Levies 
 
The most important financial obligation imposed on owners in a sectional title 
scheme, is the payment of their levies.  The practice is generally to raise levies 
monthly, but the trustees are allowed to determine how the instalments shall be 
paid.192  „Levies‟ is the popular term used in practice for what is more formally 
referred to as „contributions‟ or „assessments‟ in the Act and the prescribed rules.193  
Without regular payment of levies a body corporate simply cannot function.  
Therefore, one of the most important functions of the body corporate is to establish a 
fund, called the administrative or levy fund, to cover expenses194 and to use all 
available measures to force owners to pay their levies regularly.  In the following 
chapter we shall see that sectional owners are responsible for the payment of 
ordinary levies;195 special levies;196 and in the case of exclusive use areas, additional 
levies.197   
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 S 37(1)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
3(1)(c)). 
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2 3 Relevant legislation:  Property Rates Act and Systems Act  
 
The relationship between the relevant provisions of the Act, the Property Rates Act 
and the Systems Act198 requires clarification in order to understand references to 
these legislative enactments in later chapters of this thesis.  This clarification can 
only be achieved by furnishing some background material on these acts and by 
examining the impact these acts have on the sectional title industry. 
 
Property rates are one of the major sources of income for local governments, given 
that they serve as the main source of discretionary revenue for municipalities.199  
Municipalities are entitled to charge municipal property rates on properties within 
their municipalities based on municipal valuation.  This valuation is in turn based on 
the market value of the property and is periodically updated.  Residents do, however, 
have the opportunity of commenting on or raising objections to these valuations if 
they believe that it has not been fairly or correctly determined.  An objection must be 
lodged before the closing date for objections on forms prescribed by the local or 
metropolitan municipality concerned.  The prescribed forms are in most cases also 
available on the municipality‟s website.  These forms must state the reasons for the 
objection and must be accompanied by any supporting documents.200   
 
Historically local municipalities in the various provinces handled the rating of property 
differently by applying their own special legislation and unique system of rating and 
assessment.201  Therefore, one of the main aims of the Property Rates Act is to bring 
consistency, uniformity and simplicity in respect of the way in which municipalities 
levy rates throughout the whole of the Republic of South Africa.202 
 
The power of municipalities to levy property rates derives directly from the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution).  Section 229(1) 
                                                          
198
 See especially 5 4 below. 
199
 See for instance the Memorandum on the Objects of the Local Government: Property Rates Bill B19-2003 
para 1.1. 
200
 Anonymous Phatshoane Henney Attorneys “How are my municipal rates and taxes determined?” 
<http://www.kloppersinc.co.za/NewsPublications/NewsArticle.aspx?CategoryID=1&articleId=671> (accessed 
20-06-2013).  
201
 Memorandum on the Objects of the Local Government: Property Rates Bill B19-2003 para 1.2.  See also M 
Kelly-Louw “Collection of levies by a body corporate” (2004) 12-2 JBL 94 98. 
202
 Kelly-Louw (2004) JBL 98.  
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of the Constitution clearly states that a municipality may impose rates on property 
and surcharges on fees for services provided by or on behalf of the municipality.  If 
authorised by national legislation, the municipality may also impose other taxes, 
levies and duties appropriate to local government or to the category of local 
government to which the particular municipality belongs.203  The Constitution, 
however, states that this power is not unfettered and also not solely in the discretion 
of municipalities.204  Firstly, section 229(2)(a) restrains municipalities from exercising 
their fiscal powers in any way that would materially and unreasonably prejudice: 
national economic policies; economic activities across municipal boundaries; or the 
national mobility of goods, services, capital or labour.  Secondly, section 229(2)(b) 
allows national legislation to regulate the exercise of this power of municipalities.205  
The Property Rates Act is consequently not the source of the power in terms of 
which municipalities may levy property rates, but rather an instrument to give effect 
to section 229 of the Constitution.206         
 
Before the promulgation of the Property Rates Act municipalities levied rates and 
taxes on sectional title bodies corporate according to the value of the land and 
buildings in sectional title schemes.  The total of these rates was then recovered 
from sectional owners according to their participation quota, based on floor area in 
the case of residential units and according to the quota as determined by the 
developer in the case of non-residential units or according to a special scheme rule 
which amended the levy share.207   
 
With the promulgation of the Property Rates Act municipalities became entitled to 
levy rates and taxes on individual sectional title units.208  This change is based on 
the fact that the definition of „property‟, in the latter act, encompasses all immovable 
                                                          
203
 Ss 229(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  The Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 does not define „property‟ but in context it means land including any immovable 
property on or in the land or under the surface of the land.  It includes all land in the Republic of South Africa as 
the whole of the territory of the Republic of South Africa is covered by municipalities.  See also the 
Memorandum on the Objects of the Local Government: Property Rates Bill B19-2003 para 1.2 and N Steytler 
“Property Rates Act in operation” (July 2005) 7-3 LGB 1 1.   
204
 Memorandum on the Objects of the Local Government: Property Rates Bill B19-2003 para 1.2. 
205
 Memorandum on the Objects of the Local Government: Property Rates Bill B19-2003 para 1.2. See also in 
general Steytler (July 2005) LGB 1.    
206
 Memorandum on the Objects of the Local Government: Property Rates Bill B19-2003 para 1.3. 
207
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-10(4). 
208
 4-10(4). 
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property registered in the name of a person and thus also sectional title units 
registered in the name of a sectional owner.209  The reason for this is that under the 
Property Rates Act sectional title units are considered immovable property on which 
the municipality can levy rates. Therefore, each sectional owner became responsible 
for the payment of his own rates to the municipality, instead of sharing a collective 
rate charged on the land and the building with the other sectional owners in the 
scheme.210  This means that bodies corporate are no longer responsible for the 
collection of rates from the sectional owners and payment of these rates to the 
municipality.211   
 
We have seen above that each unit is now rated individually according to its market 
value and not according to its floor area or the quota determined by the developer.  
The application of this uniform standard of market value is welcomed because it 
implies that, at least from a valuation point of view, all property owners are treated 
fairly.212  Therefore, issues such as the quality of the view, the layout and the special 
equipment installed in the section will now be taken into consideration in the 
valuation of a unit.  This new levy dispensation was introduced in the Cape Town 
metropolis from 1 July 2007 and in Johannesburg, Durban and most of the rest of 
the country from 1 July 2008.213  
 
Although the Property Rates Act has been welcomed by the sectional title industry, it 
may create problems for municipalities.  Municipal valuers must now value many 
more properties, as each sectional title unit now constitutes rateable property.  
Furthermore, obtaining data on individual sectional title units and their owners is 
laborious and costly, especially where bodies corporate are uncooperative.  It is also 
often difficult to gain access to the individual units.  Moreover, some municipalities 
struggle to comply with the added administrative burden of serving valuation notices 
and rates bills on so many property owners.214  
 
                                                          
209
 S 1(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act 6 of 2004 sv “property”. 
210
 S 10.   
211
 Memorandum on the Objects of the Local Government: Property Rates Bill B19-2003 para 2.3.1. 
212
 R Franzsen “Municipal Property Rates Act: Some Valuation Issues” (February/March 2009) 11-1 LGB 25 
25. 
213
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 4-10(5). 
214
 Franzsen (February/March 2009) LGB 27.  
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The Systems Act also has an impact on levies charged to sectional owners in 
sectional title schemes.  The latter Act seeks to establish the basic principles and 
mechanisms to give effect to a collective vision of developmental government and, 
therefore, focuses primarily on the internal systems and administration of the 
municipality.215 
 
Before the promulgation of this act taxes and other local authority charges for 
electricity; gas; water; fuel; sanitary; and other services to the building or buildings 
and land, were payable by the body corporate in terms of section 37(1)(a)216 of the 
Act.   The Systems Act now provides that members of the local community have the 
duty to promptly pay service fees, surcharges on fees, rates on property and other 
taxes, levies and duties imposed by the municipality.217  In charging fees for 
municipal services, a municipality must, within its financial and administrative 
capacity, take reasonable steps to ensure that the consumption of services by 
individual users is measured through accurate and verifiable metering systems in 
cases where the measuring of the consumption of services is mandatory.218  There is 
also an obligation on an owner to provide access to the premises to an authorised 
representative of the municipality or service provider at all reasonable hours in order 
to read, inspect, install or repair any meter or service connection for reticulation, or to 
disconnect, stop or restrict the provision of any service.219  
 
In terms of Annexure 8 of the regulations under the Act, rule 33(3) states that the 
trustees of the body corporate must, if so required in writing by a majority of owners, 
procure the installation and maintenance in good working order, at the body 
corporate‟s cost, of separate meters to record the consumption of electricity, water 
and gas in respect of each individual section and the common property.  If and for so 
long as no separate meters have been installed the contribution payable by each 
owner in respect of electricity, water and gas must be calculated in accordance with 
                                                          
215
 Memorandum on the Objects of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Bill B27B-2000 para 1. 
216
 Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 3(1)(a)(ii). 
217
 S 5(2)(b) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000. 
218
 S 95(d). 
219
 S 101.  
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the participation quota of each section or the amendment of such quota with regard 
to contributions for expenses.220   
 
The installation of these separate meters is, however, very expensive and therefore 
not all sectional title sections are as yet equipped with such meters.221  It is important 
to note that until every section in a particular scheme has been fitted with its own 
meter, the body corporate will still receive an account from the municipality for the 
electricity, water and gas consumption of the entire sectional title scheme.  Once 
separate meters have been installed the amounts due will be charged to the owners 
of the individual sections in the above proportion and paid over to the municipality.222     
 
The effect of the provisions of both acts is thus that rates and taxes and other local 
authority charges for electricity; gas; water; fuel; sanitary and other services to the 
building or buildings and land, in terms of section 37(1) of the Act, 223 are now no 
longer charges due to the body corporate but charges due to municipalities.  Thus 
where separate meters have been installed, these charges can no longer be 
included in the ordinary levies collected from sectional owners. 
 
Where all the sections in the scheme have been equipped with separate meters, the 
body corporate would need an agreement with the municipality to provide services to 
parts of the common property such as electricity to the entrance hall and the 
corridors in the building, and for operating the security gate and the lift as well as 
water for the lawns and gardens situated on the common property of the scheme.  
Section 38(h) of the Act makes provision for the latter situation by giving the body 
corporate the power to enter into an agreement with the municipality and any other 
person or body to supply the building or buildings and the land with electricity, gas, 
water, fuel and sanitary services.  The latter power of the body corporate has not 
been re-enacted in section 4 of the STSMA (which deals with the powers of bodies 
corporate) and can, therefore, only be implied from the general provision of section 
4(i) of the STSMA which states that the body corporate has the power to do all things 
                                                          
220
 See Annexure 8 rule 31 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 read with Annexure 8 r 33(4). 
221
 The reason for this is, firstly, that such meters are expensive and, secondly, that it requires extra pipes and 
cables. 
222
 J Van der Walt “Separate Rating of Sectional Title Units” (August 2007) 2-6 Paddocks Press Newsletter 1 2. 
223
 Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 3(1)(a)(ii). 
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necessary for the enforcement of the rules and for the management and 
administration of the common property.  This is unfortunate since for the sake of 
certainty this power should have been expressly included in section 4 of the STSMA.     
 
The combination of the Property Rates Act and the Systems Act is thus of great 
importance for this thesis since it has an enormous effect on the financial obligations 
of sectional owners.  It substantially reduces the financial interdependence of 
sectional owners in sectional title schemes since rates and taxes are now subsumed 
under municipal charges and no longer treated as body corporate charges.  
However, in the case of service charges separate meters must be installed, to 
measure the consumption of the various services, for these services to fall under 
municipal charges.  If no meters are installed the body corporate would still collect 
the service charges and then pay these over to the municipality.  Bodies corporate, 
therefore, need to install these meters but due to the fact that the installations of 
these meters are expensive sectional title schemes are seldom equipped with such 
meters.  I therefore strongly argue that bodies corporate must be forced to install 
these meters in all new schemes to make sure that service charges are directly due 
to municipalities rather than to bodies corporate.  This will reduce the notoriously 
high debts owed by sectional title schemes to municipalities.    
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Chapter 3:  Financial Obligations of Sectional 
Owners 
 
3 1 Introduction 
 
We have seen in chapter 1, at 1 2, that the power of a body corporate to collect 
contributions from sectional owners is not directed at financial gain, but primarily to 
ensure that there is sufficient money available to cover the expenses of the scheme.  
Since a body corporate‟s only source of funding is the contributions received from 
sectional owners,1 the most important financial obligation on a sectional owner is the 
payment of levies, which are often referred to as the „lifeblood‟2 of the body 
corporate. 
 
To achieve harmony in a sectional title scheme it must be managed properly. Proper 
management would require that the common parts of the building and the common 
facilities are maintained adequately and regularly.3  To attain this goal, the Sectional 
Titles Act 95 of 1986 (the Act) requires that a body corporate establish an 
administrative fund sufficient in its opinion to cover the expenses related to the 
maintenance and management of a sectional title scheme.4  Section 3(1)(a) of the 
Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 (the STSMA) replaces this 
subjective criteria above by stating that the body corporate must establish and 
maintain an administrative fund which is „reasonably sufficient‟ to cover the 
estimated annual operating cost of the scheme.  In an effort to keep the monthly 
levies paid by sectional owners as low as possible, many bodies corporate do not 
provide sufficiently for the annual operating cost of the scheme.5  Therefore, the 
replacement of a subjective criterion by an objective criterion would play an 
important role in ensuring the financial soundness of sectional title schemes.6   
                                                          
1
 CG Van der Merwe & JC Sonnekus Sectional Titles, Share Blocks and Time-Sharing Volume 1 Sectional 
Titles (Service Issue 16 May 2013) 9-4.    
2
 T Maree Sectional Titles on Tap Volume 1 2ed (2006) 6.1. 
3
 CG Van der Merwe & L Muňis Argüelles “Enforcement of Financial Obligations in a Condominium or 
Apartment Ownership Scheme” (2006) 16 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 125 125.  
4
 S 37(1)(a) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
5
 CG Van der Merwe “Third Generation Sectional Titles” (2012) 4 TSAR 611 622-623. 
6
 The innovation of this objective criterion is supported by s 39(1)(c) of the Community Schemes Ombud 
Service Act 9 of 2011 which states that any owner may now approach the ombud service for an order declaring 
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Another related issue is the existence of a reserve fund to cover unexpected or 
substantial capital expenditure.7  In terms of the STSMA a reserve fund must be 
established in such amounts as are reasonably sufficient to cover the cost of future 
maintenance and repair of the common property but not less than the amounts as 
may be prescribed by the Minister of Human Settlements.8  The impact of this 
provision on the issue of the financial contributions of sectional owners will be 
discussed.  
 
The first part of this chapter will, therefore, deal with the obligation on the part of the 
body corporate to establish an administrative and a reserve fund and to indicate 
what contributions sectional owners are required to contribute to each of these 
funds.   
 
In order to pinpoint the extent of the financial obligations of a sectional owner with 
regard to contributions to the administrative fund, it is important to know the types of 
expenses sectional owners are responsible for.  In this regard the Act makes a 
distinction between ordinary levies;9 special levies;10 and additional levies.11  The 
difference between these kinds of levies will be discussed before tackling the 
question as to when contributions become payable, which is essential for financial 
planning.  In addition we will establish when responsibility for the payment of levies is 
transferred to a purchaser on the sale of a unit.   
 
Another noteworthy financial obligation is that sectional owners do not only have to 
contribute to the administrative and reserve funds, but are also personally liable for 
the debts of the body corporate,12 which must be paid out of the administrative fund.  
We shall see that this situation was unfair to sectional owners who had already paid 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
that the contribution  levied on owners was incorrectly determined and that an adjustment of the contribution to 
a correct or reasonable amount be made. 
7
 See in general Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-19 – 14-20. 
8
 S 3(1)(b) of the Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011. 
9
 S 37(2) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 3(2)). 
10
 Annexure 8 r 31(4B) and ss 37(2A) and (2B) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles 
Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 3(3)). 
11
 S 37(1)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
3(1)(c)). 
12
 S 47(1) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 15). 
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their contributions and that the Sectional Titles Amendment Act 7 of 200513 tried to 
rectify this inequity by amending the proviso to section 47(1).  This, however, brought 
new problems to the table. 
 
The chapter will be concluded with a consideration of the issue as to whether 
aggrieved sectional owners may withhold the payment of levies and whether they 
are entitled to a refund of the profits or contributions lawfully levied upon them and 
paid by them.  
   
The chapter will thus critically analyse and evaluate the most important aspects 
regarding the financial obligations of sectional owners in a sectional title scheme.  
Where necessary, proposals for the improvement of unsuitable current conditions 
will be advanced.   
 
3 2 Contributions to the administrative and reserve fund   
 
One of the main functions of the trustees is to prepare a detailed budget of the 
expected income and expenditure for the following financial year with or without the 
help of the managing agent.14  This budget must contain realistic estimates of 
expenses for the ensuing year, including a reasonable provision for contingencies 
and future maintenance.15  This will be replaced by the more exact provisions of the 
STSMA, which specifically divides levied contributions into contributions to the 
administrative fund16 and to the reserve fund.17  
 
In terms of the Act the body corporate must establish an administrative fund to cover 
expenses for the repair, upkeep, control, management and administration of the 
common property; rates and taxes; other local authority charges for the supply of 
electric current, gas, water, fuel, and sanitary and other services to the building or 
buildings and land and insurance premiums; and to enable the body corporate to 
                                                          
13
 S 6 of the Sectional Titles Amendment Act 7 of 2005.  See also WD Ryan & GJ Pienaar “Geskilbeslegting by 
die toepassing van bestuursreëls van deeltitelskemas” (2007) 3 TSAR 437 438. 
14
 Annexure 8 r 36 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
15
 S 37(1)(a). 
16
 Ss 3(1)(a)(i)-(iv) of the Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011. 
17
 S 3(1)(b). 
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discharge any other function or obligation.18  This enumeration of charges is 
repeated in Annexure A regulation 4(i) as part of the information which must be given 
to tenants when a rental building is converted into a sectional title scheme.  This 
administrative fund is essentially needed to finance proper maintenance of the 
common property and for keeping it in a state of good and serviceable repair.19  The 
Act also requires the body corporate whenever necessary, to collect contributions 
from sectional owners to the administrative fund, in order to satisfy any claims 
against the body corporate.20  The body corporate is under specific obligation to 
determine the amounts to be raised for these purposes on an annual basis.21  Such 
an assessment is done in the annual budget which must be presented at each 
annual general meeting.  The body corporate must then raise the amounts by levying 
contributions on the sectional owners in proportion to their respective participation 
quotas.22   
 
The ordinary home-owner can postpone providing for maintenance and repairs until 
his budget allows it.  Sectional owners are, however, obliged by the Act to contribute 
whenever the body corporate deems contributions necessary.23  Contributions 
become payable from the date that the body corporate comes into existence24 in 
proportion to the respective participation quotas of sectional owners or in accordance 
with special rules introduced by the developer or the body corporate with regard to 
the allocation of expenses.25  The management rules require trustees to prepare the 
budget in the form of an itemised estimate of the anticipated income and expenditure 
of the body corporate for the following financial year for consideration at the annual 
general meeting of the body corporate.26  This estimate must then be approved, with 
                                                          
18
 S 37(1)(a) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 ss 
3(1)(a)(i)-(iv)).  Furthermore, reg 4(i) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 gives an indication of what would 
be regarded as common expenses.  See also in general J Paddock “Levies: What you Really need to Know” 
(June 2008) 3-6 Paddocks Press Newsletter 1 1. 
19
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-17 – 14-18.  
20
 S 37(1)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
3(1)(c)).  
21
 S 37(1)(c) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
3(1)(e)). 
22
 S 37(1)(d) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
3(1)(f)).    
23
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-18(1). 
24
 Annexure 8 r 31(1) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
25
 Annexure 8 r 31(1) read with s 32(4). 
26
 Annexure 8 r 36. 
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or without amendment, by a majority resolution of the general meeting.27  
Management rule 36(1) has recently been amended and now states that prior to the 
commencement of every financial year of the body corporate, the trustees must 
cause to be prepared an itemised estimate of the anticipated income and 
expenditure of the body corporate for the ensuing financial year, which estimate shall 
be laid before the annual general meeting for consideration.28  Therefore, it seems 
that the budget must be prepared in the format that it would be submitted to the 
annual general meeting for consideration prior to the start of the financial year.29 
 
The first kind of levy for which sectional owners are responsible are ordinary levies.  
The annual budget would normally make provision for the payment of the following 
ordinary levies: insurance premiums; electricity consumed on the common property; 
water where the scheme has a bulk water meter; maintenance of lifts; audit fees 
given that bodies corporate must be audited once a year regardless of size; 
managing agent fees where applicable; stationary; bank charges; cleaning costs; 
security services and intercom charges; and garden and swimming pool expenses.30  
This list is by no means exhaustive and it excludes items of a non-recurrent or 
unimportant nature.31  
 
Contributions levied on sectional owners should not be limited to the sum required to 
cover the amount budgeted for the actual running expenses of the ensuing year.  
Sectional owners can expect to spend a substantial amount of money over a period 
of time coping with both foreseen and unforeseen problems, warding off 
obsolescence and replacing worn-out equipment.  For example, substantial amounts 
of capital will be required for the repainting or renovation of the building.32  Sectional 
owners should thus not be miserly when they have to vote on the annual budget due 
to the fact that the equity in their units are dependent on the proper maintenance of 
                                                          
27
 Annexure 8 r 31(2). 
28
 GN R 23 in GG 34639 of 28-09-2011. 
29
 C Riddin “Revised rules for levies and budgets” (December 2011) 6-12 Paddocks Press Newsletter 2 2. 
30
 See in general T Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book One 2ed (1999) 12-16 and Van der Merwe Sectional 
Titles 14-18(1) – 14-18(2). 
31
 Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book One 16. 
32
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-19. 
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the scheme as a whole, which requires proper budgeting and adequate provision for 
unforeseen expenses.33  
 
Bodies corporate can, however, reduce the problems posed by unexpected or 
substantial capital expenditure by including in the budget provision for future 
maintenance and repairs in a reserve fund (sinking fund).  The advantage of such a 
reserve fund is that ordinary monthly levies need not be substantially increased to 
meet future capital expenses such as the painting of the building.34  Therefore, the 
STSMA now replaces the obiter reference to a reserve fund35 in the Act with a 
provision that explicitly makes provision for the mandatory establishment of a 
reserve fund36 in order to promote the financial stability and longevity of sectional title 
schemes.37  In this regard the STSMA now provides that bodies corporate must 
„establish and maintain a reserve fund in such amounts as are reasonably sufficient 
to cover the cost of future maintenance and repair of common property but not less 
than such amounts as may be prescribed by the Minister‟.38  The main purpose of a 
reserve fund in sectional title schemes is to prevent malfunctioning facilities and 
building or buildings becoming derelict and no longer suitable for their intended use.  
The minimum annual contributions to this reserve fund, which will probably be a 
percentage of the annual contributions to the administration fund, will be prescribed 
by the Minister of Human Settlements in the regulations.39  If the contributions 
determined for the reserve fund at the annual general meeting are not reasonably 
sufficient to cover the cost of future maintenance and repairs of the common 
property or facilities, any sectional owner may in future, in terms of section 39(1)(c) 
of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011 (the CSOSA), approach 
the ombud service for a declaratory order that the contribution levied on sectional 
owners for this purpose was incorrectly determined and must be adjusted to a 
correct amount. 
 
                                                          
33
 T Maree “The levies issue” (October 2010) 37 MCS Courier Newsletter 1 1. 
34
 See in general Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-19 – 14-20.  
35
 See s 37(1)(a) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 which refers to „reasonable provision for future 
maintenance and repairs‟. 
36
 Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 3(1)(b).  
37
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-20. 
38
 Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 3(1)(b). 
39
 Van der Merwe (2012) TSAR 623. 
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It is, however, unfortunate that the STSMA did not provide for such a reserve fund in 
a more detailed manner.  For example, it would have been judicious to follow the 
New South Wales Strata Schemes Management Act 138 of 1996 which specifically 
distinguishes between the expenditure side and the income side of the sinking fund 
(reserve fund).  In terms of the latter act the expenditure side of a sinking fund 
consists of seven items in strata schemes (sectional title schemes) with more than 
three lots (units) namely:40 actual or expected expenditure for painting or repainting 
any part of the common property which is a building or other structure; actual or 
expected expenditure to acquire personal (movable) property;41 actual or expected 
expenditure to renew or replace personal property;42 actual or expected expenditure 
to renew or replace fixtures and fittings that are part of the common property; actual 
or expected expenditure to replace or repair the common property; actual or 
expected expenditure to meet other expenses of a capital nature; and any payments 
of surplus moneys to owners from the sinking fund.43  
 
The income side consists of the following items:44 contributions levied on, and paid 
by, owners for payment into the fund; any amounts paid to the owners corporation 
(body corporate) by way of discharge of insurance claims unless those amounts 
have been paid into the administrative fund; any amount received by the owners 
corporation that is not required or permitted to be paid into the administrative fund; 
interest paid or recovered forms part of the fund to which the relevant contribution 
belongs; and any interest received on an investment made under section 73(1) forms 
part of the fund to which the investment belongs.45   
 
An inadvertent omission in this regard in the STSMA is that this act fails to expressly 
provide for the investment of moneys in the reserve fund as it does for the 
investment of moneys in the administrative fund.46  The power of the body corporate 
                                                          
40
  Ss 71(1) and 75(2) of the New South Wales Strata Schemes Management Act 138 of 1996. 
41
 For example, purchasing a new or used washing machine, clothes dryer, lawn mower or broom for an owners 
corporation (body corporate).  See A Ilkin NSW Strata and Community Schemes Management and the Law 4ed 
(2007) 209.  
42
 This would include the renewal or replacement of an owners corporation‟s lawn mower, washing machine, 
clothes dryer and even light globes.  See Ilkin Strata and Community Schemes 209. 
43
 See in general Ilkin Strata and Community Schemes 208-209. 
44
 Ss 70, 73(2) and 80(2) of the New South Wales Strata Schemes Management Act 138 of 1996. 
45
 See in general Ilkin Strata and Community Schemes 210. 
46
 Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 4(g). 
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to invest the moneys in the reserve fund can, however, be performed under the 
general provision of section 4(i) of the STSMA which states that the body corporate 
may do all things reasonably necessary for the enforcement of the rules and for the 
management and administration of the common property.       
 
3 3 Kinds of levies 
 
We have already discussed the ordinary levies which sectional owners must pay into 
the administrative fund as part of their financial obligation as members of a sectional 
title scheme.  We shall now explain the other two kinds of levies owed by sectional 
owners in a sectional title scheme.  However, before one can examine special47 and 
additional levies48 it must be noted that the Act used to make provision for the 
payment of increased levies in terms of prescribed management rule 31(4A).      
 
Normally it is not possible to have an annual general meeting during the first month 
of the financial year and, therefore, levies for the next financial year are almost 
always fixed some time after the commencement of that year.49  The main reason for 
this lapse of time is the fact that the annual financial statements, the budget for the 
ensuing financial year and other documentation relating to the annual general 
meeting take time to prepare.50  There would thus be a gap in the financial calendar 
during which no levies are recoverable from owners that might cause cash flow 
problems for bodies corporate.51   
 
Before the insertion of management rule 31(4A) this problem was overcome by the 
trustees raising special levies52 on the basis of the participation quota of each unit to 
cover the shortage of funds in the financial calendar.  All sectional owners were 
notified of these levies and were also advised as to the amounts payable by each of 
them.  These special levies were then collected by the trustees until the budget was 
                                                          
47
 Annexure 8 r 31(4B) and ss 37(2A) and (2B) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles 
Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 3(3)). 
48
 S 37(1)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
3(1)(c)). 
49
 Maree Sectional Titles on Tap 6.13.  See also G Paddock Sectional Title Survival Manual 6ed (2008) 10-13. 
50
 I Kotze “Levies Due after the Financial Year End” (October 2010) 37 MCS Courier Newsletter 9 9. 
51
 Maree Sectional Titles on Tap 6.13.  
52
 Annexure 8 r 31(4) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
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approved and the new levies were confirmed at the annual general meeting.53  The 
insertion of management rule 31(4A) specifically catered for this situation in a 
different manner.  It provided that sectional owners were liable for contributions in 
the same amount and payable in the same instalments as were due and payable by 
them during the previous financial year to cover the shortfall in levies for the shortfall 
period.  This was given effect in the proviso which stated that the trustees may, if 
they consider it necessary and by written notice to the sectional owners, increase the 
contributions due by the owners by a maximum of 10% to account for the possible 
increased liability of the body corporate.  The liability for the payment of these 
increased levies continued until the new budget for the ensuing year was 
approved.54  The fact that the provision was inserted after management rule 31(4) 
meant that it applied not only to ordinary levies but also to special levies as raised by 
the trustees.55 
 
The Sectional Titles Amendment Regulations of 2013,56 however, deleted 
management rule 31(4A).57  The latter rule was replaced by a new sub rule 31(4B) 
that allows trustees to raise special levies in respect of all expenses as are 
mentioned in rule 31(1) and which are not included in rule 31(2).  Such levies and 
contributions may be payable in one sum or by such instalments as and at such 
times as the trustees shall think fit.  Increased levies are thus a matter of the past.    
 
The second kind of levy that may be raised by the trustees from time to time is thus 
special levies.  Special levies may only be raised for expenses which are necessary 
but were not budgeted for in the estimate of income and expenditure approved at the 
last annual general meeting.58  Over the years the raising of special levies has 
become an established practice, even though it was never covered expressly by the 
provisions of the Act.  Model management rule 31(4) was the peg used to legitimise 
the collection of special levies.  The latter rule determined that the trustees may from 
time to time, whenever necessary, charge special levies on sectional owners or call 
                                                          
53
 Maree Sectional Titles on Tap 6.13 - 6.14. 
54
 Annexure 8 r 31(4A) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986.  See also Kotze (October 2010) MCS Courier 
Newsletter 10.  
55
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-18(1).  
56
 GN R 196 in GG 36421 of 14-03-2013. 
57
 S 9(c) of the Sectional Titles Amendment Regulations of 14 March 2013. 
58
 Annexure 8 r 31(4B) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986.   
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upon them to make special contributions in respect of particular expenses which 
were not included in the budget.  The most important aspects of the latter rule is that 
special levies are raised by the trustees alone; special levies can only be raised if the 
expense is necessary; and the expense for which the special levy is raised must not 
have been budgeted for in the last annual budget approved at the last annual 
general meeting.59 
 
The collection of special levies was only recently legalised by the Sectional Titles 
Amendment Act 11 of 2010.  Subsection (2A) inserted into section 37 provides that 
any special contribution becomes due on the passing of a resolution in this regard by 
the trustees and may be recovered by the body corporate by action in any court 
(including a Magistrate‟s Court) having jurisdiction, from the persons who were 
owners of units at the time when such resolution was passed.60  The newly inserted 
subsection (2B) of section 37 then defines a special contribution as any contribution 
not budgeted for at an annual general meeting and which is levied upon owners 
during the ensuing year.  The reference should have been to the current year, as is 
the position in terms of section 3(4) of the STSMA, instead of the ensuing year.  This 
provision leaves too much to the trustees‟ discretion with regard to the imposition of 
special levies.  Furthermore, the ability to raise special contributions should have 
been limited to unbudgeted contributions in circumstances where the body corporate 
requires additional income to satisfy claims against it and the collection of such 
income cannot be delayed for inclusion in the budget ratified by owners at the next 
annual general meeting.61   
 
Consequently, special levies are contributions which owners are obliged to pay in the 
same proportion as their participation quotas over and above their normal, budgeted 
for levies in order to provide additional funds for a special project or an unexpected 
expense during the current year.62 
 
                                                          
59
 J Paddock “Special Levies in Sectional Title Schemes” (March 2009) 4-3 Paddocks Press Newsletter 5 5. 
60
 Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 3(3).  The recovery of such a special contribution is 
facilitated by allowing an application to an ombud instead of an action in any competent court (including a 
Magistrate‟s Court) having jurisdiction. 
61
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-18(5) - 14-18(6).  See also CG Van der Merwe “A Critical Analysis of the 
Innovations introduced by the Sectional Titles Amendment Bill of 2010” (2011) 22 Stell LR 115 133.    
62
 See Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book One 21.   
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Due to the unlimited extent of special levies, it is disputed whether the raising of 
special levies should be allowed.  Developers can, however, amend management 
rule 31(4B) to make provision for a rule to indicate what kind of special expenses will 
be considered necessary.  Since management rule 31(4B) can be amended, 
developers should be encouraged to impose more practical provisions to provide 
clarity to trustees as to when they have the right to raise special levies and as to 
when they should wait and rather cover the expense concerned in the next annual 
budget of the scheme.63    
 
These special levies may be payable in one lump sum or by such instalments as the 
trustees think fit.64  Trustees have every right to raise special levies without 
consulting with the sectional owners, but this is not recommended.65  As already 
mentioned above, special levies are calculated and apportioned to owners according 
to their respective participation quotas.  Therefore, any other formula would be 
invalid unless sanctioned in an amended management rule.66 
 
The last kind of levies that can be raised are additional levies.  The Act requires that 
sectional owners with exclusive use rights must make additional contributions to the 
fund established under section 37(1)(a) to satisfy claims against the body corporate 
with regard to the exclusive use areas concerned.67  Normally these additional 
contributions are arranged to be part of the levy payable by the specific sectional 
owner that are served by the exclusive use area.68  This means that additional levies 
should not be allocated to all sectional owners in accordance with their participation 
quotas, since only the owners of exclusive use areas are responsible for the 
payment of these additional levies.69   
 
                                                          
63
 G Paddock “Now the Developer can Amend PMR 31” (December 2008) 3-12 Paddocks Press Newsletter 2 3. 
64
 Annexure 8 r 31(4B) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
65
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-18(6) and Woudberg Basic Sectional Title Book One 21. 
66
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-18(6).  In practice trustees often make the mistake to apportion levies on 
an equal basis; see L De Lange “Special Levies – The Bare Necessities” (October 2007) 27 MCS Courier 
Newsletter 5 5. 
67
 S 37(1)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
3(1)(c)).  See also in general H Mostert “The Regulation of Exclusive Use Areas in terms of the Sectional Titles 
Act 95 of 1986: An Evaluation of the Existing Position and Suggested Alternatives” (1997) 8 Stell LR 324 338-
339.  
68
 G Paddock The Sectional Title Handbook 2ed (1990) 63.  See also in general Mostert (1997) Stell LR 339. 
69
 Maree Sectional Titles on Tap 6.17. 
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In Body Corporate of the Solidatus Scheme No SS 23/90 v De Waal70 the court had 
to decide whether the repair of certain structural defects, caused by faulty 
workmanship and poor design and construction, in a number of exclusive use areas 
in a sectional title scheme could be accommodated under the term „maintenance‟ in 
terms of section 37(1)(b).  The perception of the court was that the rights to exclusive 
use areas were so closely akin to ownership as to be virtually indistinguishable.71  
Accordingly the court decided that the sectional owners of these exclusive use areas 
were liable for the cost of repairs for these structural defects even though the 
structural flaws were not caused by them.72  This decision was severely criticised by 
various authors.  Van der Merwe is of the opinion that the structural parts of the 
building or buildings in a sectional title scheme, whether situated within a section, an 
exclusive use area or on the common property, should always be considered 
common property.  Furthermore, he suggests that the overhaul of structural defects 
should be considered as works which go beyond the ordinary scope of maintenance 
and should in principle fall in the responsibility sphere of the body corporate.73  
However, Maree proposed that there might be instances where the holders of 
exclusive use areas could rightly be held liable for the repair of structural defects.  
Examples of such instances would be where the structural failure was caused by the 
holder himself; where the structural failure occurred because of normal usage of the 
area; or where the structure forms part of the exclusive use area solely for the 
purpose of exclusive use and is not an integral part of the building supporting or 
protecting other sections or the common property.74   
 
Maree also suggests that the amount required in respect of exclusive use areas 
should be apportioned to the sectional owners served by exclusive use areas in 
proportion to the actual estimated costs related to each exclusive use area.  
Furthermore, he suggests that the trustees should keep the levy income relating to 
these areas in a separate bank account, which account should only be utilised for 
expenditure related to such areas.  Where expensive repairs are required to an 
exclusive use area and the budget is insufficient in such regard the costs related to 
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 1997 3 All SA 91 (T). 
71
 99E. 
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 99E-F. 
73
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 11-31. 
74
 T Maree “Drawing the Line – apportionment of expenses of exclusive use areas” (June 2002) 412 De Rebus 
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the repairs should be recovered from the sectional owner concerned as an additional 
levy.75 
 
3 4 Date on which levies become payable and responsibility for payment on 
transfer of a unit 
 
The Act and the management rules contain contradictory statements as to when 
levies are payable.  Before the amendment of section 37(2) of the Act by the 
Sectional Titles Amendment Act 29 of 2003, the body corporate could recover the 
amounts from the persons who were owners of units at the time when such 
contributions became due.  The amended section 37(2) after 2003 provides that any 
contribution levied under section 37(1) is due and payable on the passing of a 
resolution to that effect by the trustees of the body corporate, and may be recovered 
by the body corporate by action in the relevant court from the persons who were 
owners of units at the time when such resolution was passed.76  The relevant 
management rule 31(3) then somewhat confusingly states that within 14 days after 
each annual general meeting the trustees must advise each owner in writing of the 
amount payable by him in respect of the approved annual budget, whereupon such 
amount shall become payable in instalments, as determined by the trustees.77  
 
This implies that the decision of the sectional owners at the annual general meeting 
is the legal act that triggers liability for levies.  It would have been more logical for 
this sub rule to oblige the trustees to hold a meeting and to pass a resolution that the 
levy was due and payable within 14 days after the annual general meeting and, 
thereafter, to notify the owners in writing of the amounts due under the resolution 
they passed.  Maree regards the notification as a requisite for the payment of 
instalments but not as the moment on which contributions become claimable.  The 
failure to notify the owners would, therefore, constitute neglect on the part of the 
                                                          
75
 T Maree “Determination of levies and involvement of the trustees?” (September 2009) 34 MCS Courier 
Newsletter 10 11. 
76
 S 37(2) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986.  In the absence of a trustees‟ resolution levies will not be 
legally determined and will therefore not be due and claimable in law.  Thus in terms of s 37(2) there simply are 
no levies without a trustees‟ resolution.  See in this regard The Body Corporate of the Peaks Sectional Title 
Scheme, NO: SS 230/2002 v Dean Allan Prinsloo NO and Others WCC 20-09-2012 case no 7729/2012 para 27 
and T Maree “The Peaks Decision” (December 2012) 42 MCS Courier Newsletter 1 1.  
77
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trustees but should not render the contributions non-claimable.78  The failure to notify 
the owners may also mean that the amount of the contributions is not payable in 
instalments but that the full amount of the annual levy became due and payable 
when the trustees approved the resolution.79   
 
The amendment of section 37(2) by the Sectional Titles Amendment Act of 2003, 
which takes precedence over the provisions in the management rules, however, 
provides clarity as to the date when levies become due and payable.  We have seen 
that it stipulates that any contributions levied under any provision of subsection (1), 
shall be due and payable on the passing of a resolution to that effect by the trustees 
of the body corporate, and may be recovered by the body corporate by action in any 
court (including any Magistrate's Court) of competent jurisdiction from the persons 
who were owners of units at the time when such resolution was passed. 
 
The fact that contributions may be recovered „from the persons who were owners of 
the units at the time when the resolution was passed‟ causes confusion amongst 
sectional owners in sectional title schemes since it is assumed that the effect is that 
if an owner sells during the budget year, he will still be liable for the contributions for 
the entire year.80  Before the amendment the body corporate could recover the 
contributions „from the persons who were the owners of units at the time when such 
contributions became due‟, as opposed to recovering them from the person who was 
the owner on the passing of the resolution by the trustees.  This entailed that if a 
sectional owner sold his unit during the budget year, the monthly levy payments was 
merely transferred to the new purchaser.   
 
After the amendment of section 37(2) it was suggested that the body corporate 
would not be allowed to collect levies for the remaining part of the year from new 
owners.81  This implies that a person who owned the unit when the levy became due 
and payable is the only person from which the body corporate may legally recover 
                                                          
78
 T Maree “Latest Amendments to the Sectional Titles Act: Why now? Why this” (May 2005) 16 MCS Courier 
Newsletter 10 10-11.  
79
 11. 
80
 M Kelly-Louw “Collection of levies by a body corporate” (2004) 12-2 JBL 94 97 and M Kelly-Louw “The 
Preferential right of the Local Government or the Body Corporate above that of the Mortgage Bondholder 
during Insolvency Proceedings” (2004) 18 Speculum Juris 168 173. 
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the levy.  This can be problematic, for example, when a special levy is raised and 
becomes due and payable after an owner has sold his unit but before the transfer of 
ownership has taken place.  The seller would thus still be the owner at the time the 
special levy was raised and therefore the body corporate is legally entitled to recover 
the special levy from the seller and not from the purchaser as the new owner.  
 
To avoid disputes like this the seller may assign his levy obligations to the purchaser 
with effect from the date of transfer.  This contractual agreement must be accepted 
by the body corporate to be of any effect and can be achieved by means of a 
tripartite agreement between the seller, purchaser and body corporate.82  An 
example of such a clause, used by estate agency Chass Everrit, reads as follow: 
 
“It is agreed between the parties that the seller shall not be liable for the levies and 
other costs due and payable to the Body Corporate as from the date of registration of 
the transfer into the purchaser‟s name.  Accordingly the purchaser shall be liable and 
shall pay all levies and other costs due to the Body Corporate from such date.  The 
purchaser hereby indemnifies the seller against any claims in terms of section 37 of 
the Sectional Titles Act.”
83
 
 
The suggestion of Chass Everrit may provide a workable solution and also end the 
confusion around section 37, as discussed above. 
 
Fortunately, the amendment of section 37(2) of the Act by the Sectional Titles 
Amendment Act 11 of 201084 now specifically sheds light on the question as to who 
is responsible for the payment of levies where transfer of ownership has taken place.  
It now provides that upon the change of ownership of a unit, exclusive use areas or 
real rights of extension, the successor in title becomes liable for the pro rata payment 
of such contributions from the date of change of ownership.85  The fact that the new 
owner will become automatically liable for his share of the annual levies as from the 
date of registration of transfer of the unit into his name, will eliminate the need for the 
parties to enter into a tripartite agreement with the body corporate at the time of 
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 Paddock (June 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 3.  
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 Kelly-Louw (2004) JBL 97 and Kelly-Louw (2004) Speculum Juris 173-174. 
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 S 11 of the Sectional Titles Amendment Act 11 of 2010. 
85
 S 37(2) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 3(2)). 
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change of ownership in order to ensure the continued flow of budgeted contributions 
to the administrative fund.86   
 
With regard to special levies, the inserted subsection (2A) of section 37 reads that 
any special contribution shall be due on the passing of a resolution in this regard by 
the trustees and may be recovered from the persons who were owners of units at the 
time when such resolution was passed.87  Section 37(2A) was, however, not made 
subject to the same proviso as section 37(2) which means that the new owner will 
not automatically become liable for the portion of the special levy that was not yet 
paid on the transfer of ownership.  This result seems fair where the special levy was 
made payable in one sum but it is questionable whether this should also be the case 
where the special levy was made payable in instalments and all instalments were not 
paid at the time of transfer of ownership.88  Therefore, the tripartite agreement is not 
yet dead and should be utilised whenever a purchaser of a unit is required to take 
over the responsibilities of the seller in respect of any outstanding special levies.89  
The STSMA, however, now states that any special contribution becomes due on the 
passing of a resolution in this regard by the trustees of the body corporate levying 
such contribution and may be recovered by the body corporate by an application to 
an ombud.  It also corrected the lacuna in the Act by providing that upon the change 
of ownership of a unit, the successor in title becomes liable for the pro rata payment 
of such contributions from the date of change of ownership.90   
 
3 5 Personal liability of sectional owners for the debts of the body corporate 
 
A harsh reality in the South African sectional title context is the culture of under-
budgeting for expenses at annual general meetings and the non-payment of levies 
by sectional owners.  Consequently, there are numerous examples of bodies 
corporate finding themselves in grave financial distress.  The body corporate would 
inevitably default on its payments where the reserves and monthly income are 
insufficient to meet its commitments.  When this happens creditors will turn to 
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 T Maree “Latest Proposed Amendments to the Sectional Titles Act; Will these be the last?” (September 2009) 
34 MCS Courier Newsletter 1 4. 
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 S 11 of the Sectional Titles Amendment Act 11 of 2010. 
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 Van der Merwe (2011) Stell LR 133. 
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sectional owners individually to recover their claims as, in terms of the Act, the 
sectional owners are personally liable for the debts of the body corporate.91  This is, 
therefore, an instance where sectional owners are burdened with an additional 
financial obligation which can be enforced in the same manner as the other kinds of 
expenses discussed above.  
 
Under section 47(1) of the Act the liability of sectional owners is, however, of a 
subsidiary nature because they can only be sued if the body corporate is unable to 
satisfy its debts.92  If a judgement debt against the body corporate remains 
unsatisfied notwithstanding the issue of a writ, the judgement creditor can apply for 
the joinder of the members (sectional owners) of the body corporate in their personal 
capacities as joint judgement debtors in respect of the judgement debt.93  When this 
joinder takes place, the judgement creditor may recover the amount of the debt still 
outstanding from the members on a pro rata basis in proportion to their respective 
participation quotas or in accordance with any amendment to these proportions 
made in terms of section 32(4).94  Consequently, the trustees should not allow the 
liabilities of the body corporate to exceed its assets and result in an inability to 
discharge its ordinary day-to-day liabilities to its service providers and others.95 
 
The main features of section 47(1) can be summarised as follow:96  Firstly,   a 
creditor of the body corporate can only demand payment from individual sectional 
owners if a judgement is obtained against the body corporate and such a judgement 
remains unsatisfied or a nulla bona return is issued.  If this happens, the judgement 
creditor must apply to the court for the joinder of the sectional owners in their 
personal capacities as joint judgement debtors in order to recover the judgement 
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 H Delport “Sectional Title Unit Owners‟ Liability for Payment of Body Corporate‟s Debts” (2005) 26-2 
Obiter 404 404-405.  See alsoVan der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-10(1). 
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94
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debt pro rata from them.  Secondly, while sectional owners are jointly and severally 
liable for the debts of the body corporate, this liability is limited to a percentage of the 
debt based on the unit‟s participation quota or as modified in the rules.97  Thirdly, all 
sectional owners must be joined but the judgement creditor may recover pro rata 
payment from certain sectional owners only.  Fourthly, only sectional owners at the 
time when the application for joinder is made may be joined.  Therefore, sectional 
owners who were members when the debt was incurred may only be joined if they 
were still owners at the time of the application.  Lastly, section 47(1) initially did not 
draw any distinction between sectional owners who consistently paid their levies and 
levy defaulters.  That is, even though all the sectional owners had to be joined, the 
judgement creditor was able to recover from only levy-paying members who then 
had to recoup what they paid from the other sectional owners, some of whom were 
not in a financial position to repay what the sectional owner had paid.  This situation 
was highly unfair to sectional owners who faithfully paid their levies, due to the fact 
that they could be held liable for the debts of the body corporate, even though they 
did not cause the indebtedness of the body corporate.98  This „highly unfair‟ situation 
was taken care of by the amendment of the proviso to section 47(1) in the Act by the 
Sectional Titles Amendment Act 7 of 2005.  The proviso now reads as follow: 
 
“Provided that any member who has paid the contributions due by him or her in terms 
of section 37(1) to the body corporate in respect of the same debts prior to the 
judgement against the body corporate, may not be joined as a joint judgement debtor 
in respect of the judgement debt”
99 
 
This means that a sectional owner who has paid his portion of the levies in respect of 
specific accounts cannot be joined as joint debtor in respect of those accounts 
because he has already made payment in respect of the same debt.  Furthermore, if 
a special levy has been raised to cover extraordinary expenditure, the sectional 
owner who has paid his portion of the special levy cannot be joined as a judgement 
debtor in respect of this expenditure since he has already made payment in respect 
of the same debt, namely the extraordinary expenditure.100    
                                                          
97
 Under s 32(4) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
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An important question is, however, whether a sectional owner can be joined as a 
judgement debtor for debts incurred by the body corporate before he became a 
member of the body corporate, as was the situation before the Sectional Titles 
Amendment Act of 2005.  On the one hand one can argue that a judgement creditor 
claiming payments of debts incurred before such owner became a member of the 
body corporate, may join the sectional owner as a joint judgement debtor in respect 
of those debts because the levies were not paid in respect of the same debt.101  On 
the other hand it is arguable that the intention of the legislature was to amend the 
situation where levy paying sectional owners can be held liable for the debts of the 
body corporate.  The intention of the legislator could never have been to grant relief 
to levy paying owners, and not to purchasers into the scheme, who were not even 
owners when the debts were incurred.  Therefore, arguably the correct interpretation 
of section 47(1) would be that owners could be joined as judgement debtors, only if 
they were owners at the time when they were liable to pay levies in respect of the 
debt in question and they failed to pay these levies.102  
 
We have seen that the new proviso forces judgement creditors to take action for 
satisfaction of their debts against only those sectional owners who have not paid 
their levies.  Besides the fact that judgement creditors might find the task of 
unravelling the distinctive parts of levy payments impossible, it would also exempt 
sectional owners who have paid even the smallest portion towards „the same debt‟.  
From the perspective of the sectional owners the amendment would be welcomed 
since it removes the possibility to join sectional owners who paid their levies in 
respect of particular body corporate debts, but it might undermine the good 
governance and creditworthiness of bodies corporate in general.103  
 
Furthermore, compromising the original idea of making sectional owners personally 
liable for the debts of the body corporate could in practice result in the fact that a 
body corporate might have to be liquidated.  The Act does, however, not have any 
                                                          
101
 Delport (2005) Obiter 410; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-10(2) – 14-10(3).  This argument does, 
however, not prevent the risk of purchasing into a scheme where the body corporate has unpaid debts.  See Van 
der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-10(3). 
102
 Delport (2005) Obiter 410-411; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-10(3).  
103
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provisions to regulate such an occurrence.104  The fear that enormous municipal 
debts that have built up against bodies corporate would be passed on to individual 
sectional owners were also alleviated by the promulgation of the Local Government: 
Municipal Property Rates Act 6 of 2004 (the Property Rates Act), because it provides 
that sectional owners must be sued separately for municipal rates and in particular 
circumstances also for service charges.105  Therefore, the robust approach by the 
legislature to solve this problem, and thereby compromising one of the basic 
principles of the Act, that sectional owners have a personal subsidiary liability to pay 
all the debts of the body corporate, was perhaps too drastic.106 
 
3 6 Withholding payment of levies 
 
A situation may present itself in practice where sectional owners believe that the 
body corporate owes them money and that they are fully entitled to withhold their 
levy payments in lieu of this debt.  Such action may sound reasonable but it is not 
legally justified since sectional owners are only entitled to off-set such debts once the 
matter has been adjudicated by an arbitrator or a judge.107 
 
In the case of Body Corporate of Fish Eagle v Group Twelve Investments (Pty) Ltd108 
the High Court of the Witwatersrand had the opportunity to adjudicate upon the 
withholding of contributions by aggrieved sectional owners.  The body corporate 
applied for the final liquidation of a company, the registered owner of 22 units in the 
scheme, which owed the body corporate more than R400 000 in arrear levies and 
other charges.  The company opposed the application on several grounds.  The 
main grounds were the following: firstly, that the respondent had to carry out certain 
maintenance work, which the trustees omitted to do, and, secondly, that the 
increased and special levies were due to the trustees‟ mismanagement and were 
anyway superfluous because the body corporate had sufficient funds.109   
 
                                                          
104
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-10(4). 
105
 T Maree “Body Corporate Debts and Joinder of Owners: An Ineffectual Solution” (March 2006) 10-1 
Property Law Digest 2 3.  See also Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-10(4).  
106
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-10(4).  
107
 Paddock (June 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 3. 
108
 2003 5 SA 414 (W). 
109
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The court looked at management rule 31(4) which entitled trustees, from time to 
time, to impose special levies upon owners.  The court also took notice of section 
39(1) of the Act which determines that the functions and powers of the body 
corporate (which includes the function of requiring owners, whenever necessary, to 
make contributions by way of levies in terms of section 37(1)(b)) must be performed 
and exercised by the trustees of the body corporate holding office in terms of the 
rules.  It is the trustees, and not any individual sectional owner, who are empowered 
to take a decision as to whether or not the imposition of a levy (which would include 
a special levy) is necessary as contemplated by section 37(1)(b) of the Act, and by 
management rule 31(4).   
 
Furthermore, in terms of section 37(1)(d) of the Act one of the functions of a body 
corporate is to determine from time to time the amount to be raised for the purposes 
aforesaid.  In accordance with section 39(1) of the Act and management rule 30 the 
trustees for the time being of the body corporate have the function of determining the 
amounts to be levied upon sectional owners.  The court, therefore, decided that no 
sectional owner is entitled to dispute his liability for the payment of levies on the 
ground that the levies concerned were excessive in his opinion.110 
 
However, in terms of the CSOSA an applicant (sectional owners or occupiers) can 
now bring an application for an order declaring that a contribution levied on owners 
or occupiers is incorrectly determined or unreasonable, and an order for the 
adjustment of the contribution to a correct reasonable amount.111  This provision is 
laudable since sectional owners can now dispute their liability for the payment of 
levies that are excessive.  Following this route will also be much swifter and cheaper 
than having the matter adjudicated by an arbitrator or a judge.   
 
3 7 Recovery of profits on levies 
 
Another related question with regard to the financial obligations of sectional owners 
is whether sectional owners are entitled to a refund of contributions lawfully levied 
upon and duly paid by them.  The answer to this question necessitates a 
                                                          
110
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consideration of model management rule 45.  This rule makes it clear that sectional 
owners are not entitled to a refund of contributions lawfully levied upon and duly paid 
by them.112  The aim of this rule is to ensure that, once money has been lawfully 
levied and paid into the administrative fund, bodies corporate are not tempted to 
withdraw money for frivolous purposes.  Placing an embargo on refunding was a 
fairly crude obstacle placed in the way of bodies corporate to guarantee sufficient 
money in the reserve fund to pay for reasonable future expenses.  However, if the 
sectional owners decide to charge lesser levies in order to bring surpluses in the 
reserve fund down to what is required in the Act (to provide for reasonable future 
maintenance and repairs),113 a purchaser cannot challenge  such a resolution on the 
ground that it reduces his share in the reserve fund.114   
 
Therefore, sectional owners are not entitled to recover or be refunded any levies that 
they have paid to the body corporate, unless they can prove that a part or a whole of 
a contribution levied upon them was unlawful.115 
 
3 8 Evaluation 
 
Bodies corporate can only discharge their statutory administrative and maintenance 
obligations if they have access to a continual supply of operating capital.116  The Act 
caters for this by requiring that each body corporate must establish an administrative 
fund sufficient, in the opinion of the body corporate, to cover its expenses.117  The 
payment of levies by sectional owners is, therefore, the most important financial 
obligation that is placed on sectional owners.  However, for many years accounting 
and financial estimates and reporting in sectional title schemes were not up to a 
standard that ensured financially sound bodies corporate.  The large amount of 
special levies that are currently raised in sectional title schemes bears testimony to 
this.  This state of affairs may be due to the failure to deliver monthly management 
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 Annexure 8 rule 45(1) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
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 See s 37(1)(a) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
114
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 14-20(2). 
115
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reports in many sectional title schemes, or a lack of adequate expertise to prepare 
proper estimates.118 
 
It is commendable that the STSMA now explicitly requires that the funds budgeted 
for the administrative fund must be reasonably sufficient to cover the annual 
expenses of the scheme and makes provision for the establishment of a reserve 
fund which will promote the financial stability and longevity of sectional title schemes.  
The fact that the Minister of Human Settlements must decide on the total amount of 
the reserve fund is to be welcomed since this would prevent bodies corporate from 
being stingy in determining such amount.  Unfortunately, the STSMA does not 
specifically state what would be part of the income and expenditure side of the 
reserve fund, as is the case in New South Wales.  This would have given more 
clarity on how to correctly determine the amounts payable to the reserve fund.  
Nevertheless, the fact that the body corporate must now ensure that the budgeted 
levies are sufficient to cover the expenses of the current year and that a reserve fund 
with reasonably sufficient funds must be set up, would definitely diminish the need to 
impose special levies on sectional owners.  
 
We have seen, at 3 3, that the well-designed provision of model management rule 
31(4A), which used to make provision for the payment of increased levies, has been 
deleted by section 9(c) of the Sectional Titles Amendment Regulations of 2013.  A 
possible reason for the replacement of management rule 31(4A) is the fact that the 
ability to impose special levies was belatedly given recognition in the Act itself by the 
insertion of section 37(2A) and (2B) by the Sectional Titles Amendment Act of 2010.  
The gap left by the deletion of increased levies is thus now covered by means of 
special levies which should not be raised by the trustees for frivolous purposes.  
Arguably, the raising of special levies will now take place more often because it also 
needs to cover expenses during the period where no levies are payable by sectional 
owners.  Developers should thus use the opportunity to amend management rule 
31(4B) to impose more practical provisions to provide clarity to trustees as to when 
they have the right to raise special levies.119    
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Previously the seller, purchaser and body corporate had to enter into a tripartite 
agreement to transfer the levy obligations from the seller to the purchaser, which 
was costly, time consuming and impractical.  Fortunately, with the amendment of 
section 37(2) of the Act by the Sectional Titles Amendment Act of 2010 the need for 
tripartite agreements came to an end because the amended section now provides 
that upon the change of ownership of a unit, exclusive use areas or real rights of 
extension, the successor in title becomes liable for the pro rata payment of such 
contributions from the date of change of ownership.120  Section 37(2A) was, 
however, not made subject to the same proviso as section 37(2) which means that 
the new owner will not become automatically liable for the portion of the special levy 
that was not yet paid on the transfer of ownership.  This means that the tripartite 
agreement is still applicable in the case of special levies where transfer of ownership 
takes place and the liability for pro rata payments is transferred to the purchaser.  
The STSMA, however, took a step in the right direction by providing clarity on who is 
responsible for the payment of special levies where transfer of ownership has taken 
place by stating that the successor in title becomes liable for the pro rata payment of 
such contributions from the date of change of ownership.121  Therefore the seller, 
purchaser and body corporate need not enter into a tripartite agreement because 
owners now automatically become liable for the pro rata payment of such 
contributions where transfer of ownership has taken place. 
 
The new proviso to section 47(1)122 of the Act, limiting the recovery of debts of the 
body corporate to owners who have not paid their contributions to the said debt, is 
problematic because it assumes that the total amount of levies raised prior to 
judgement will cover the current and judgement debts of the body corporate and 
does not take into account that the body corporate‟s debts are often not caused by 
the non-recovery of contributions, but rather by inadequate budgeting.123  The new 
proviso also forces the judgement creditor to take action only against non-paying 
owners.  Besides the fact that it would be almost impossible for a judgement creditor 
to unravel the distinctive parts of levy payments, it would apparently also excuse 
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owners who have paid even the smallest portion towards the same debt.124  
Furthermore, where necessary, the recovery could include execution proceedings 
which would presumably be limited to a specific owner‟s arrears in contributions.  
This entails a shortfall for the judgement creditor.125  Moreover, the Sectional Titles 
Amendment Act of 2005 created uncertainty as to whether a member of the body 
corporate may, as in the past, be joined as a joint judgement debtor in respects of 
debts incurred by the body corporate before such member obtained his membership 
of the body corporate.  It is unfortunate that section 15 of the STSMA, which is an 
exact re-enactment of section 47 of the Act, does not state that if an owner has paid 
his levies neither he nor his successor in title may be joined as judgement debtors 
for payment of the body corporate‟s debts, provided that the successor also keeps 
up his levy payments.126  In principle members of a sectional title body corporate 
should be liable for its debts, because a movement away from this would undermine 
good governance and it would also wear down the creditworthiness of bodies 
corporate. 
 
Lastly, we have seen that aggrieved sectional owners may not withhold the payment 
of levies to off-set debts they believe are owed to them by the body corporate.  The 
withholding of the payment of levies may only take place once the matter has been 
adjudicated by an arbitrator or judge.  This situation is laudable since owners would 
have otherwise been able to take the law into their own hands even in unjustifiable 
circumstances.  Laudably, the CSOSA now makes provision for sectional owners to 
dispute their liability for the payment of levies that are excessive.  It is also 
praiseworthy that owners are not entitled to a refund of contributions lawfully levied 
upon them and paid because this ensures that there are sufficient funds for expected 
and unexpected future maintenance and repairs.    
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Chapter 4:  Less Severe Measures for the 
Enforcement of Financial Obligations 
 
4 1 Introduction 
 
The difficulties involved in the timeous collection of levies are the main source of 
financial and personal anxiety encountered by bodies corporate in sectional title 
schemes.  In difficult economic times the collection of levies becomes even more 
crucial, but unfortunately it also becomes less successful.1  Repeated failure by 
sectional owners to comply with their financial obligations may prevent timely 
maintenance and the efficient administration of the scheme, which would ultimately 
result in the scheme‟s downfall.2  Arrear levies should thus be strictly controlled and 
regulated by only allowing low margins for debt.3  Harmony in sectional title schemes 
depends on competent management that allows the common parts of the building 
and the common facilities to be adequately and regularly maintained.4  Therefore, it 
is clear that bodies corporate must be provided with stronger mechanisms to better 
enforce the payment of levies.  A swift and inexpensive procedure must be found to 
allow the body corporate to collect these levies timeously.5   
 
The attachment and sale in execution of sectional title units, which will be discussed 
in the next chapter, is the most severe measure used to enforce sectional owners‟ 
financial obligations.  Fortunately for bodies corporate the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 
1986 (the Act), the prescribed rules and the Magistrates‟ Courts Act 32 of 1944 also 
make provision for less severe measures for the enforcement of sectional owners‟ 
financial obligations.  These measures include the following: levies are recoverable 
in court; the defaulting owner is held  responsible for all costs of recovery and 
interest on arrears; the suspension of the defaulting owner‟s voting rights; an 
embargo on the defaulting owner‟s nomination and election as trustee;  an embargo 
                                                          
1
 JL Winokur “Meaner Lienor Community Associations: The “Super Priority” Lien and Related Reforms under 
the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act” (1992) 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 353 357. 
2
 CG Van der Merwe & JC Sonnekus Sectional Titles, Share Blocks and Time-Sharing Volume 1 Sectional 
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3
 9-5. 
4
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on the alienation of a unit unless all arrears have been paid; the attachment of the 
defaulter‟s movables and rental income; emolument attachment orders, garnishee 
orders and administration orders issued against the defaulter; and sequestration of 
the sectional owner.   
 
The advantages and disadvantages of each of these measures will be thoroughly 
investigated in this chapter.  We shall see that some of these measures are 
moderately successful in forcing solvent defaulters to pay their contributions but that 
most of them have been proved ineffectual in practice.  We shall, therefore, consider 
whether the management rules can be amended to provide for more efficient 
measures of enforcement, and if so, whether these measures pass the test of 
constitutionality.  Finally, we shall consider whether the legislator should be called 
upon to include stronger mechanisms for legal recourse in the Act that will better 
address the problems encountered in the enforcement of the financial obligations of 
sectional owners. 
 
4 2 Less severe measures  
 
4 2 1 Recoverability in court 
 
In terms of the Act all contributions levied for administrative expenses shall be due 
and payable once the trustees of the body corporate have passed a resolution to that 
effect.6  This resolution must be passed soon after each annual general meeting 
where the estimate of income and expenditure (budget) was approved and the 
amount to be levied on owners during the ensuing financial year determined.7  The 
amount each sectional owner must pay is determined in accordance with the 
participation quotas, or an amendment with regard to expenses, of their respective 
sections.8  Within 14 days after the annual general meeting each owner must be 
advised in writing of the amount payable by him.  This amount will become payable 
in instalments as determined by the trustees.9  Once the resolution has been passed 
by the trustees, arrear contributions may be recovered by the body corporate by 
                                                          
6
 S 37(2) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 3(2)). 
7
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action in court, including any Magistrate‟s Court, from the persons who were owners 
of units at the time when such resolution was passed.10  
 
The following steps should be taken by collection attorneys before they commence 
with an action in the Magistrate‟s Court.  Firstly, it would be advisable for the attorney 
to call the defaulting owner to inform him of the outstanding contributions that need 
to be paid.  If no payment is made after the telephone call the second step would be 
to send a letter of demand to the defaulting owner informing him that if he fails to pay 
his levies before a certain date further legal action will commence.  If the defaulting 
owner then fails to respond to the letter of demand a summons may be issued after 
the payment period expires.  The summons should be delivered to the Magistrate‟s 
Court so that the sheriff can serve the summons on the defaulting owner.  Thereafter 
the defaulting owner has 10 days to defend.  If the claim is not defended the attorney 
can apply for a default judgement.  Once judgement is granted by the Magistrate‟s 
Court the defaulting owner can be blacklisted and the collection attorney can execute 
against his assets.   
 
The cost of the recovery of levies can be kept minimal since it can be recovered in 
the Magistrate‟s Court and not necessarily in the High Court having jurisdiction.11  
Bodies corporate should, therefore, act swiftly against levy defaulters in order to 
avoid having to go to the High Court since the claim or the value of the matter in 
dispute in a Magistrate‟s Court should not exceed the amount determined by the 
Minister from time to time by notice in the Government Gazette.12      
 
The cost of recovery could have been even less if it was permissible to recover 
levies by an action in a South African Small Claims Court.  The latter option is, 
however, ruled out by the Small Claims Court Act 61 of 1984 because it only 
entertains claims between natural persons and does not allow legal persons like a 
body corporate to institute claims in the Small Claims Court.13  
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 S 37(2). 
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 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-8(1) – 9-9. 
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The Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 (the STSMA) now states 
that ordinary levies, additional levies and levies payable to the reserve fund may be 
recovered by the body corporate by an application to a regional ombud from persons 
who were owners of units at the time when such resolution was passed.14  This 
procedure would be swifter than the time-consuming action required in any 
competent court, including a Magistrate‟s Court, having jurisdiction.  Furthermore, 
the STSMA also makes provision for the recovery of special contributions by an 
application to the ombud.15  The swifter recovery of special contributions will be even 
more important where substantial amounts of money are required to affect 
maintenance or repairs in emergency situations.  It is, however, important to note 
that the body corporate still has the discretion to rather pursue the action in a court of 
law since both of the above mentioned provisions of the STSMA uses the word „may‟ 
which is considered to be permissive rather than mandatory.16  
 
4 2 2 Defaulting owner’s responsibility for costs of recovery  
 
Prescribed management rule 31(5) reads as follows:  
 
“An owner shall be liable for and pay all legal costs, including costs as between 
attorney and client, collection commission, expenses and charges incurred by the 
body corporate in obtaining the recovery of arrear levies, or any other arrear amounts 
due and owing by such owner to the body corporate, or in enforcing compliance with 
these rules, the conduct rules or the Act.” 
 
In terms of this rule the defaulting owner will be liable to pay all legal costs incurred 
by the body corporate in the recovery of arrear levies.  Legal costs may include the 
following (this list is by no means exhaustive and depends on the specific situation at 
hand): correspondence (telephone calls and e-mails sent and received); letters of 
demand; summonses; appearances in court; instructions; and the perusal of 
documents.  De Villiers J, in Barnard NO v Regspersoon van Aminie en ‘n Ander17 
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 S 3(2) of the Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011. 
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 S 3(3). 
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 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-9. 
17
 2000 1 SA 213 (T). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
79 
 
also decided that legal costs include costs in respect of the sequestration of an 
insolvent estate.18  
 
This rule also specifies that legal costs include costs as between attorney and client.  
The successful party in a court case is generally entitled to party and party costs, 
which means that the successful party will recover from the other side, a portion of 
the costs that he has to pay to his attorney.  However, the Act specifically states that 
the winner, which would in this case be the body corporate, can recover legal costs 
on an attorney and client scale.  This means that the body corporate will recover a 
higher proportion of its cost.19 
 
Besides legal costs the defaulting owner will be liable for collection commission.  In 
practice most levy financiers and collection attorneys will recover their costs incurred 
in collecting debts and enforcing compliance with the rules from amounts paid by 
defaulting owners.  Therefore, Paddock suggests that it would be wise for a 
developer to amend management rule 31(5) to make this position clearer.  This can 
be done by allowing a range of body corporate agents to charge contingency fees 
that the body corporate can recover from owners.  Contingency fees are the 
arrangement between the levy financier or collection attorney and client (body 
corporate) whereby the levy financier or collection attorney agrees to represent the 
client with compensation (fee) to be a percentage of the amount recovered.  Since 
contingency fees are generally charged at a higher rate than ordinary fees, such an 
amended rule might also address the fee structure, perhaps by allowing the trustees 
to approve the amounts payable from time to time.20  
 
In addition the defaulting owner will be liable for expenses and charges incurred by 
the body corporate in obtaining the recovery of arrear levies.  It is difficult to answer 
whether fees charged and disbursements incurred by others such as managing 
agents and levy financiers, for example para-legal costs, are recoverable from the 
defaulting owner.  Arguably management rule 31(5) only deals with legal costs and 
that all the examples following after the words „legal costs‟ are qualified by the 
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expression „legal costs‟.  On this view „expenses‟ and „charges‟ incurred by others 
are not recoverable from the defaulting owner.  A more likely interpretation would, 
however, be that the last part of management rule 31(5) namely „expenses and 
charges incurred by the body corporate‟ are separate items not covered by the 
phrase „legal costs‟.  In such a case the defaulter would be liable not only for legal 
costs but also for other expenses and charges incurred by the body corporate in 
recovering arrear levies, which would, therefore, include fees charged and 
disbursements incurred by others such as managing agents and levy financiers.  If 
the latter interpretation is acceptable a mechanism should be put in place to prevent 
costs spiralling or the rule should be amended to exclude such expenses and 
charges as an item recoverable from the defaulting owner. 21    
 
Finally it should be noted that the defaulting owner will be liable for the legal costs, 
collection commission and recovery expenses of the body corporate in regard not 
only to the recovery of arrear levies but also for the recovery of any other arrear 
amount due and owing to the body corporate or in enforcing compliance with the 
prescribed rules and the Act.22   
 
From a legal comparative perspective South Africa is not the only country that makes 
the defaulting owner liable for legal costs and other expenses in the recovery of 
arrear levies.  For example, the Spanish Law on Horizontal Property of 21 July 1960 
provides that all reasonable legal costs and the collection costs incurred prior to a 
court case can be claimed upon the presentation of written proof.  Furthermore, court 
costs can be claimed and if the action gets opposed, the general rule as to judicial 
costs applies, and the total cost in using legal representation can be claimed.23  The 
Ontario Condominium Act of 1998 also specifically states that the management 
association (body corporate) is entitled to claim all expenses connected with the 
collection or attempted collection of arrear contributions.  This includes the cost of 
preparing and registering a certificate of lien which establishes a security charge on 
                                                          
21
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the apartment of the defaulter in favour of the body corporate for money owed to the 
body corporate.24   
 
4 2 3 Defaulting owner’s responsibility for interest on arrears 
 
Prescribed management rule 31(6) reads as follows: 
 
“The trustees shall be entitled to charge interest on arrear amounts at such rate as 
they may from time to time determine”. 
 
This rule places an additional financial burden on the defaulter who is already liable 
for legal costs, collection commission, and recovery expenses and charges because 
the trustees in addition are entitled to charge interest on arrear amounts at such 
rates as they may from time to time determine.   
 
It must be pointed out that no interest will be recoverable if the trustees fail to take a 
resolution to set interest at a particular rate.   This has been confirmed in the recent 
case of The Body Corporate of the Peaks Sectional Titles Scheme, No: SS230/2002 
v Dean Alan Prinsloo NO and Others.25  The absence of a resolution to set a rate of 
interest would lead to the unfortunate situation whereby levy-paying owners would 
effectively subsidise the arrears of levy defaulters.  
 
The next question is whether the trustees really have absolute discretion in setting 
the rate of interest and whether they may set a rate which exceeds the rates set 
under the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975, which currently specifies a rate 
of 15.5 %.26   
 
In Body Corporate Lynwood Gardens v Mureli Yegi and Another27 the court queried 
the statement28 that the interest rate may not exceed the rate set under section 1(2) 
                                                          
24
 Art 85(3)(c) of the Ontario Condominium Act of 1998 (S.O., 1998, Ch. 19).  See also Van der Merwe & 
Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Duke Journal of International and Comparative Law 130-131. 
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 WCC 20-09-2012 case no 7729/2012.  For a summary of this case see T Maree “The Peaks Decision” 
(December 2012) 42 MCS Courier Newsletter 1 1.   
26
 S 1(2) of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975. 
27
 CPD 27-08-2003 case no A35/2003 para 11. 
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of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act.  The latter act provides that if a debt bears 
interest and the rate at which the interest is to be calculated is not governed by any 
other law or by an agreement or a trade custom, or in any other manner, such rate 
shall be calculated at the prescribed rate.29  In the present case, the annual general 
meeting resolved by majority vote to direct the board of trustees to increase the rate 
of interest charged on arrear contributions to 10% per month.30  Therefore, it was 
held that the obligation to pay interest at the rate of 10% per month was created by 
agreement between the owners and for that reason the Prescribed Rate of Interest 
Act did not apply.31   
 
It should be pointed out that the rationale for deciding that the interest rate was not 
restricted to the rate prescribed in the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act was that the 
rate decided on by the trustees was based on a direction of the general meeting to 
increase the rate of interest to 10% per month, which adds up to 120% per year.  
The court construed this direction to the trustees as an agreement reached between 
the members of the body corporate and because the rate at which the interest was to 
be calculated was governed by an agreement, the rate need not be calculated at the 
prescribed rate.  It could be questioned whether a majority resolution directing the 
trustees to charge interest at a certain rate can be regarded as an „agreement‟ as to 
the rate of interest.  What is clear, however, is that if the trustees have set a rate of 
10% per month without having been directed by the general meeting to do so, the 
rate set would not have been covered by an agreement and that, therefore, they had 
fallen foul of the prescribed rate of 15.5% per year as prescribed by the Prescribed 
Rate of Interest Act.  From this it follows that trustees do not have absolute discretion 
to charge whatever rate they please, but that the rate they charge is governed by the 
provisions of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act.32 
 
A related question is whether the general meeting would be allowed to adopt a 
resolution to direct the trustees to charge a higher rate than the prescribed rate.  In 
general it makes sense for a meeting of owners to decide what rate of interest 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
28
 In n 6 to para 237 at page 196 in the chapter of LAWSA dealing with Sectional Titles, contributed by Prof CG 
Van der Merwe.  
29
 S 1(1) of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975. 
30
 Body Corporate Lynwood Gardens v Mureli Yegi and Another CPD 27-08-2003 case no A35/2003 para 2. 
31
 See in general Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-10(2). 
32
 See in general Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-10(2) – 9-10(3). 
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should be charged on arrear levies and this happens frequently in practice.  It gives 
the owners a chance to decide on a reasonable rate related to the characteristics of 
that particular scheme.  However, in my opinion not even the general meeting should 
have an unfettered discretion to adopt whatever interest rate they like since I am of 
the opinion that the rate of interest should be linked to an objective standard.  
Paddock supports this when he suggests that the applicable rate of interest should 
be linked to some external published interest rate that is regularly reviewed and 
amended in line with economic circumstances.33  Maree, on the other hand, is of the 
view that the in duplum rule, which prevents interest exceeding the capital balance, 
should be the only limitation applicable to interest levied upon owners in respect of 
amounts mentioned in management rule 31(5) and (6).34  In summary, I argue that 
prescribed management rule 31(6) requires the trustees to determine the rate of 
interest.  General meetings should give owners an indication of the rate of interest to 
be charged on arrears, but this should not be construed as an agreement which can 
circumvent the limitations set by the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act.  It seems 
improper to accept that the only limitation on the rate of interest charged should be 
the in duplum rule according to which a creditor is not allowed to obtain twice the 
amount of the capital debt.     
 
The court in Body Corporate Lynwood Gardens v Mureli Yegi and Another35 
furthermore accepted the decision in Standard Bank of South Africa v Oneanate 
Investments (in liquidation)36 that the compounding or capitalisation of interest is not 
permissible, for to allow such practice would be an easy method of avoiding the in 
duplum rule or the provisions of the Usury Act 73 of 1968.37  Therefore, the court 
decided that the payment of the 10% interest per month was subject to the in duplum 
rule.38       
 
                                                          
33
 Paddock (December 2008) Paddocks Press Newsletter 3-4.     
34
 T Maree “Is there a cap on interest rates for arrears” (December 2012) 42 MCS Courier Newsletter 2 2-3. 
35
 CPD 27-08-2003 case no A35/2003. 
36
 1998 1 SA 811 (A).  
37
 Body Corporate Lynwood Gardens v Mureli Yegi and Another CPD 27-08-2003 case no A35/2003 para 10.3. 
38
 Para 14.2(1). 
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Mitchell v Beheerliggaam RNS Mansions39 considered whether the charge of 
compound interest on unpaid levies and interest was permissible in terms of 
management rule 31(6).  The applicant bought a unit in a sectional title scheme at a 
sale in execution subject to the condition that the buyer must pay any amount due in 
law to the body corporate.  After the sale the applicant received a reconciliation 
which indicated that an amount of R180 579, 26 was owed in respect of the unit as 
at June 2008.  It appeared from the statement that interest had been capitalised and 
thus that compound interest had been levied.  The applicant then sought an order 
from the court that the respondent was only entitled to charge simple interest at a 
rate determined from time to time by the trustees.40  Several pronouncements on the 
subject of compound interest in general was reviewed before the judge assumed in 
favour of the applicant that compound interest would only be payable if there was 
something in the Act which specifically provided for the payment of such interest.41  
 
It was shown that one of the functions of a body corporate is to establish a fund for 
administrative expenses which is sufficient in its opinion for the repair, upkeep, 
control, management and administration of the common property.42  It is for these 
reasons that the body corporate is obliged to require owners to make contributions to 
the fund43 and to recover them in any competent court.44  Management rule 30 
provides that trustees are obliged to levy and collect contributions from the owners in 
accordance with the provisions and in the proportions set forth in management rule 
31.  After the content of management rule 31(5) was mentioned, Murphy J 
highlighted that management rule 31(6) entitles the trustees to charge interests on 
arrear amounts at such rate as they may determine from time to time.  Murphy J then 
pointed out that rule 31(5) draws a distinction between „arrear levies‟ on the one 
hand and „any other arrear amounts due and owing‟ on the other hand; and that rule 
31(6) entitles the trustees to charge interest on any arrear amounts and not only on 
arrear levies.  From this literal interpretation he concluded that rule 31(6) allowed the 
trustees to charge interest on unpaid interest charged on arrear levies, thus 
                                                          
39
 2010 5 SA 75 (GNP).  For a short summary of the judgment see N De Goede “M.D. Mitchell v Beheerligaam 
RNS Mansions: Simplifying a Compounded Issue” (September 2010) 5-9 Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
40
 Mitchell v Beheerliggaam RNS Mansions 2010 5 SA 75 (GNP) para 6. 
41
 Paras 8-10. 
42
 Para 11. 
43
 Ss 37(1)(a)-(d) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
44
 S 37(2). 
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compound interest.  He goes on to remark that the trustees would fail in their 
fiduciary duty if they did not charge defaulting owners compound interest, which they 
would be able to earn on money invested in a commercial bank as they are entitled 
to do under prescribed management rules 4345 and 44;46 and thus they comply with 
their obligation to ensure that the fund for administrative expenses is sufficient to 
enable the body corporate to fulfil its functions.47  Therefore, Murphy J concluded 
that the Act authorised the charge of compound interest on unpaid levies and 
dismissed the application for a declarator that the body corporate is only allowed to 
charge simple interest on such amounts.48   
 
Van der Merwe, however, submits that due consideration was not given to  Body 
Corporate Lynwood Gardens v Mureli Yegi and Another49 where the court remarked 
that the compounding or capitalisation of interest is not permissible, for to allow such 
practice would be an easy method of avoiding the in duplum rule or the provisions of 
the Usury Act.50 
 
While the rationale for charging interest on arrears and other debts owed to the body 
corporate is to force the defaulting owner to pay arrears, the aim is not to punish the 
defaulting owner.  Moreover, the modern trend under the Consumer Protection Act 
68 of 2008 and other consumer protection legislation is to be more lenient on 
defaulters and to allow them to have their payments rescheduled.  In view of this it 
seems acceptable to set the rate of interest that can be charged in accordance with 
the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act.   
 
4 2 4 Suspension of voting rights  
 
The sectional owner‟s right to vote is one of the normal consequences of 
membership of a body corporate.  A sectional owner is automatically a member of 
                                                          
45
 In terms of management rule 43 any funds not immediately required for disbursement may be invested in a 
savings or similar account with any building society or bank approved by the trustees from time to time. 
46
 Management rule 44 then again states that interests on moneys invested shall be used for any lawful purpose. 
47
 Mitchell v Beheerliggaam RNS Mansions 2010 5 SA 75 (GNP) para 14. 
48
 Para 15. 
49
 CPD 27-08-2003 case no A35/2003. 
50
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-10(4).  
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the body corporate which entitles him to vote at all general meetings either 
personally, by proxy51 or through a legally recognised representative.52  
 
In this regard prescribed management rule 64 provides the following: 
 
“Except in cases where a special resolution or unanimous resolution is required 
under the Act, an owner shall not be entitled to vote at any general meeting if - 
 
(a)  any contributions payable by him in respect of his section and his 
undivided share in the common property have not been duly paid; or 
         (b)     …: Provided that any mortgagee shall be entitled to vote as such  
         owner‟s proxy at any general meeting, even though paragraph (a)  
         or the foregoing provisions of this paragraph may apply to such  
         owner.” 
                     
From the above it is clear that the suspension applies only in the case of ordinary 
resolutions and not if he has to vote for matters requiring a special or unanimous 
resolution.53  However, an owner who has not paid his levies may still attend and 
speak at any general meeting.  Furthermore, the proviso to rule 64 clearly states that 
any sectional mortgagee of a defaulting sectional owner‟s unit is entitled to vote as 
such owner‟s proxy at any general meeting.54  There is no reason why an owner who 
is not entitled to vote but remains entitled to attend and speak at a meeting should 
not be included in the calculation of the quorum.55  It seems trite that this suspension 
will only be lifted once the whole debt is satisfied.56  
 
                                                          
51
 Annexure 8 r 67 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
52
 Such as a trustee; Annexure 8 r 65 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986.  See also J Paddock 
“Disqualifications from Voting in Sectional Title Meetings” (July 2010) 5-7 Paddocks Press Newsletter 4. 
53
 In terms of Puerto Rican case law this suspension also applies to unanimous resolutions, which would thus 
deprive the defaulting owner of the right to vote on a unanimous resolution.  See in general Van der Merwe & 
Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Duke Journal of International and Comparative Law 133.   
54
 Annexure 8 r 64(a) and (b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986.  See also in general Van der Merwe 
Sectional Titles 9-10(5) and Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Duke Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 133.  
55
 C Baker “Quorums and the Value of Votes: Proposed changes to Prescribed Management Rules 53, 57 and 
64” (February 2009) 4-2 Paddocks Press Newsletter 1 3.  
56
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-10(5). 
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In Herald Investments Share Block (Pty) Ltd and Others v Meer and Others; Meer v 
Body Corporate of Belmont Arcade and Another57 the court highlighted the phrase 
„contributions payable‟ by the defaulting owner.  The court examined prescribed 
management rules 30, 31 and 45 and the sections of the Act applicable to 
contributions, and found that „contributions‟ referred solely to the amounts levied on 
owners of sections to meet the expenses of the body corporate and not to interest on 
any overdue contributions.58  Since none of these rules refer to interest, the court 
found that rule 64(a), dealing with the suspension of voting rights in case of non-
payment of „contributions‟ could not be invoked if a defaulting owner paid the capital 
amount of the arrear levies but not the simple or compound interest that had accrued 
thereon.  The court cautioned that to disqualify a sectional owner from voting at a 
general meeting is a very stringent sanction, as it deprives him of a voice in relation 
to matters arising directly from his ownership of immovable property.  The latter 
inequitable disadvantage is recognised by the phrase at the beginning of rule 64(a) 
which excludes disqualification on resolutions requiring either unanimous or special 
resolutions.  Therefore, it is impermissible to silence the voice of any sectional owner 
if he is in arrears with his contributions, when it comes to profoundly important 
issues.  Consequently, the court found that the suspension of the right to vote on the 
ground of non-payment of compound interest was not justified and that the owners 
should have been permitted to exercise their voting rights at the special general 
meeting.59   
 
De Goede pointed out that in terms of Mitchell v Beheerliggaam RNS Mansions60 
there is a fiduciary duty on trustees to raise compound interest on arrear levies under 
management rule 31(6), but because of the decision in Herald Investments Share 
Block (Pty) Ltd and Others v Meer and Others; Meer v Body Corporate of Belmont 
Arcade and Another61 the trustees are not allowed to use the suspension of vote 
sanction to enforce the non-payment of interest.  Therefore, trustees must settle for 
the more expensive and time-consuming option of approaching the court to claim 
arrear interest.  He also pointed out that this narrow interpretation of management 
                                                          
57
 2010 6 SA 599 (KZD). 
58
 Para 38. 
59
 Para 39.  See also T Maree “How not to Settle a Dispute” (March 2011) 506 De Rebus 35 35-37 and Van der 
Merwe Sectional Titles 9-10(5) – 9-10(6). 
60
 2010 5 SA 75 (GNP). 
61
 2010 6 SA 599 (KZD). 
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rule 64(a) meant that any unpaid interest, whether compound or simple, as well as 
administration and penalty fees did not bring the rule into application.  He, therefore, 
argued that the court perhaps should have sought an interpretation of „contributions‟ 
that precludes compound interest defaulters from voting in terms of management 
rule 64(a).  He based this on the fact that the term „contributions‟ is not pertinently 
defined in the Act and that management rules 30, 31 and 45 do not define the 
makeup of contributions.  He, therefore, proposes a mechanism by which the term 
„contributions‟ could include „interest‟.  He furthermore argues that interest is a 
foregone conclusion on „arrear amounts‟ as it is described in management rule 31(5) 
and (6) and to separate interest from „contributions‟, which must surely fall under 
„arrear amounts‟, is artificial.  Finally, he argued that the exclusion of overdue interest 
in the application of management rule 64(a) is an absurdity and could not have been 
the intention of the legislature.62   
 
It is also questionable whether an owner‟s voting right should be suspended in 
situations where the trustees consider that an owner has not duly paid a levy, but the 
owner insists that the levy was not correctly raised.63  It may not be sensible to 
exclude these owners from the meeting or deny them a vote when their presence 
and participation may be crucial for curing the problem.64  Moreover, some items on 
the agenda of an annual general meeting are so important that no owner should be 
excluded from the voting on these.  Examples of such items include the election of 
trustees, the approval of the budget, or indeed all business related items.65   
 
The main problem is, however, that the suspension of voting rights is in final analysis 
not an efficient remedy to force defaulting owners to settle their levies with the body 
corporate.  Many owners who do not pay their levies care little about the operation of 
the sectional title scheme and rarely attend general meetings.  Again, the practical 
difficulties involved in enforcing the suspension of voting rights may outweigh the 
deterrent value of this specific sanction.66 One of these practical difficulties would be 
                                                          
62
 N De Goede “Management Rule 64(a) now missing some teeth” (December 2010) 5-12 Paddocks Press 
Newsletter 2. 
63
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-10(6).  
64
 Baker (February 2009) Paddocks Press Newsletter 3. 
65
 4. 
66
 Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Duke Journal of International and Comparative Law  
133-134.  See also Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-10(6). 
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the identification of the defaulting owners at a general meeting who are not allowed 
to vote on ordinary resolutions, but must then be called upon to vote on unanimous 
and special resolutions.  Therefore, the practical implications of the embargo on 
voting rights should be carefully considered and applied by chairpersons.  An 
incorrect application of this embargo could render the proceedings and resolutions 
made at the general meetings null and void.67   
 
We have seen that the voting embargo against levy defaulters only applies to arrear 
levies and not to interest raised in respect of arrears and other legal costs incurred in 
the collection of levies.  Bodies corporate can only collect arrear compound interest 
by the expensive, time-consuming and often-divisive process of handing the account 
over to attorneys.  Therefore, a strong argument can be advanced that either the 
legislature should amend the Act or management rule 64(a) or that the Courts should 
change their interpretation of this provision at the next opportunity to ensure that this 
embargo is an adequate deterrent against owners who have not paid accrued 
interest on their levies and collection expenses.68    
 
4 2 5 Embargo on nomination and election as trustee 
 
Section 9(a) of the Sectional Titles Amendments Regulations of 2013 now places an 
embargo on the nomination and election of owners as trustees if they are in arrears 
with the payment of their levies.  Before the amendment of Annexure 8 rule 7 levy 
defaulters could have gained control of the trustees, manipulated decision-making 
and even blocked resolutions to institute levy recovery actions against themselves.69  
Therefore, Annexure 8 rule 7, which deals with the nomination of trustees, has now 
been amended by the addition of a second proviso which stipulates that no person 
who is in breach of management rule 64(a) or (b)70 may be nominated or elected as 
trustee.  We have seen at 4 2 4 above, that management rule 64(a) prevents owners 
who are in arrears with the payment of their levies from voting on ordinary 
resolutions of the general meeting.  These owners may, therefore, not be nominated 
or elected as trustee.  The introduction of this sanction is laudable since owners who 
                                                          
67
 Maree (March 2011) De Rebus 37. 
68
 De Goede (December 2010) Paddocks Press Newsletter 2. 
69
 T Maree “Latest rule amendments” (April 2013) 44 MCS Courier Newsletter 1 1.  
70
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stand for election to the office of trustee should set the example for the other owners 
in honouring their financial obligations to the body corporate.      
 
4 2 6 Embargo on alienation unless arrears paid  
 
In terms of the Act, the registrar shall not register a transfer of a unit unless a 
conveyancer‟s certificate is produced confirming that, as at date of registration, the 
body corporate has certified that all moneys due to it have been paid or that 
provision has been made to the satisfaction of the body corporate for the payment 
thereof.71  This provision thus places an embargo on the transfer of a unit unless 
arrear levies have been paid.72  However, as will be explained in chapter 5, this 
remedy would only be effective if the unit is not heavily mortgaged and the transferor 
has sufficient funds before the sale to pay off the arrears.73 
 
Most sectional owners who deny that the debt is owed will pay under protest in order 
to obtain the clearance certificate and will then institute an enrichment action to 
reclaim payment of money not owed.  This is known as the „protest payment‟ route.  
However, in terms of section 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) of the Act the owner can, instead of 
payment, make provision to the satisfaction of the body corporate for the payment of 
the debt.  This is known as the „payment provision‟ route.  Provision for payment can 
be made by providing some sort of conditional guarantee or depositing payment into 
the trust account of an attorney, accompanied by his undertaking to pay the body 
corporate the amount eventually found, or agreed, to be due.  The body corporate 
must be reasonable when determining whether it is satisfied with the owner‟s 
payment provision; that is the body corporate‟s discretion is not unfettered.74   When 
a statute requires an act to be „to the satisfaction‟ of some entity or authority it 
confers discretion on that entity (here the body corporate).  However, where the 
payment provision is objectively reasonable and the owner‟s dispute is bona fide, the 
                                                          
71
 S 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
72
 For a similar embargo provision see s 118(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 
which prohibits the transfer of immovable property unless the relevant municipality has issued a certificate 
stating that all the amounts due in connection with that property, including municipal service fees during the two 
years preceding the date of application for the certificate have been fully paid.   
73
 See in general Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-10(7) – 9-11. 
74
 R Darrol “Payment provision for disputed sectional title debts when wishing to sell” (January/February 2007) 
461 De Rebus 57 57. 
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law obliges the body corporate to be satisfied on the ground that discretion must be 
exercised according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private 
opinion.75 
 
Protest payments seem illogical, costly and time consuming by being unnecessarily 
litigious; they also raise questions about the onus of proof.  Therefore, it would be 
wiser for sectional owners to follow the „payment provision‟ route if they deny that 
they owe a debt and are in the process of selling and transferring their units.76    
 
In First Rand Bank Ltd v Body Corporate of Geovy Villa77 the Supreme Court of 
Appeal settled the dispute as to whether the embargo in question can be construed 
as a tacit lien, charge or preferent right in favour of the body corporate, ranking 
above a previously registered mortgage.  The Supreme Court of Appeal decided that 
this restriction was significant in the case of the transfer from an insolvent estate78 
since the embargo can be accommodated as part of the cost of realisation within the 
scheme, as provided by the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.79  Therefore, the applicable 
conveyancer‟s certificate will only be issued once the debt is paid, which would then 
lead to the registration of the transfer of the unit.  Only then would the mortgagee be 
able to exercise his security right from the proceeds of the sale.80  The Supreme 
Court of Appeal, however, refused to recognise that the embargo could be construed 
as a security right, which would afford the body corporate a preferential right with 
respect to outstanding debts pertaining to the unit, in cases where the transfer was 
not from an insolvent estate.81  This matter will be discussed in detail in chapter 5.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
75
 Sharp v Wakefield 1891 AC 173 179; Cassar and Cassar v Belville Municipality and Another 1958 3 SA 318 
(C) 325; Pretoria North Town Council v A.I. Electric Ice-Cream Factory (Pty.) Ltd. 1953 3 SA 1 (AD) 12. 
76
 See in general Darrol (January/February 2007) De Rebus 57.  
77
 2004 3 SA 362 (SCA). 
78
 Para 27. 
79
 S 89(1) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.  See also Nel NO v Body Corporate of the Seaways Building and 
Another 1995 1 SA 130 (C) 136E-F confirmed in Nel NO v Body Corporate of the Seaways Building and 
Another 1996 1 SA 131 (A).   
80
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-11. 
81
 First Rand Bank Ltd v Body Corporate of Geovy Villa 2004 3 SA 362 (SCA) paras 30-31. 
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4 2 7 Attachment of movables and rental income of the defaulter 
 
The Magistrates‟ Courts Act makes provision for the body corporate to attach and 
sell in execution the moveable property of a sectional owner against whom a 
judgement has been obtained.82  Following this route, however, is not always a 
straight forward process.  
 
A prudent body corporate (judgement creditor) which doubts whether a judgement 
debtor (sectional owner) has attachable moveable assets, will have to institute 
proceedings under a section 65A(1) notice which makes an inquiry into the financial 
position of the judgement debtor possible.83  This firstly involves a court giving 
judgement for the payment of a sum of money or ordering the payment in specified 
instalments.  Secondly, this judgement or order must have remained unsatisfied for a 
period of 10 days from the date it was given or became payable or from the expiry of 
the suspension period ordered in terms of section 48(e), as the case may be.  In 
these instances the judgement creditor may issue, from the court of the district in 
which the judgement debtor resides, carries on business or is employed, a notice 
calling upon the judgement debtor to appear in chambers on a specified date to 
enable the court to inquire into the financial position of the judgement debtor.84  This 
provision thus makes it possible to determine whether the judgement debtor has 
attachable assets for settling his debts to the judgement creditor.   
 
If a judgement creditor issues a warrant of execution against the judgement debtor‟s 
movable property before the hearing in terms of a notice under section 65A(1) and a 
nulla bona return indicating a lack of movable property is made, section 65E(4) of the 
Magistrates‟ Courts Act provides that the judgement creditor shall not be entitled to 
claim the costs in connection with the warrant unless the court, on good cause, is 
shown orders otherwise.  A prudent judgement creditor must, therefore, first 
ascertain whether the judgement debtor is in possession of attachable moveable 
assets, as discussed above.85   
                                                          
82
 S 66 of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act 32 of 1944 and r 36. 
83
 See in general DE Van Loggerenberg Jones & Buckle: The Civil Practice of the Magistrates’ Courts in South 
Africa Vol 1 10ed (Service 3, 31 March 2013) 411-414.  See also Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-11 – 9-12.  
84
 S 65A(1)(a) of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act 32 of 1944. 
85
 See in general Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-11 – 9-12. 
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A further problem is that movable property will frequently have been bought under a 
hire-purchase, credit or sale agreement with a term suspending the transfer of 
ownership to the purchaser.86  Therefore, the seller retains ownership of the property 
and it is only the mostly negligible interest of the purchaser (judgement debtor) in the 
property that is attachable and not the moveable itself.87  Moreover, there is the risk 
that third parties may lay claim to the attachable movable property by way of 
interpleading proceedings.88  What is more, the costs of issuing a warrant and 
levying execution rank as a first charge on the proceeds of the moveable property 
sold in execution.89  An obstructive judgement debtor may increase the costs of 
execution or the moveable property may be of so little value that a sale in execution 
would not be worthwhile.  Rule 39(1) of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act provides that if 
the proceeds of such a sale are not sufficient to cover the costs of execution, such 
costs may be recovered from the judgement debtor as costs awarded by the court.  
Lastly, all warrants of execution lodged with the sheriff on or before the day 
preceding the date of sale in execution rank pro rata in the distribution of the 
moveable property sold in execution.90 
 
Besides the attachment of movables, the judgement creditor is entitled to attach the 
rental which the sectional owner claims from a tenant to whom he has let his 
apartment.  The reason for this is that the interest of a judgement debtor in a contract 
of lease is considered an incorporeal moveable which may be attached in 
execution.91   
 
In Jones and Others v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd and Others92 the Cape Provincial 
Division decided that the only incorporeal moveable property capable of attachment 
in terms of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act was the property defined as being subject to 
attachment in terms of section 68 of this act.93  In terms of section 68(3) the 
                                                          
86
 9-12. 
87
 S 68(3) of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act 32 of 1944 and r 42(2).  See also Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-12. 
88
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-12.  
89
 R 39(1) of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act 32 of 1944. 
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 R 39(2). 
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 TLLDV Van Winsen, AC Cilliers and C Loots The Civil Practice of the Supreme Court in South Africa 4ed 
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messenger may attach and sell in execution the interest of the execution debtor in 
any movable property belonging to him or pledged or sold under a suspensive 
condition to a third person.  Further, the messenger may sell the interest of the 
execution debtor in movable property or immovable property leased to the execution 
debtor or sold to him under any hire-purchase contract or under a suspensive 
condition.  The Magistrates‟ Courts Act, therefore, does not expressly include 
interest in a contract of lease, the rent payable by the lessee, as an incorporeal 
movable.  
 
However, the court stated that a judgement creditor seeking to execute upon 
incorporeal moveable property not enumerated in terms of the Magistrates‟ Courts 
Act under the authority of a Magistrate‟s Court judgement must invoke the aid of the 
High Court.94  In the latter regard it is important to note that it is not necessary to 
obtain a judgement in the High Court95 since it would be sufficient to apply for and 
obtain the necessary permission from the High Court to attach and sell in execution 
the defaulting owner‟s right, title and interest in a lease.96   
 
Since the interest of a sectional owner in a contract of lease is not expressly 
enumerated as an incorporeal moveable in terms of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act the 
body corporate as judgement creditor would have to bring an application in the High 
Court for the necessary permission to attach and sell in execution the defaulting 
owner‟s right, title and interest in the lease.  Factors such as the duration of the term 
of lease, the period of notice required to terminate the lease and the rent payable by 
the lessee will be taken into account to determine the value of the lease.97   
  
In comparative perspective, the Puerto Rican Law on Condominiums of 25 June 
1958 provides the most direct example.  Here it is stated that if the unit is let, the 
association (body corporate) can request a court order compelling the tenant to pay 
                                                          
94
 422C. 
95
 As was held in Hogan v Messenger, Johannesburg 1915 WLD 101 104. 
96
 See Patel v Manika and Others 1969 3 SA 509 (DCLD).   
97
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-12 - 9-12(1). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
95 
 
the rent directly to the management council (trustees) of the scheme for the benefit 
of the association until the whole debt is extinguished.98 
 
4 2 8 Other orders under the Magistrates’ Courts Act  
 
Besides the attachment and sale in execution of the defaulting owner‟s property, the 
Magistrates‟ Courts Act makes provision for other processes of execution.99  
 
Firstly, it makes provision for emolument attachment orders.  This requires the 
defaulting owner‟s employer to pay the specific amounts of the defaulting owner‟s 
emoluments100 to the body corporate.101  However, this type of enforcement is 
seldom used in practice in the sectional title industry.102   
 
Secondly, the Magistrates‟ Courts Act makes provision for garnishee orders.  This 
means that a Magistrate‟s Court may order the attachment of any debt at present or 
in future owing or accruing to the defaulting owner to an amount sufficient to satisfy 
the judgement and costs of the proceedings of attachment.103  Garnishee 
proceedings are, therefore, a procedure by which a judgement creditor may obtain a 
court order against a third party who owes money to, or holds money for, the 
judgement creditor.  In practice it is usually obtained against a bank to pay money 
held in the account of the debtor to the creditor.  This means of enforcement is also 
not frequently used in practice.104   
 
Lastly, the Magistrates‟ Courts Act makes provision for administration orders, which 
provide for the administration of the judgement debtor‟s estate by an administrator.  
Administration orders occur in cases where defaulting owners are unable to meet 
their financial obligations and where their estates are so small that sequestration 
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proceedings are not warranted.  The administration order forces the defaulting owner 
to regularly pay the administrator a prescribed amount which the latter distributes pro 
rata among the creditors.105  When the court determines this amount it may leave an 
unencumbered amount sufficient to enable a defaulting owner to discharge monthly 
instalments he may be obliged to pay in terms of an instalment sale transaction or 
mortgage bond.  The problem with administration orders is that the amount available 
for distribution is usually very small and, therefore, the dividend accruing to individual 
creditors, especially if there are many, would be negligible.106  Furthermore, this 
procedure cannot be initiated by the body corporate as creditor since the judgement 
debtor himself must generally bring an application for the granting of such order.107 
 
4 2 9 Sequestration 
 
If a sale in execution is unsuccessful the body corporate can institute 
sequestration108 proceedings on the basis that the defaulting owner is de facto 
insolvent.109  As already pointed out and as will be discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter, it would be advantageous for the body corporate to have the indebted 
owner sequestrated where the owner‟s unit is heavily mortgaged.   
 
The body corporate must show that it has a claim against the owner of not less than 
R100; the owner has committed an act of insolvency or is insolvent; and that there is 
reason to believe that it will be to the advantage of the owner‟s creditors if his estate 
is sequestrated.110 
 
One of the requirements for compulsory sequestration is thus that the defaulting 
owner should either have committed an act of insolvency or that he should in fact be 
insolvent.111  Due to the fact that the body corporate would normally have difficulty 
proving that the defaulting owner is in fact insolvent it would have to rely on any of 
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the eight different grounds of insolvency mentioned in the Insolvency Act as grounds 
for his application for the compulsory sequestration of the defaulting owner‟s 
estate.112  In practice the body corporate would probably rely on section 8(b) of the 
Insolvency Act which states that:  
 
“if a court has given judgment against him and he fails, upon the demand of the 
officer whose duty it is to execute that judgment, to satisfy it or to indicate to that 
officer disposable property sufficient to satisfy it, or if it appears from the return made 
by that officer that he has not found sufficient disposable property to satisfy the 
judgment.”  
 
The effect of the latter section is that attachment proceedings may be interrupted in 
order for a sequestration order to be applied for.113 
 
The most important question which arises is whether the body corporate will satisfy 
the requirement that advantage to creditors in the specific circumstances must be 
shown.114  In Meskin & Co v Friedman115 Roper J defined this advantage to creditors 
as follows: 
 
“In my opinion, the facts put before the Court must satisfy it that there is a reasonable 
prospect – not necessarily a likelihood, but a prospect which is not too remote – that 
some pecuniary benefit will result to creditors.”
116 
 
Pecuniary benefit has been understood to be in the form of a dividend to creditors, 
but Segal submits that the requirement of a pecuniary benefit need not necessarily 
be restricted to payment of a dividend.117 
 
Notwithstanding the cost and time involved in applying for a sequestration order, it 
may be worthwhile for the body corporate to follow this route, especially if the unit is 
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heavily mortgaged, on account of the effective right of preference the body corporate 
would obtain in terms of section 89(1) of the Insolvency Act.118 
 
4 3 Suggestions for the more efficient enforcement of financial obligations in 
sectional title schemes 
 
4 3 1 General  
 
In this section we shall consider the South African Property Owners‟ Association 
(SAPOA) proposals and measures employed in other jurisdictions to enforce 
sectional owners‟ financial obligations more efficiently and effectively.  These 
measures include: a first claim to rental owed; suspension of services; the „name and 
shame‟ sanction; monetary fines for the late payment of levies; special summary 
proceedings in court for the recovery of late payments and the loss of locus standi to 
sue.  This will be followed by an examination of the Sectional Title Levy Underwriting 
Security (STILUS) which provides an affordable and effective, so called quick fix, 
solution to enforce the payment of levies.  In conclusion, I will explore how the 
submission of sufficient information can simplify the levy recovery process.  The 
ultimate aim is thus to advance proposals that strengthen the Act and improve the 
enforcement of sectional title financial obligations.  
 
4 3 2 SAPOA proposals  
 
In the following section I will analyse the sanctions suggested in the SAPOA 
Memoranda for the effective and efficient enforcement of an owner‟s financial 
obligations.   
 
The first suggestion was that in the event that an apartment is rented out to a tenant, 
the body corporate should be given the first claim to the rental owed by the tenant in 
order to satisfy the owner‟s levies.  This particular sanction can be found in various 
foreign law statutes.  Such recourse usually takes the form of a security right in 
respect of the outstanding rent or a direct action by the body corporate against the 
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tenant for rent owed on the unit in satisfaction of the debt or part thereof.119  The 
Ontario Condominium Act provides that the body corporate may, by written notice, 
require the lessee to pay the lesser amount of the default and the amount due under 
the lease.120  The Puerto Rican Law on Condominiums is even more direct since it 
provides that if the unit is let, the body corporate can request a court order 
compelling the tenant to pay all rent directly to the management council (trustees) of 
the scheme for the benefit of the association (body corporate) until the whole debt is 
extinguished.121  A third mechanism is employed in terms of the Colombian Law on 
How to Expedite the Horizontal Property Regime of 3 August 2001 whereby the 
owner and occupier, by whatever title, are jointly and severally liable to the 
association for any contributions due.  It is, however, important to note that the 
occupier would only be liable for claims that arise after the commencement of his 
occupation and that he would have recourse against the owner for payments made 
to the association.  The effect is that a tenant or other occupier can be sued directly, 
whether or not the owner defaults on his payments.122   
 
Commendably the legislator took notice of the rental diversion proposal.123  The 
Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011 (the CSOSA) now provides that 
an adjudicator may in appropriate circumstances make an order which requires a 
tenant in a community scheme (which includes a sectional title scheme) to pay to the 
association (body corporate) and not to his landlord (sectional owner), all or parts of 
the rentals payable under a lease agreement. This payment will be made from a 
specified date and until a specified amount due by the landlord to the body corporate 
has been settled.  It is further provided that in terms of such an order:124 the tenant 
must make the requisite payments and may not rely on any right of deduction, set-off 
or counterclaim that he has against the landlord to reduce the amount to be paid to 
                                                          
119
 Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 136. 
120
 Art 87 of the Ontario Condominium Act of 1998 (S.O., 1998, Ch. 19).  See also Van der Merwe & Muňiz-
Argüelles (2006) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 136. 
121
 Art 39 (codified in § 1293c) of the Puerto Rican Law on Condominiums (Ley de condominios) of 25 June 
1958 (Puerto Rico Laws Ann. Tit. 31 §§ 1291-1294d (2005)).  See also Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles 
(2006) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 136. 
122
 Art 29 of the Colombian Law on How to Expedite the Horizontal Property Regime (Ley por medio de cual se 
expide el régimen de propriedad horizontal) of 3 August 2001.  See also Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles 
(2006) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 136-137. 
123
 See G Paddock “Rental diversions where landlords are in arrears with levies?” (November 2010) 5-11 
Paddocks Press Newsletter 1 where it was argued that such a rental diversion should rather be included in the 
Community Schemes Ombud Service Bill than the rules of a scheme. 
124
 S 39(1)(f) of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
100 
 
the body corporate;125 payments made by the tenant to the body corporate discharge 
the tenant‟s liability to the landlord under the lease;126 and the association must 
credit amounts received from the tenant to the account of the landlord.127 
 
The second suggestion offered by SAPOA was the suspension of services provided 
to a defaulting owner.  This would only apply to schemes where separate meters 
have not been installed to measure the services provided to the apartments and 
charges for such services are collected by the body corporate as part of the levies 
payable to the municipality which provides such services.  For example, the body 
corporate should be allowed to suspend the water; electricity; cable television; video 
and other services provided by common central installations to the defaulter‟s unit 
who is more than three months in arrears with levy contributions.128  In terms of the 
Puerto Rican Law on Condominiums the board of directors (trustees) are allowed to 
suspend common services such as water, electricity, gas and telephone when an 
owner defaults on his contributions for more than two months.  After the first month, 
the defaulting owner needs to be notified of the board of directors‟ intention to 
suspend these services.  However, the interruption of these services may only take 
place if the health of the owner concerned would not be endangered.  The services 
will only be restored once the outstanding debt has been paid in full.129  Furthermore, 
the Puerto Rican Law on Condominiums provides that cable television, video, and 
other services provided by common installations may be suspended if the owner is 
more than three months in arrears with his levy payments.130  The suspended 
services may not be reconnected by the owner or occupier unless the board or the 
manager have authorised this.  If the owner or occupier does make illegal use of the 
common facilities of which he has been deprived a penalty amounting to triple the 
amount due, including the principal sum plus interest is enforced.131   
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Depriving owners or occupiers of services such as water and electricity can be 
extremely effective in enforcing the timeous payment of monthly contributions where 
the sectional owner is solvent.  It is, however, important to note that without 
authorisation in a condominium statute or the bylaws, the suspension of services in 
the South African context, would constitute spoliation and the body corporate could 
be ordered by the court to restore the status quo ante.132   
 
This is illustrated by Froman v Herbmore Timber and Hardware (Pty) Ltd.133  In this 
case the applicant purchased a townhouse from the respondent situated at 99 
Francis Street, Bellevue, Johannesburg as No 4 on a plan prepared in terms of the 
Sectional Titles Act 66 of 1971 (the old Act).  The applicant shortly thereafter went 
into occupation of the townhouse, at an occupational rental prescribed by the sale 
agreement which also made provision for the payment of a monthly levy until such 
time as the transfer of the unit had been registered.134  Clause 21.4 of the agreement 
deals with the supply of electricity and water to the unit and reads as follow: 
 
"The purchaser shall pay on due date the account for electricity consumed in the 
section in accordance with the consumption of electricity as shown on the sub-meter 
of the section.  The purchaser agrees that should separate water meters be installed 
at any stage in the buildings, the purchaser shall pay the cost of water consumed in 
the section direct to the seller or the local authority, as the case may be, and 
promptly on the due date thereof."
135
 
 
The respondent later purported to cancel the contract on the ground that the 
applicant was in breach thereof, and required the applicant to vacate the premises 
which the applicant reclined to do.  The respondent‟s servants then severed the 
supply of electricity and water to the applicant‟s unit.  The applicant then 
reconnected the electricity and water, but the respondent‟s servants then once again 
cut them off.  Besides the suspension of these services the respondent also 
removed the front door and an internal sliding door of the unit.136  The applicant 
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thereupon applied to the court for the issue of a rule nisi calling on the respondent to 
show cause why an order should not be granted interdicting the respondent from 
severing the supply of electricity and water and removing the doors, and requiring 
their reinstatement, amongst other relief.137  It was argued by counsel for the 
applicant that the severance of the electricity and water supplies amounted to an act 
of spoliation.  In response counsel for the respondent contended that the 
discontinuance of these supplies could be no more than a breach of contract since it 
left the applicant in possession of the premises.  The court favoured the conclusion 
that the respondent's only purpose in cutting off the water and lights was to force the 
applicant to vacate and therefore the action of the respondent amounted to a 
deprivation of the applicant's right to obtain water and electricity.  The Court also 
stated that there was no reason why an incorporeal right of this nature should not 
form the subject of spoliation proceedings.138  
 
In Queensgate Body Corporate v Marcelle Josianne Vivianne Claesen139 the High 
Court once again had to decide whether cutting off the electricity supply constituted 
an act of spoliation.  A dispute raged between the two parties and because of this 
the respondent refused to pay the monthly levies to the appellant as she was obliged 
to do.  As a result of this the appellant cut off the electricity supply to her two units.  
The appellant claimed entitlement because of rule 15 of the house rules promulgated 
in terms of section 35 of the Act which stated that the trustees have the right to 
disconnect the electricity supply to the relevant unit until payment is made.  On 
behalf of the respondent it was submitted that the appellant‟s action in cutting off the 
respondent‟s electricity supply constituted an act of spoliation which entitled the 
respondent to an order to have the electricity supply immediately restored.  The 
Magistrate upheld the respondent‟s contentions and granted the order as prayed for 
by the respondent. 
 
In an appeal brought against this order Blieden J quoted from the decision of Nino 
Bonino v De Lange140 as authority for his statement that the legal remedy of 
mandament van spolie had been part of our law for generations.  The appellant 
                                                          
137
 610F-G. 
138
 610G-I. 
139
 WLD 26-11-1998 case no A3076/98. 
140
 1906 TS 120. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
103 
 
argued that depriving a party of electricity was an invasion of that person‟s 
possessory rights and could justify spoliation proceedings, but that the deprivation in 
this instance was lawful by virtue of the provisions of the Act and the house rules 
promulgated in terms thereof and that it occurred with at least the tacit consent of the 
respondent.  It is trite that consent to spoliation is a valid defence to any application 
based on the mandament van spolie.  In his averment that such consent was indeed 
present, the applicant advanced two arguments.  Firstly, he argued that when buying 
into the sectional title scheme the respondent accepted the house rules as being 
binding on her and, secondly, that on a previous occasion the respondent had 
accepted the severance of her electricity supply through doing nothing about it.  
Blieden J dealt with the last argument first and decided that the fact that the 
respondent had agreed to be spoliated a year before did not assist the appellant 
since her claim before the Magistrate‟s Court was based on one event and that was 
the only one relevant at the stage of the hearing.  With regard to the first argument 
advanced by the applicant, Blieden J once again quoted from the judgment of Nino 
Bonino v De Lange141 (where Innes CJ dealt with a clause in a lease which 
purported to prevent a party who had breached a lease having access to the leased 
premises without the lessor having any recourse to law): 
 
“Under these circumstances does a clause of this kind place the lessor in any better 
position than he would have occupied without it.  In my opinion it does not and for the 
simple reason that the court cannot recognise such a provision.  It is an agreement 
which purports to allow one of the two contracting parties to take the law into their 
own hands to that which the law says only a court shall do, that is to dispossess one 
person and to put another person in the possession of the property.  It purports to 
allow the lessor to be himself the judge of whether a breach of contract has been 
committed and having decided in his own favour to allow him on his own motion to 
prevent the lessee from having access to the premises.  Only a court of law does 
these things.  The parties cannot stipulate to do it themselves.”
142
 
 
Furthermore, Blieden J decided that the appellant‟s attempt to distinguish the 
present case from Nino Bonino v De Lange143 because the house rules were 
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sanctioned by section 35 of the Act was without merit.  The fact that the house rules 
were in accordance with the provisions of section 35 of the Act did not elevate the 
rules from being anything more than an agreement between the unit holders and the 
appellant and therefore the analogy between the house rules and the Articles of 
Association of a company, as suggested by the respondent‟s council, was a valid 
one.  To reach this conclusion Blieden J quoted from Gohlke & Schneider and 
Another v Westies Minerals Eiendoms Beperk and Another:144 
 
“The articles therefore merely have the same force as a contract between a company 
and each and every member as such as to observe their provisions…”
145    
 
Therefore, the clause in the house rules which gives the appellant the right to cut off 
the electricity supply of any owner who is in arrears with his levies is clearly contrary 
to the common law because it constitutes nothing but a power to interfere with such 
person‟s right to use the existing electricity supply.  Blieden J then concluded that 
this was a clear act of spoliation and that there was no consent valid in law that 
allowed such an act.  Accordingly the appeal was dismissed.  
 
These two cases show that it is not an option in South African law to introduce a 
sanction in the rules of a sectional title scheme which authorises the body corporate 
to cut off the electricity and water supply of an owner who defaults on the payment of 
his levies.  The option is further undermined by the fact that in the course of time 
separate meters will be installed in the apartments of most sectional title schemes 
with the effect that the electricity and water will be charged by the municipality 
concerned and not by the body corporate as part of levies. 
 
Two recent Supreme Court of Appeal decisions can be applied by analogy to the 
question as to whether a statutory provision (as opposed to a provision in the rules of 
a particular sectional title scheme) authorising the cutting off of services to specific 
premises could prevent redress in terms of the mandament of spolie.  
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In City of Cape Town v Strümpher146 the issue was whether the disconnection of the 
municipal water supply to certain premises could be redressed by a mandament van 
spolie.  The crucial question was whether the City's interference with the 
respondent's water supply was lawful and whether it was authorised by section 
11(2)(d) of the Water Services Act 36 of 1998 or section 30(1) of the relevant water 
by-law and section 9 of the City's debt collection by-law, which allows the cutting off 
of services on certain conditions.147  The Supreme Court of Appeal found that the 
interference was not lawful due to the fact that the City overlooked the provisions of 
section 4(3)(a) of the Water Services Act, which requires that 'the limitation or 
discontinuation of water services must be fair and equitable', and its own dispute 
resolution procedures provided for in the Credit Control and Debt Collection Policy 
which stipulated the procedure to be followed when the water user (debtor) has 
declared a dispute.148 
 
In dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal rationalised its finding that a 
spoliation order was the appropriate remedy in the circumstances as follows:  
 
“The evidence in the present matter shows that the respondent for the past 37 years 
had received an uninterrupted supply of water from the City at the time when that 
service was summarily terminated.  I have already alluded to the fact that the 
respondent's rights to water were not merely personal rights flowing from a contract, 
but public-law rights [Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 4 
SA 55 (CC) para 34] to receive water, which exist independently of any contractual 
relationship the respondent had with the City.  The respondent's use of the water was 
an incident of possession of the property.  Clearly interference by the City with the 
respondent's access to the water supply was akin to deprivation of possession of 
property.  There is therefore no reason in principle why a water user who is deprived 
of a water service summarily by a water service authority, without that authority 
complying with its procedural formalities for dispute resolution laid down in its own 
bylaws, should not be able to claim reconnection of the water supply by means of a 
spoliation order.  It therefore follows that the mandament van spolie was available to 
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the respondent and the courts below were correct in granting the relief claimed by the 
respondent.”
149
 
 
This case may be contrasted with the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
Rademan v Moqhaka Municipality and Others150 which dealt with the disconnection 
of an electricity supply by the municipality concerned.  The appellant, a member of 
the Moqhaka Ratepayers and Residents Association, failed to pay her taxes and 
levies to the respondent, the Moqhaka municipality.  The above Association 
comprised residents who claimed to be unhappy with the poor delivery of municipal 
services.  The members decided to withhold payment of their rates and taxes as a 
means of forcing the municipality to attend to their various complaints.  On account 
of the non-payment of rates and taxes, the municipality disconnected the electricity 
supply to the appellant without a court order. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal pointed out that the legislature, appreciating the 
difficulties experienced by municipalities when ratepayers protest and refuse to pay 
for municipal services, decreed in section 97(1)(g) of the Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (the Systems Act) that provision should be made 
for the termination of municipal services or the restriction of the provision of 
municipal services when payments of ratepayers are in arrears.  Further, similar 
powers for municipalities were decreed in section 25 of the Credit Control and Debt 
Collection Bylaws of 14 May 2004.151  The Supreme Court of Appeal found it both 
unrealistic and untenable to expect a municipality faced with numerous residents 
who steadfastly refuse to pay their rates and taxes to approach the court each time a 
ratepayer defaults to seek a court order authorising the discontinuation of services.  
Taking into account the number of service delivery protests and demonstrations 
across the country and the concomitant refusal by ratepayers to pay their rates, 
taxes and fees for municipal services, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that 
pursuing these matters in court would result in municipalities being overwhelmed by 
court cases, losing precious time in the process and incurring costly legal bills 
unnecessarily.  Quoting from the judgment of Yacoob J in Mkontwana v Nelson 
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Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and others; Bisset and others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and others v MEC, Local 
Government and Housing, Gauteng and others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and 
Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curia),152 the Supreme Court of Appeal concluded 
that these powers were undoubtedly given to municipalities to enable them to collect 
all moneys that are due and payable to them in the most cost-effective manner.153 
 
Consequently, the Supreme Court of Appeal concluded that in light of the relevant 
legislation, there was no statutory instrument which requires a municipality to obtain 
a court order authorising the discontinuation of a municipal service.  It also confirmed 
that there was incontrovertible evidence that a letter of demand preceding 
discontinuance was sent to the appellant but that, in line with resolutions taken by 
the Moqhaka Ratepayers and Residents Association, she decided not to pay.  It also 
pointed out that in terms of section 21(2) of the applicable by-laws failure to deliver 
or send a final demand within seven working days does not relieve a customer from 
paying arrears.154 
 
In effect this case decided that if the legislation which authorises the discontinuance 
of services is followed to the letter, the discontinuance of services would be 
considered lawful and would not, therefore, expose the municipality for a mandament 
of spolie.  
 
For our purpose these cases have shown that a legislative sanction consisting of the 
discontinuance of services would have to be clearly worded to prevent such 
discontinuance being addressed by the mandament of spolie.  To amend the Act to 
provide such a sanction to the body corporate would not be worthwhile since the 
collection of service charges are in the process of being transferred to the 
municipalities concerned.155  Furthermore, these cases have shown that even 
municipalities have to tread very carefully to prevent reliance on the mandament of 
spolie if they want to sanction defaults in payment of service charges by 
discontinuing services.  
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4 3 3 The ‘name and shame’ sanction 
 
A third SAPOA suggestion encouraging timeous payment of arrears is for the 
legislator to consider the so-called „name and shame‟ sanction encountered in a few 
overseas jurisdictions.  The aim of this sanction is to embarrass defaulting owners 
into paying outstanding debts owed to the body corporate.156  The Spanish and 
Colombian statutes make provision for this particular sanction.  In terms of the 
Spanish Law on Horizontal Property it is required that the notice convening the 
general meeting must contain a list of the names of owners who are in arrears with 
the payment of their debts to the body corporate.  At the start of the general meeting, 
a warning must be given to such owners who are at risk of being deprived of their 
vote.157  The Colombian Law on How to Expedite the Horizontal Property Regime is 
even more severe.  Besides including the names of the defaulters in the minutes of 
the general meeting, the publication of their names on a notice board in an 
appropriate location in the condominium complex is also authorised.  To make sure 
this notice is for the eyes of the residents only it may not be displayed in a place 
visited by visitors of the building.158 
 
4 3 4 Penalties for late payment of levies 
 
Finally, in addition to the three previous SAPOA proposals it is suggested that the 
model rules of sectional title schemes should be amended by either the developer or 
the sectional owners to exact monetary fines for the late payment of contributions.159  
This sanction is found in several foreign condominium statutes.  In terms of the 
Puerto Rican Law on Condominiums the by-laws of a scheme may charge a penalty 
of 10% interest on a contribution that is more than 15 days overdue.  Furthermore, 
amounts that are not paid on the due date will automatically generate interest at the 
maximum rate.  After more than three monthly instalments remain unpaid, the unpaid 
amount will draw an additional penalty of 1% of the total debt which needs to be paid 
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monthly.160  The Singapore Building Maintenance and Strata Management Act 47 of 
2004 states that where any contribution and interest thereon is not paid within 30 
days after becoming due and payable, the management corporation (trustees) may 
serve a written demand on the subsidiary proprietor of the lot (unit) concerned.161  An 
owner who fails to pay contributions or interest due and owing within 14 days from 
the date of service of a written demand is guilty of an offence.  This offence attracts, 
on conviction, a fine not exceeding  $10 000 and, in the case of a continuing offence, 
a further fine not exceeding $100 for every day or part thereof during which the 
contribution or interest or both remain unpaid.162  The Singapore Land Titles (Strata) 
Act 41 of 1967 includes substantially the same provision together with a further fine 
„not exceeding $100 for every day during which the contribution or interest remains 
unpaid after conviction.‟163   
 
MCST Plan No 593 (Delta House) v Grandfield Investment International Pte Ltd,164 
dealt with this provision of the Singapore Land Titles (Strata) Act with regard to a 
further fine.  Young CJ, who delivered the judgment in this case, held that a court 
does not have the power to impose a fine in advance for continuing offences that 
have yet to be committed.  Young CJ explained the decision as follows: 
 
“… It is a fundamental principle in criminal law that an offender can only be punished 
for an offence with which he was charged and of which he was convicted.  To 
sentence an offender in advance, for a criminal act yet to be committed, would be 
going completely against all jurisprudential theory, either of the common law or the 
civil code.  A statutory provision such as that of s 42(11) of the LTSA creates, at the 
time of conviction, a liability for continuing the offence.  However, this liability will only 
be crystallized subsequently, when it has actually been proven that the default has 
continued after the time of conviction.”
165 
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It is very unlikely that the Sectional Titles Regulations Board166 or the Sectional Titles 
Schemes Management Advisory Council167 will be persuaded to change the model 
rules in order to insert a provision exacting fines from sectional owners who default 
on the payment of their levies.  The only other available option would be to advise 
the owners in sectional titles to adopt a special rule to provide for fines against 
owners who fail to pay their monthly contributions. The content of such a rule must, 
however, be considered carefully.     
 
4 3 5 Summary proceedings in court 
 
Most jurisdictions usually have to resort to ordinary court procedures to enforce 
owners‟ financial obligations.  However, certain jurisdictions have introduced special 
summary proceedings for the recovery of late payments.168  These proceedings are 
less time-consuming, more informal and supposedly less costly.   
 
The Spanish Law on Horizontal Property introduced a summary court procedure 
which must be authorised at the general meeting.  If authorised, the debtor is notified 
of the amount claimed and furnished with a certificate signed by the chairman and 
the secretary indicating the amount of the debt.  The defaulting owner must then 
provide a bank guarantee for this amount, otherwise the association is entitled to 
execute against an adequate amount of the owner‟s property to cover the debt.169   
 
The Puerto Rican proceedings are even more effective.  In terms of the Puerto Rican 
Law on Condominiums the board of directors (trustees) are allowed to sue the debtor 
for arrears of up to $5000 in special court proceedings devised for the collection of 
small claims.  The debtor must be notified of the claim for payment at least 15 days 
before the filing of the action in court.170  This is similar to an action in the South 
African Small Claims Court.  Unfortunately, we have seen, at 4 2 1, that the Small 
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Claims Court Act does not allow bodies corporate to institute claims in the Small 
Claims Court.    
 
4 3 6 Loss of locus standi to sue 
 
The Puerto Rican statute provides a sanction of another kind for owners with 
outstanding debts which are applicable after only one month‟s default.  The Puerto 
Rican Law on Condominiums requires that an owner must be up to date with his 
contribution payments in order to challenge any resolution of the board or the 
general meeting in court or in any other administrative tribunal.  After hearing both 
sides of the story the court or tribunal may decide in accordance with the law, equity, 
and good neighbourliness to validate the locus standi of the defaulting owner.171   
 
In terms of South African law there is no similar provision for the loss of locus standi 
to sue.  This is due to the fact that section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) states that everyone has the right to have any 
dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing 
before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or 
forum.  Therefore, it is highly unlikely that such a sanction would stand the test of 
constitutionality in the South African context. 
 
4 3 7 STILUS 
 
An affordable and effective, so called quick fix, solution to enforce the payment of 
levies has now become available to trustees for the first time in the form of the 
STILUS levy guarantee insurance policy.172  The aim of STILUS is to insure bodies 
corporate against the non-payment of levies and thereby guaranteeing their monthly 
income.  In order to utilise its specialist skills in the sectional title industry STILUS 
was registered in July 2010 as Santam‟s newest underwriting management agency 
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and has already been welcomed by insurance brokers, managing agents and 
trustees who have been briefed by the policy.173 
 
By insuring with STILUS bodies corporate are able to insure levy income at a fairly 
modest premium in order to have sufficient money in their administrative and reserve 
funds to undertake necessary maintenance and thereby preserve the value of their 
investment.  This can be seen as a form of guarantee insurance.  When a levy 
financier lends money to a body corporate it must be repaid with interest while 
STILUS ensures that any unpaid levies will be paid.  Owners who do not pay their 
levies will become defaulters under the STILUS policy and would be liable for the 
cost of the recovery of arrears.  According to the policy the body corporate agrees to 
charge defaulting owners interest at a rate determined by STILUS, which includes 
legal costs at the „attorney and client‟ rate.  The interest and charges will be for the 
benefit of STILUS and its collection attorneys.  Because the defaulting owner will be 
sued in the name of the body corporate, the managing agent and the trustees are 
obliged to give whatever support and assistance that are required in the litigation 
process.  Furthermore, if requested, STILUS must be furnished with certificates by 
the bodies corporate‟s auditors, managing agents and lawyers to support the 
claim.174   
 
By receiving payment of a levy default claim, the body corporate is obliged to credit 
that payment to a STILUS claims received ledger account rather than to the 
defaulting owner‟s ledger account.  This is because the owner‟s debt to the body 
corporate must continue to reflect as unpaid for it is only on this basis that the body 
corporate is entitled to refuse to issue a levy clearance certificate and effectively 
charge the units as security for the claim.  Therefore, both the approved managing 
agent and the body corporate undertake not to issue a levy clearance certificate for a 
unit in respect of which a claim has been made or at least not without the written 
consent from STILUS.  By breaching this condition, the capital amounts received 
from STILUS will become repayable together with interest and collection costs.175  
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When STILUS has investigated and paid a claim, it is clear from the documentation 
that STILUS and Santam accept the risk that the body corporate might not be 
successful in the legal action against the defaulting debtor.  This means that if any 
amount is not legally recoverable, the body corporate will not have to repay any part 
of the claim.  This kind of insurance is sold as an annual policy through insurance 
brokers and would be renewed annually except where the body corporate gives prior 
notice of cancellation.  The amount of the premium payable is linked to the amount 
of the specific sectional title scheme‟s indemnity insurance.  This insurance will be 
operated by approved managing agents and they will have to ensure, in return for a 
share in the administrative fee, that the body corporate has a legally recoverable 
claim.  These managing agents will, however, not be involved in the collection of the 
claim except for rendering administrative support.176 
 
We have seen that this guarantee insurance is marketed to bodies corporate through 
Santam‟s network of insurance brokers, who will then co-operate with the managing 
agents responsible for the administration of sectional title schemes.  Bodies 
corporate can claim once an owner is more than a month in arrears with his levy 
payments.  STILUS will then settle these claims within 7 to 10 days.  Furthermore, 
STILUS will delegate the task of collecting the claims to a panel of attorneys 
appointed by Tertius Maree.177  
 
STILUS will thus benefit the following parties.  Firstly, owners are assured that levy 
payments will be up to date and, therefore, budgeted maintenance programmes can 
be implemented with confidence as the body corporate‟s cash flow is secured.  
Secondly, trustees can bank on a guaranteed cash flow according to their budget.  
This will prevent delays in the payment of the creditors of the body corporate and the 
undertaking of maintenance to the building and its facilities.  Thirdly, managing 
agents do not have to spend unnecessary time and effort collecting outstanding 
levies, instead allowing them to focus solely on the administration of their clients‟ 
properties.  Lastly, brokers will now be able to offer additional financial assistance to 
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bodies corporate.  STILUS is thus reportedly providing a winning scenario for all 
parties concerned.178 
 
There are, however, some issues that need to be addressed.  It is perhaps 
questionable whether the body corporate has the right to refuse a levy clearance 
certificate when it has received the insurance pay-out for the levy on the argument 
that the defaulter‟s debt had not been paid under the STILUS policy.  Van der Merwe 
suggests that the courts will in all probability espouse the arrangement and regard 
the owner‟s debt as unpaid.179   
 
Another issue is whether the trustees need to obtain a special resolution from the 
owners in terms of section 37(1)(g)180 of the Act to conclude the contract on behalf of 
the body corporate.  The conclusion of the policy cannot be classified as one of the 
functions of the body corporate and, therefore, it would have to be accommodated 
under the catch-all function under section 38(j).181  Section 38(j) allows the trustees 
to „do all things reasonably necessary for the management and administration of the 
common property‟ and therefore it can be argued that the trustees would be entitled 
to enter into the arrangement without being authorised by a special resolution of the 
general meeting.  The trustees would thus be entitled to enter into such arrangement 
under section 39(1)182 of the Act if a scheme cannot reasonably take the risk of not 
receiving levies on the due date and the STILUS levy guarantee option is the most 
sensible type of financing available.183   
 
4 3 8 Submitting sufficient information at the start of the recovery process 
 
Tertius Maree Associates, who have been specialising in the collection of arrear 
levies for many years, found that problems relating to the recovery of levies mostly 
arise due to the lack of information submitted to attorneys at the start of the recovery 
process.  Therefore, it is of utmost importance that attorneys who are approached to 
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recover levies are supplied with all the facts and details pertaining to the levies and 
the defaulting owner.184 
 
The trustees or managing agent must be prepared to furnish the acting attorney with 
the following information.185  Firstly, there must be an up to date account of the debt 
owed by the defaulting owner.  The reason for this is that such an account indicates 
how the outstanding amount has been calculated. This would be the first matter a 
debtor scrutinises and if necessary queries when he receives a letter of demand.   
 
Secondly, the correct contact details of the defaulting owner must be supplied to the 
attorney.  The domicilium addresses of owners who are in default are very important, 
because any legal action taken must be addressed to the domicilium address of the 
debtor.  The postal address must also be supplied because the defaulting owner 
often does not live at the unit address and if a residential address is available, is 
must be provided as well.  Therefore, the letter of demand should be sent to the 
domicilium address, the postal address and if available to the residential address of 
the debtor as well.  
 
Thirdly, a copy of the management rules must be furnished since these rules 
establish how levies are determined, how interest is raised and for which costs the 
debtor may be held liable.  Most sectional title schemes are governed by the 
standard rules, but some schemes may contain special rules, which are especially 
important if they alter the formula determining the way expenses are calculated.   
 
Fourthly, bodies corporate must provide attorneys with the budget and minutes 
approved at the most recent annual general meeting.  This will allow the collection 
attorneys to evaluate whether the correct procedures were followed in determining 
the levies.  In addition this will give the attorney sufficient information to answer the 
defaulting owner‟s queries as to how the outstanding amount was calculated and 
what expenses he is liable for in terms of the budget.  The above documents are 
always required as evidence if the debtor decides to defend the action.    
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Further, it is important that the trustees or managing agent supply the attorney 
concerned with the resolution of the trustees which determined the levies to be paid 
by individual owners.  The prescribed management rules require the trustees to meet 
within 14 days after the annual general meeting, to determine the individual levies 
due by owners and to notify them accordingly.186  The supply of this information must 
not be overlooked by trustees since it would give opposing attorneys grounds to 
dispute levy recovery claims.   
 
Lastly, attorneys must be supplied with the trustees‟ resolution confirming the rate of 
interest as provided for in standard prescribed management rule 31(6).  It can either 
be in the form of an extract from the minutes of a trustees‟ meeting, or by means of a 
written resolution signed by all the trustees. 
 
By complying with the abovementioned requirements, attorneys will be provided with 
the essential information that is needed for the effective and efficient collection of 
arrear contributions.  Compliance with all of the above mentioned documents may 
appear cumbersome but it should not discourage trustees.  In the event that some 
information is lacking attorneys should be able to assist bodies corporate in obtaining 
what is required.187  
 
4 4 Evaluation 
 
At 4 2 1 it was shown that an application to an ombud, from persons who were 
owners of units at the time when such resolution was passed, is sufficient to recover 
arrear contributions.188  This is a crucial innovation to help bodies corporate collect 
outstanding contributions timeously.  Because regional adjudicators will be given 
specialised training in handling such claims this is a better solution than making it 
possible for the part-time judges in the Small Claims Court to handle such claims.  
The recovery of arrear contributions by an application to an ombud may become one 
of the major operations of the various regional offices and may necessitate the 
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appointment of an experienced debt collector on the staff of every regional ombud 
office in the country.    
 
The threat of having to pay all legal costs, including costs between attorney and 
client, collection commission, expenses and charges incurred by the body corporate 
in obtaining the recovery of arrear levies might in practice encourage defaulting 
owners to think carefully before they refuse to make payment.  This is especially so 
in cases where owners withhold levies on account of some complaint or grievance 
against the body corporate, the trustees or the managing agent.  Defaulting owners 
should be advised to avoid escalating debts by settling their debts immediately and 
then trying to settle their complaints or grievances in another manner, such as 
raising their complaints at a general meeting. 
 
If not preceded by a due process hearing the suspension of voting rights may be 
unconstitutional, especially where the resolutions affect the property rights of the 
owner in terms of sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution.  The fact that the 
management rules allow the defaulting owner to attend and take part in the 
discussions of the general meeting and that the mortgage creditor may vote as proxy 
for a defaulting owner goes a long way to protecting the constitutional and perhaps 
also the property rights of the defaulting owner.   
 
That the CSOSA now makes provision for an order that the body corporate may, in 
appropriate circumstances, have the first claim to the rent owed by the tenant of the 
defaulting owner will significantly improve the position of the body corporate.189  This 
is especially true for schemes with a large number of absentee owners where most 
of the apartments are let to tenants. 
 
Besides the fact that it would be difficult to argue that the discontinuation of services 
would not affect the health of the defaulting owner and his family, it is also 
questionable whether the body corporate should be given such extensive powers.  It 
can be argued that bodies corporate are neither courts nor public service bodies and 
should not be allowed to utilise such extremes without proper adjudication.  
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Furthermore, we have seen that rushed action by the body corporate may not only 
lead to claims for restoration of the status quo ante but might also establish grounds 
for damages.  Moreover, the removal of services might result in unjustifiable 
hardship to a non-solvent owner who already finds it difficult to keep his unit from 
being sold at a forced sale.190   
 
Any rule in a sectional title scheme should be reasonable.  In deciding what is 
reasonable, the values enshrined in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution are 
paramount.  This means that conflicting interests must be balanced by giving careful 
consideration to the fundamental rights concerned.191   In terms of the Constitution 
everyone has the right to privacy192 and dignity.193  Therefore, it is difficult to see how 
the „name and shame‟ sanction introduced by an amendment of the Act or a model 
rule would survive a constitutional challenge.  However, it can be argued that an 
owner‟s right to privacy and dignity may be restricted in terms of the limitation clause 
in the Constitution where these rights are required to be reasonable and 
justifiable.194    
 
At 4 3 7 above we have seen that STILUS provides an efficient, effective and low 
cost measure to enforce the financial obligations of sectional owners, which will 
benefit all parties concerned.  It is, however, important to note that the decision to 
make use of STILUS involves entering into a complex contract and that it would also 
increase the body corporate‟s overheads.  Paddock therefore correctly suggests that 
no trustee should take this decision without obtaining independent professional 
advice as to whether the body corporate needs levy financing and whether STILUS 
is the best type available.  Furthermore, the majority of owners should agree that 
levy financing is necessary and that an increase in the scheme‟s overhead expenses 
is justifiable.195  We have also seen that trustees and managing agents must submit 
                                                          
190
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-31.  See also Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law 135.  
191
 CG Van der Merwe, P Mohr & M Blumberg “The Bill of Rights and the Rules of Sectional Title Schemes: A 
Comparative Perspective” (2000) 11 Stell LR 155 180.  
192
 S 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
193
 S 10. 
194
 S 36. 
195
 G Paddock „Stilus‟ Santam Insurance” (February 2011) 6-2 Paddocks Press Newsletter 4. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
119 
 
sufficient information at the start of the recovery process to ensure that attorneys can 
collect arrear levies without unnecessary delays and difficulties. 
 
Arguably the most efficient and effective measure to enforce financial obligations is 
to make provision for penalties for late payment of contributions.  The main 
advantage of this measure is that the body corporate need not go to court to exact 
the fine, unless challenged.  This sanction can be very effective, even more so in the 
case of absentee landlords who do not bother to pay their monthly contributions.  
However, the effect would be limited in the case of poor owners who simply do not 
have the money.196  A temporary solution in the South African context would be to 
amend the rules to exact a monetary fine where a sectional owner does not pay his 
monthly levies on time.197  However, a more permanent and uniform solution is 
needed and therefore the legislator should consider amending the Act so as to make 
provision for this particular sanction.    
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Chapter 5:  Attachment and Sale in Execution of 
Sectional Title Units 
 
5 1 Introduction 
 
In chapter 3 we have seen that sectional owners are obliged to pay their share of the 
common expenses by contributing to a fund from which the costs for administering 
and managing the scheme as well as maintaining the common property are drawn.1  
Ultimately the success of a sectional title scheme will depend on a steady flow of 
levy payments from the sectional owners to the coffers of the body corporate.2  Many 
bodies corporate, however, find themselves in a chaotic financial position because of 
financial difficulties on the part of sectional owners when it comes to the payment of 
regular monthly levies and the recent tendency on the part of owners to refuse to pay 
levies.3  The non-payment of levies is thus a serious problem in many sectional title 
schemes.4 
 
Since non-compliance with financial obligations can destroy the financial stability of a 
scheme, effective measures for its enforcement are essential.5  In the previous 
chapter it was shown that the body corporate may ensure compliance with the 
financial obligations in various ways but most of these mechanisms have proven to 
be unsatisfactory in practice.  This dissatisfaction stems from either the fact that the 
mechanisms do not have adequate recourse to provide an efficient legal remedy or 
simply because the defaulting owner‟s financial position is so poor that he is not able 
to pay the levies and the interest on the arrears.  Consequently, this chapter will 
focus on the most severe measure and in fact a measure of last resort for the 
enforcement of financial obligations, namely attachment and sale in execution of the 
sectional title unit where a sectional owner‟s movable property proves to be 
insufficient to cover his debt to the body corporate. 
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3
 CG Van der Merwe & JC Sonnekus Sectional Titles, Share Blocks and Time-Sharing Volume 1 Sectional 
Titles (Service Issue 16 May 2013) 9-5. 
4
 M Kelly-Louw “Collection of Levies by a Body Corporate” (2004) 12-2 JBL 94 98. 
5
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-7. 
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Sectional title units are usually subject to mortgage bonds which entails that the 
bondholder‟s interests must be weighed against those of the body corporate in 
securing compliance with the sectional owner‟s financial obligations.6  Section 
15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 (the Act) restrains the registrar 
from registering transfer of a unit until a conveyancer‟s certificate is issued 
confirming that the body corporate has certified that all moneys due by the transferor 
in respect of the said unit have been or that provision has been made for the 
payment thereof.  The crucial question in this regard is whether this embargo 
provision can be construed as a tacit lien, charge or preferent right in favour of the 
body corporate ranking higher than that of the mortgage creditor.7   
 
There are also some obstacles that await the mortgage creditor when it comes to the 
attachment and sale in execution of a sectional title unit.  In this regard it is important 
to examine the constitutionality of the execution procedure against mortgaged units 
in terms of section 66(1)(a) of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act 32 of 1944 and rule 45(1) 
of the Uniform Rules of the High Court, as well as the impact of the application of the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 
(PIE) on mortgaged units that are sold in execution. 
   
In terms of section 15B(3)(b) of the Act where provision has been made by law for 
the separate rating of units the registrar is not entitled to transfer a unit unless he is 
furnished with a clearance certificate from the local authority confirming that all rates 
and moneys due to it under any law in respect of the land and buildings of the 
scheme have been paid.  Therefore, this chapter will conclude with an examination 
of the relationship between the Local Government: Municipal Property Rates Act 6 of 
2004 (the Property Rates Act), the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 
2000 (the Systems Act) and the Act.   
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5ed (2006) 488. 
7
 See in general CG Van der Merwe “Does the restraint on transfer provision in the Sectional Titles Act accord 
sufficient preference to the body corporate for outstanding levies” (1996) 59 THRHR 367 367-387.   
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5 2 Ranking of body corporate’s embargo vis-à-vis the security right of the 
mortgage creditor  
 
If the sectional owner‟s movable property turns out to be insufficient to settle his 
debt, the body corporate can proceed to attach the unit and to sell it in execution.8  
However, in terms of the Act the registrar shall not register a transfer of a unit unless 
a conveyancer‟s certificate is produced to him that, as at date of registration, the 
body corporate has certified that all moneys due to it have been paid or that 
provision has been made to the satisfaction of the body corporate for the payment 
thereof.9  The latter provision is called the embargo or restraint provision.10   
 
Units that are attached and sold in execution, to settle a sectional owner‟s debt to the 
body corporate, are more often than not subject to a mortgage bond and therefore 
the critical question is whether the embargo provision confers on the body corporate 
a preferent claim ranking higher than that of the mortgage creditor.11  This very 
question came up for decision in several court cases over a period of time. 
 
The first court called upon to make a decision on this matter was the Transvaal 
Provincial Division (now the South Gauteng High Court) in South African Permanent 
Building Society v Messenger of the Court, Pretoria, and Others.12  Although already 
decided in 1989, this case was only reported in 1996 in the appendix to the 1996 (1) 
South African Law Reports.  In this case the applicant, the SA Permanent Building 
Society, brought an application for an order declaring that its mortgage bond was 
preferent in a sale in execution of the unit of a defaulting owner in the Solitaire 
Sectional Title Scheme to the claim of the second respondent, Body Corporate of 
Solitaire Building, in terms of the previous embargo provision in the Sectional Titles 
Act 66 of 1971 (the old Act).13  The body corporate was the only respondent that 
appeared by way of counsel. 
 
                                                          
8
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-12(3). 
9
 S 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
10
 GJ Pienaar Sectional Titles and other Fragmented Property Schemes (2010) 213. 
11
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-12(3) and Badenhorst et al The Law of Property 488.  
12
 1996 1 SA 401 (T). 
13
 S 15(4)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 66 of 1971. 
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Curlewis J pointed out that the facts were not in dispute and that the only point to 
decide upon was a legal one, namely whether the claim of the mortgage creditor 
(applicant) was preferent to the claim of the body corporate for arrear levies.14  The 
applicant had a mortgage bond over a certain unit in the Solitaire sectional title 
scheme and the body corporate was still owed certain levies when the sectional 
owner attempted to transfer the unit to a new purchaser.  Curlewis J, therefore, had 
to decide whether the claim of the mortgage creditor was preferent to that of the 
body corporate.  Counsel for the body corporate relied on the embargo provision in 
section 15(4)(b) of the old Act (before it was replaced by section 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) of 
the Act), which stated the following: 
 
“No transfer of a unit, any portion thereof, or any individual share therein can be 
registered unless all money due to the body corporate by the transferor in respect of 
the unit has been paid, or satisfactory arrangements have been made for the 
payment thereof.”  
 
Counsel for the body corporate argued that the embargo provision15 was analogous 
to section 26 of Ordinance 43 of 1903 (T), which placed an embargo upon transfer 
unless certain rates were paid to a municipality.  He continued that in Johannesburg 
Municipality v Cohen’s Trustees,16 it was stated that this embargo creates a „very 
real and extensive preference‟ and that this would have preference over any other 
right, such as a mortgage bond.17  Curlewis J pointed out that these remarks were 
fortified by the statement of the judge from whom that appeal came namely that the 
embargo is „something not wholly in the nature of a lien or hypothec but sui generis 
whereby the council practically obtains a preference over other creditors‟.18  Another 
case relied upon by counsel for the body corporate was Stadsraad van Pretoria v 
Letabakop Farming Operations (Pty) Ltd.19  In this case Ackermann J interpreted 
section 26 of the Ordinance (analogous to section 50(1) of the Local Government 
                                                          
14
  South African Permanent Building Society v Messenger of the Court, Pretoria, and Others 1996 1 SA 401 
(T) 402B-D. 
15
 S 15(4)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 66 of 1971. 
16
 1909 TH 811. 
17
 South African Permanent Building Society v Messenger of the Court, Pretoria, and Others 1996 1 SA 401 (T) 
402F-G. 
18
 Johannesburg Municipality v Cohen’s Trustees 1909 TH 811 137. 
19
  1981 4 SA 911 (T) 917D. 
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Ordinance 17 of 1939 (T)) as conferring „a lien or some other species of right which 
was preferent to a bond‟. 
 
Curlewis J found that Cohen and Letabakop were of no consequence for two 
reasons.20  Firstly, the remarks of Innes CJ and Solomon J were only obiter dicta.21  
Secondly, these obiter dicta were considered by a Full Bench in the same Transvaal 
Division in Rabie NO v Rand Townships Registrar.22  Curlewis JP, Greenberg J and 
Gey van Pittius J held in this case that the right given to municipal councils by the 
embargo provision of section 47(b) of Ordinance 9 of 1912 to prevent transfer of 
premises until arrear rates had been paid, did not constitute „a claim ranking in 
priority‟ to a mortgage over such premises within the meaning of section 55(2) of Act 
32 of 1917.23  
 
Curlewis J was not prepared to go an inch beyond what section 15(4)(b) sets out.  
He reasoned that the right resulting from this embargo may be „not wholly in the 
nature of a lien or a hypothec but sui generis‟ but that it was nothing more.24  This 
conclusion was in his opinion supported by two considerations namely, firstly, that 
commercial undertakings (and indeed the public generally) required legal certainty 
rather than doctrinal purity or juristic correctness and, secondly, that the preference 
afforded to mortgage creditors should not be lightly disturbed.  He also cautioned 
that if the legislature wished to change this position, the intention to do so must be 
clearly expressed and the ambit of the change clearly defined.25 
 
Consequently, Curlewis J having found further support for his view in the Transvaal 
Provincial Division case of Pretoria Stadsraad v Geregsbode, Landdrosdistrik van 
Pretoria,26 concluded that the clause did not create a preferential claim in favour of 
the body corporate and that the claim of the mortgagee was indeed preferent to that 
                                                          
20
 See in general Van der Merwe (1996) THRHR 379. 
21
 South African Permanent Building Society v Messenger of the Court, Pretoria, and Others 1996 1 SA 401 (T) 
402I. 
22
 1926 TPD 286. 
23
 South African Permanent Building Society v Messenger of the Court, Pretoria, and Others 1996 1 SA 401 (T) 
403A-B, referring to the ratio decidendi in Rabie NO v Rand Townships Registrar 1926 TPD 286 289-290.     
24
 South African Permanent Building Society v Messenger of the Court, Pretoria, and Others 1996 1 SA 401 (T) 
403C. 
25
 403C-D. 
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 1959 1 SA 609 (T) 613.  
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of the body corporate within the meaning of section 66(2) of the Magistrates‟ Courts 
Act.27  The result of this decision was that the mortgagee‟s claim ranked higher than 
that of the body corporate and that, since the mortgagee had not in terms of section 
66(2) of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act consented to it, the sale in execution had to be 
set aside.28 
 
The Cape Provincial Division (now the Western Cape High Court) was the next court 
that grappled with this problem.  The main factual difference between this case and 
the previous case was that the owner of the unit which was attached in execution 
was insolvent.  The applicant in Nel NO v Body Corporate of the Seaways Building 
and Another29 was the liquidator of a company which owned six units in a sectional 
title scheme known as Seaways.  All six units were mortgaged in favour of Standard 
Bank for an amount of R1, 3 million.  The applicant caused the units to be sold by 
public auction in September 1992 for the sum of R1,05 million and lodged the 
transfer documents at the Cape Town Deeds Office for registration.  The body 
corporate of the Seaways Building, the first respondent, however, refused to issue 
the levy clearance certificate required in terms of the embargo provision in section 
15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) of the Act before the registrar could register transfer of the units.  It 
appeared that levies in the amount of R106 655, 24 were outstanding in respect of 
the six units and that the company would not have sufficient funds after the mortgage 
debt owed to Standard Bank had been paid.  The body corporate‟s contention was 
that it was entitled to refuse to issue the certificate envisaged by section 
15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) until the full amount of the outstanding levies have been paid, or until 
satisfactory provision has been made for payment thereof.  The applicant then 
sought an urgent declaratory order that section 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) did not, as was 
contended by the body corporate, confer an effective preference on the body 
corporate in respect of levies owed to it by the owners of units in the event of their 
insolvency or liquidation.30   
 
                                                          
27
 South African Permanent Building Society v Messenger of the Court, Pretoria, and Others 1996 1 SA 401 (T) 
403F-G. 
28
 403G.   
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 1995 1 SA 130 (C).  
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In the course of his judgment Brand J considered the effect of the judgment by 
Curlewis J in SA Permanent Building Society that the embargo provision in the Act 
was similar in effect to the embargo provision which was considered in Rabie NO in 
that it did not render the body corporate a preferent creditor for the purposes of 
section 66(2) of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act.  In Brand J‟s view this verdict and the 
opinion of other authorities did not support the applicant‟s case due to the fact that 
they did not afford an answer to the contention of the body corporate (first 
respondent) which „was not that it was a preferent creditor (properly so called) for the 
purposes, for example, of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act or the Insolvency Act 24 of 
1936‟.  According to Brand J the body corporate‟s case was that by virtue of the 
embargo provisions of section 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) „it enjoyed an effective preference in 
the event of insolvency over any other rights, including such as those derived from a 
mortgage bond‟.31  Consequently Brand J reached the following conclusion with 
regard to Rabie NO relied upon in SA Permanent Building Society:   
 
“The very impact of the judgment in the Rabie case, read together with the Cohen 
case, is, in my view that a creditor can by virtue of an embargo provision, such as the 
one under consideration, enjoy an effective preference in the event of insolvency 
despite the fact that he is not a preferent creditor properly so called for the purposes 
of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act or the Insolvency Act.”
32 
 
Brand J eventually found that section 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) of the Act must be understood 
to create an effective preference in the event of insolvency in favour of the body 
corporate in respect of its claim for outstanding levies and that such a preference 
can be accommodated in the scheme of insolvency under the Insolvency Act as 
being part of „the costs of realisation‟ (koste van tegeldemaking in Afrikaans), 
envisaged in section 89(1) of the latter act.33  The trustee in insolvency proceedings 
must turn all assets into money (tegeldemaking) so as to distribute the estate of the 
insolvent amongst his creditors.  The only way to realise the costs of the asset would 
be to sell the unit and this first requires the settlement of the arrears in terms of the 
embargo.  Therefore, moneys due to the body corporate form part of the costs of 
realisation of the asset of the insolvent.  The moral of the case is thus that a body 
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corporate will only enjoy preferential status on a sale in execution where the owner is 
insolvent.  Consequently, it would be wise for bodies corporate to wait until the unit 
owner is insolvent before procuring an attachment of the unit.34 
 
With the leave of the Cape Provincial Division the matter came before the Appellate 
Division (now the Supreme Court of Appeal).35  EM Grosskopf JA discussed Cohen 
and Rabie NO and pointed out that Rabie NO concluded that the municipality's claim, 
although enjoying the benefits discussed in Cohen, nevertheless was not „a claim 
ranking in priority to that of the judgement creditor‟.  He expressly mentioned that this 
was also decided in SA Permament Building Society.  Due to the fact that both 
parties accepted that the nature of the contested provision was the same as that of 
the measures considered in Cohen and Rabie NO, he then found that although the 
contested provision did not create a preference in the ordinary sense it nevertheless 
gave the body corporate a power to resist transfer of units until moneys due to it were 
paid.36 
 
With regard to the ambit of this provision, the appellant‟s main contention was that 
the contested provision did not apply to all transfers from an insolvent estate (that of 
the insolvent unit owner) or from a company in liquidation which was unable to pay 
its debts (the company that owns the units).37  Having reviewed the principles 
gathered from the applicable provisions of the Insolvency Act and the Companies Act 
61 of 1973 in the light of the legislative history of the contested provision,38 EM 
Grosskopf JA found that particularly the provisions relating to legal proceedings were 
destructive of the appellant's arguments that after liquidation of a unit owner the 
contribution was no longer due to the body corporate, or, alternatively, that only the 
eventual dividend in insolvency was due.  The right of a creditor to successfully 
prosecute proceedings for the recovery of his pre-insolvency claim necessarily 
presupposed that the whole debt to him was still owing, and, indeed, that it was still due.  
The amount which the creditor would ultimately recover would of course depend on the 
nature of his claim and the amount available for distribution among creditors (cf 
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section 78(3) of the Insolvency Act).39  
 
Consequently, EM Grosskopf JA concluded that the contributions owing to the body 
corporate remained due within the meaning of the contested provision when the 
company was placed in liquidation.  He reasoned that any other conclusion would 
have been anomalous in the light of the legislative history of the provision.  The 
contested provision required a certificate of payment (or provision for payment) of 
moneys „due‟ to the body corporate even in respect of transfers from insolvent 
estates.  He reasoned that in the light of these provisions the legislature could hardly 
have thought that in practice nothing would ever be due by an insolvent estate.  
Moreover, it was very unlikely that the legislature would have granted bodies corporate 
a remedy which is valueless when most needed, for example, when the unit holder is 
insolvent.40  The legislature clearly considered that the nature and purpose of the 
contributions were such that on insolvency of a unit owner, they should be paid by the 
estate of the unit owner rather than become the responsibility of the other unit 
owners.41  
 
The appellant‟s counsel accepted the correctness of the finding of the court a quo that 
the contested provision must be understood to create an effective preference in the 
event of insolvency in favour of the body corporate in respect of its claim for 
outstanding levies.  This preference was granted on the grounds that it could be 
accommodated in the scheme of the insolvency as being part of the „costs of 
realisation‟ envisaged in section 89(1) of the Insolvency Act. Consequently all that 
remained for EM Grosskopf JA to do was to agree with the correctness of the 
finding42 and to dismiss the appeal.   
 
The decision of the Appellate Division in Nel NO v Body Corporate of the Seaways 
Building and Another43 was then again followed and applied in the Transvaal High 
Court in Barnard NO v Regspersoon van Aminie en ‘n Ander44 and confirmed in the 
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Supreme Court of Appeal in Barnard NO v Regspersoon van Aminie en ‘n Ander.45  
The Supreme Court of Appeal, in Barnard NO v Regspersoon van Aminie en ‘n 
Ander,46 indicated that the legal costs incurred to recover the levies due on a unit 
formed part of the moneys owed to the body corporate.  Consequently, moneys due 
to the body corporate in terms of section 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) of the Act did not only 
include levies due on a sectional title unit, but also legal costs incurred by the body 
corporate in collecting such levies.47  Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
held that arrear contributions were not „taxes‟ for the purposes of section 89(1) and 
(4) of the Insolvency Act and that the two-year restriction contained in those 
subsections could not be applied to arrear contributions.48  Consequently, in the 
event that the transferor (unit owner) is insolvent, the body corporate may refuse to 
issue a clearance certificate unless all outstanding levies and other moneys due to 
the body corporate have been paid in full.49 
 
The next decision handed down was the decision of the Transvaal Provincial 
Division in Body Corporate of Geovy Villa v Sherrif, Pretoria Central Magistrate’s 
Court, and Another.50  In this test case, the body corporate of a sectional title 
scheme sought a declaratory order that the bond held by the second respondent, a 
bank, over a unit in the scheme did not rank higher than the body corporate‟s claim 
for overdue levies and costs.  In particular it sought an order that the provisions of 
section 66(2)51 of the Magistrates‟ Court Act did not apply to the unit in question.  
The body corporate in December 2000 had obtained judgement against the owner of 
the unit for overdue levies and costs in an amount of R8 600.  No payment was 
made and in February 2002 the unit was sold in execution for R32 000.  However, 
the bank refused to accept the purchase price of R32 000.52  The bank relied on 
section 66 of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act and its position as bondholder.  Section 66 
provides that: 
                                                          
45
 2001 3 SA 973 (SCA). 
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 2001 3 SA 973 (SCA). 
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 Paras 17-18.     
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 Para 29.  
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 Kelly-Louw (2004) JBL 96.  See also W Mars The Law of Insolvency in South Africa 9ed (2008) 499. 
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 2003 1 SA 69 (T). 
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 Section 66(2) of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act 32 of 1944 was instituted to protect the interest of bondholders.  
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“no immovable property that is subject to a claim preferent to that of the judgement 
creditor shall be sold in execution unless 
(a) the judgement creditor has caused…notice in writing of the intended sale in 
execution to be served personally on the preferent creditor…and… 
(c) the proceeds of the sale are sufficient to satisfy the claim of such preferent 
creditor, in full, or 
(d) the preferent creditor confirms the sale in writing”.  
 
Consequently, under section 66(2) of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act a unit can only be 
sold in execution if the proceeds of the sale are sufficient to satisfy the claim of the 
bondholder, or if the bondholder approves the sale.  In practice the bondholder 
would normally not approve the sale unless the proceeds are sufficient to cover the 
balance owing to it.53 
 
The body corporate relied on Nel NO v Body Corporate of the Seaways Building and 
Another54 and Barnard NO v Regspersoon van Aminie en ‘n Ander55 for its 
contention that the bank did not have a preferent right and that it therefore did not 
have to comply with section 66(2).56  It was argued that in these cases the Supreme 
Court of Appeal held that section 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) of the Act created a right ranking in 
preference above that of the bondholder and that its claim for overdue levies 
accordingly ranked above the bond of the bank.  The bank‟s reaction was that there 
was an established commercial practice that the bondholder‟s right was preferent to 
that of the body corporate.57 
 
The court held that the instant case was part of a larger socio-economic problem.  
Many purchasers of sectional title units are employees of the State, parastatal 
enterprises and huge private enterprises, and are therefore entitled to housing 
subsidies.  Financial institutions grant bonds of up to 100% of the purchase price and 
quite often the employer automatically credits repayments to the account of the 
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mortgage creditor bank.  Many purchasers are, however, unaware of their obligation 
to pay a levy and have made no provision for it in their financial planning.  The result 
is a disaster since even though their bond payments are up to date, the arrear levies 
and charges remain unpaid from the outset and the arrears increase monthly.  The 
failure to pay levies meant that bodies corporate were hampered in their functioning, 
which led to a deterioration of the building and eventually the creation of slum 
conditions and areas where financial institutions were no longer prepared to grant 
loans.  Thus the interests of not only the bodies corporate but also of the other unit 
owners in the scheme, bondholders and the community as a whole required that 
bodies corporate act against defaulters as quickly and efficiently as possible before 
arrears became completely out of hand.  It was also pointed out that many 
sequestrations and the concomitant negative effects thereof could be avoided if 
housing subsidy schemes of employers allowed for bond repayments, as well as for 
the payment of levies.58   
 
The court then concluded that the statement in Rabie NO v Rand Townships 
Registrar59 relative to a similar embargo creating „a preference‟ or „something not 
wholly in the nature of a lien or a hypothec but sui generis‟ was obiter.  Since the 
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Nel NO v Body Corporate of the 
Seaways Building and Another60 and Barnard NO v Regspersoon van Aminie en ‘n 
Ander61 interpreted section 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) as creating a right which ranks in 
preference above that of the bondholder, it decided that Rabie NO v Rand 
Townships Registrar62 had in effect been overruled.  The effect of this judgment was 
that a body corporate wishing to sell a unit in execution to satisfy payment of arrear 
levies, does not have to give notice to the bondholder of the unit, and the 
bondholder‟s consent was not required for the sale.63 
 
Lastly, the court held that in the light of the socio-economic situation sketched above 
the sale of units without the knowledge of the mortgage creditor could have a 
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negative effect on the value of units.  It could also result in difficulty in obtaining 
loans from financial institutions for the purchase of sectional title units, which in turn 
would negatively affect property values.  It therefore proposed an amendment to 
section 66 of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act so as to compel the body corporate to give 
the bondholder advance notice of the sale in execution of a sectional title unit.64  
Accordingly the court issued a declaratory order that, for the purposes of section 66 
of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act, the bank‟s bond did not rank higher than the body 
corporate‟s  claim for arrear levies and costs as intended in section 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) 
of the Act.  The sheriff was directed to transfer the unit in question to the purchaser 
who bought it at the sale in execution.65 
 
The latter decision was reversed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in First Rand Bank 
Ltd v Body Corporate of Geovy Villa.66  The court examined the embargo provisions 
in Johannesburg Municipality v Cohen’s Trustees67 and in Rabie NO V Rand 
Townships Registrar,68 quoted the conclusions69 and reasons70 advanced in the 
latter case and stated that it had stood the test of further scrutiny over time.  With 
approval the court also quoted passages following the Rabie NO V Rand Townships 
Registrar71 conclusion in South African Permanent Building Society v Messenger of 
the Court, Pretoria, and Others72 and in Nel NO v Body Corporate of the Seaways 
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Building and Another.73  The court held that the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in Nel NO v Body Corporate of the Seaways Building and Another74 must be 
understood in the following way.  The embargo provision of the Act created an 
effective preference in the event of insolvency in favour of the body corporate in 
respect of its claim for outstanding contributions since such a preference could be 
accommodated as part of „costs of realisation‟ under the scheme of insolvency as 
envisaged by section 89(1) of the Insolvency Act. 75 
 
By contrast to the reasoning in the court a quo the Supreme Court of Appeal pointed 
out that the effect of the judgments referred to above was that the „preference‟ 
created under the provisions of the Act was something less than and something 
different from the „preference‟ under the Magistrates‟ Courts Act.76  There was 
nothing in the provisions of section 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) of the Act that expressly elevated 
the embargo or veto right of a body corporate above the security rights of the holder 
of a mortgage bond.  If Parliament had intended that the veto right of the body 
corporate to have such an effect, it should have legislated for such an effect in 
express terms.77  The practical effect of section 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) was that whenever 
funds were available, the body corporate would be paid before an effective delivery 
took place on account of a sale in execution of the defaulting owner‟s unit.  However, 
if insufficient funds were available, a reasonable mortgage creditor could seek some 
kind of accommodation with the body corporate, but it was under no obligation to do 
so.78  He could therefore put a stop to the sale in execution. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal then distinguished Nel NO v Body Corporate of the 
Seaways Building and Another79 in which it was decided that if the owner of a unit 
was sequestrated or liquidated, the embargo in effect created a preference in favour 
of the body corporate since the payment of arrear levies could be treated as part of 
                                                          
73
 1996 1 SA 131 (A): “In argument before us it was accepted by both sides, rightly in my view, that the juristic 
nature of the contested provision is the same as that of the measures considered in the above cases.  The position 
then is that the contested provision, although it did not create a preference in the ordinary sense, nevertheless 
gave the body corporate a power to resist transfer of units until moneys due to it were paid.  The question at 
issue was the exact ambit of the power.” 135C-D. 
74
 1996 1 SA 131 (A). 
75
 First Rand Bank Ltd v Body Corporate of Geovy Villa 2004 3 SA 362 (SCA) para 22.  
76
 Para 23. 
77
 Para 24. 
78
 Para 26. 
79
 1996 1 SA 131 (A).  
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the „costs of realisation‟ envisaged in section 89(1) of the Insolvency Act.  The fact 
that the debt to the body corporate was satisfied as part of the process of realisation 
produced the same result as if the rights conferred by an embargo provision were 
preferent in the strict sense.80  Since the owner‟s unit was not sequestrated in the 
present case, the court held that the mortgage creditor, the bank, had a preferent 
claim under section 66(2) of the Magistrates‟ Court Act.  Reversing the decision of 
the court a quo, the court concluded that the body corporate, consequently, did not 
have the right to sell the unit in question in execution without reference to the first 
mortgage held by the bank.81  
 
The effect of all the cases referred to above is thus that in the event that the 
defaulting owners of units are still solvent, bodies corporate would require the 
consent of the bondholder to the sale of the unit in execution which, in practice, 
precludes bodies corporate from having the unit sold in this way.  The wisest option 
for bodies corporate would therefore be to wait until sectional owners in arrears are 
declared insolvent since they would then not only save the cost of litigation, but they 
would also have a preferent claim for arrears as part of the costs of realisation of the 
insolvent‟s assets.82  In this manner the embargo provision strengthens the position 
of the body corporate to collect outstanding levies, but it might also create a situation 
where financial institutions may become cautious to advance credit to purchasers on 
security of a mortgage bond as their preference is eroded by the insolvency of the 
mortgagor (defaulting owner).83   
 
It is, however, possible for financial institutions to take some cautious steps to 
reduce their losses by pressurising sectional owners to pay their levies timeously 
and thus to keep the payment of their levies up to date.  The following steps could be 
suggested.  Firstly, under section 37(3) of the Act mortgage creditors have the right 
                                                          
80
 First Rand Bank Ltd v Body Corporate of Geovy Villa 2004 3 SA 362 (SCA) para 27.  See also Van der 
Merwe (1996) THRHR 385.  
81
 First Rand Bank Ltd v Body Corporate of Geovy Villa 2004 3 SA 362 (SCA) para 28.  If the claim of the body 
corporate was upheld it would have had the following impact on mortgage creditors: “Moreover, the security 
afforded by mortgage investments would be materially decreased if bonded property is liable to be sold in 
execution for a trifling claim for rates without notice to the mortgagee; the rules of the magistrate‟s court do not 
prescribe the precautions afforded by the practice in the superior courts of requiring notice to the mortgagee.” 
Para 17.   
82
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-18. 
83
 D Burdette “New Problems Relating to Contribution in Insolvent Estates” (2000) 63 THRHR 458 458-464.  
See also Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-18 and Pienaar Sectional Titles 214. 
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to determine the extent to which a sectional owner‟s levies have been paid.  With this 
knowledge they can try to use friendly persuasion to warn defaulting owners to pay 
up.  Secondly, the loan agreement between the sectional owner and the mortgage 
creditor may provide that the mortgage creditor must be informed of meetings of the 
body corporate, and that the mortgage creditor may be present at such meeting and 
may vote on behalf of the sectional owner whose unit is burdened with the mortgage.  
The effect of this is that if bodies corporate do not make sufficient effort to collect 
arrear levies in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the mortgage creditors can 
pressurise the body corporate to take the necessary steps to collect arrear levies.  In 
such a way they would minimise their losses and ensure that the mortgagor does not 
fall substantially behind with the payment of levies.  A third option would be to insist 
in the mortgage agreement that mortgage debtors pay their levies to the body 
corporate by means of debit orders.  In the event that a mortgage debtor (unit owner) 
then cancels his debit order, the financial institution will immediately be aware of a 
potential problem which will give them the opportunity to take the necessary steps to 
protect their interests.84  The above options have no legal force and their effect 
would largely depend on the financial soundness of the unit owner.       
 
By contrast, bodies corporate could fortify their position in the case of imminent non-
payment of contributions by a particular unit owner by applying for the sequestration 
of the defaulting unit owner under the Insolvency Act.  Section 82(1) of the 
Insolvency Act provides that the trustee in insolvency is obliged to sell all the 
property in the insolvent estate as soon as he is authorised to do so at the second 
meeting of creditors.  As a result, the trustee can sell the unit without having to 
obtain the consent of the bondholder, which would benefit the body corporate in two 
ways.  Firstly, the new owner will replace the previous owner, and will most likely be 
able to pay future levies charged by the body corporate.  Secondly, the money due 
to the body corporate by the previous owner will be recouped from the proceeds of 
the sale as part of the cost of realisation of the assets of the insolvent, which means 
that in practice the body corporate would be paid out of the proceeds preferent to 
                                                          
84
 Burdette (2000) THRHR 459-460. 
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bondholders and other holders of security rights.  The only disadvantage of the latter 
option is that it might be a protracted process.85 
 
5 3 Obstacles for mortgage creditors on sale in execution   
 
5 3 1 Introduction 
 
It can be argued that there are two obstacles facing the mortgage creditor when it 
comes to securing an execution order against a sectional title unit.  Firstly, the 
constitutionality of the procedure for the sale in execution of immovable property in 
terms of section 66(1)(a) of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act and rule 45(1) of the Uniform 
Rules of the High Court, is questionable in the light of the provisions of section 26 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution).86  Secondly, 
if the mortgage debtor refuses to vacate the premises after the sectional title unit has 
been sold in execution, the mortgage creditor has to bring an action for eviction.  
Therefore, in every case where the eviction is sought of mortgagees who have 
foreclosed on their bonds legal practitioners would have to follow the arduous and 
costly route prescribed by PIE.87  Under this subheading both of these obstacles will 
be discussed and analysed in order to determine whether they can justifiably be 
called obstacles. 
 
5 3 2 Unconstitutionality of execution procedures under the Magistrates’ 
Courts Act and the Uniform Rules of the Court 
 
The constitutionality of the attachment and execution procedure of immovable 
property in terms of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act was first considered in Jaftha v 
Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others.88  These cases considered 
the effect of section 26 of the Constitution on the attachment and sale in execution 
process in terms of section 66(1)(a) of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act. 
 
                                                          
85
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-18. 
86
 See in general Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-18(4) - 9-24(4) and Pienaar Sectional Titles 218-220. 
87
 See in general Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-24(4) – 9-24(5) and Pienaar Sectional Titles 216-218.  
88
 2005 2 SA 140 (CC).  For a detailed discussion of this judgment see L Steyn Statutory Regulation of Forced 
Sale of the Home in South Africa LLD thesis University of Pretoria (2012) 181-190.  
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In both cases under consideration, the property was attached and sold in execution 
for trifling and extraneous debts in accordance with the normal debt collection 
procedure of obtaining a nulla bona return89 and thereafter attaching and selling the 
judgement debtor‟s immovable property in execution.  Furthermore, in both cases 
the judgements and warrants of execution were issued by the clerk of the court 
without considering the relevant circumstances.90   
 
In the High Court91 the appellants applied for orders setting aside, firstly, the sales 
and execution and, secondly, interdicting the two respondents from taking transfers 
of their homes.  The applications were based on the argument that the sale in 
execution process provided for in sections 66(1)(a) and 67 of the Magistrates‟ Courts 
Act was unconstitutional.  The applications were dismissed by the High Court 
because it held that if the sheriff issued a nulla bona return, the clerk of the court was 
obliged in terms of rule 36 of the Magistrates‟ Courts Rules to issue and sign a 
warrant of execution against the immovable property of the judgement debtor.  When 
execution takes place the judgement debtor can either vacate the premises 
voluntarily or remain in occupation.  If the premises were vacated voluntarily the 
effective loss of the home would be caused by the exercise of the judgement 
debtor‟s own free will and not by the execution process.  However, if the judgement 
debtor does not vacate the premises voluntarily he would be „holding over‟ and the 
purchaser would be required to act in terms of the provisions of PIE to secure 
eviction and therefore the eviction would be caused not by the execution process but 
by the separate legal proceedings instituted by the new owner.92  
 
In the appeal to the Constitutional Court,93 the appellants relied on section 26(1) of 
the Constitution which protects the right of access to adequate housing.  Their 
argument was formulated in the following manner: the right of access to adequate 
housing places a duty on both the state and private parties not to interfere 
unjustifiably with any person‟s existing access to adequate housing.  Consequently, 
                                                          
89
 A nulla bona return is a return by the sheriff of the Magistrate‟s Court that the judgement debtor does not 
have sufficient movable assets to satisfy the judgement debt. 
90
 Pienaar Sectional Titles 218. 
91
 Jaftha v Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others 2003 3 All SA 690 (C). 
92
 Jaftha v Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) 141C-F; see also Van 
der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-18(4) - 9-18(5). 
93
 Jaftha v Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others 2005 2 SA 140 (CC). 
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section 66(1)(a) of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act was unconstitutional because it 
allowed a person‟s right to adequate housing to be removed even in circumstances 
in which such removal was unjustifiable.94 
 
The Constitutional Court held that if section 26 of the Constitution is read as a whole, 
section 26(3) is directly applicable to eviction cases and guarantees that a person 
may not be evicted from his home without a court order being issued after 
considering all the relevant circumstances.  The aim of the entire section is to create 
a new dispensation in which everyone has access to adequate housing free from 
interference by the state unless the interference is justifiable.95  Due to the fact that 
section 26(1) protects a person‟s right of access to adequate housing, any measure 
permitting a person to be deprived of existing access to adequate housing limits the 
protection afforded in terms of section 26(1), leaving it to the court to determine 
whether such measure is just and equitable.96   
 
The Constitutional Court, therefore, held that, to the extent that section 66(1)(a) of 
the Magistrates‟ Courts Act fails to provide for a procedure of judicial oversight in the 
sales in execution process, it is unconstitutional and invalid.97  To remedy the defect, 
the Constitutional Court reverted to the mechanism of „reading in‟ and suggested that 
section 66(1)(a) must be read as though the words „a court, after consideration of all 
relevant circumstances, may order execution‟ appear before the words „against the 
immovable property of the party‟.98  This has the practical effect that, once the sheriff 
of the Magistrate‟s Court has issued a nulla bona return, the clerk of the court may 
not automatically issue a warrant of execution to attach the immovable property.  
The judgement creditor must first lodge an application with the court for an order that 
execution against the immovable property of the judgement debtor is in the specific 
circumstances of the case just and equitable.99  Furthermore, the Constitutional 
Court held that section 67 of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act is not unconstitutional to the 
                                                          
94
 Para 17. 
95
 Para 28. 
96
 Para 29. 
97
 Paras 39-40. 
98
 Paras 61-64. 
99
 Para 64. 
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extent that it does not provide for a blanket prohibition against sales in execution of 
houses below a certain value.100 
 
I am in agreement with Brits that the Constitutional Court should be highly praised for 
introducing judicial oversight for the sale in execution of immovable property (in our 
case sectional title units) in terms of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act for it does not 
prevent the sale of execution of homes as such, but it does ensure that unjustifiable 
sales in execution do not occur.101   
 
The constitutional principles applied in Jaftha were also applied to a writ of 
attachment against immovable property issued by the registrar of the High Court in 
terms of rule 45(1) of the Uniform Rules of the High Court in the case of Nedbank Ltd 
v Mortinson.102  The registrar‟s power to issue the writ limits the debtor‟s right to 
housing in terms of section 26 of the Constitution.  Since this limitation was not 
reasonable and justifiable in terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution, the defect in 
the rule could be remedied by importing words into the rule providing for judicial 
consideration of relevant factors before the writ against immovable property is 
issued.103  Consequently, the court held that section 27A of the Supreme Court Act 
59 of 1959 read with rule 31(5) empowered the registrar to grant the order but that 
such power limits the debtor‟s right to housing in terms of section 26 of the 
Constitution.  However, the court found that, in the absence of abuse of the court 
procedure, such limitation was reasonable and justifiable in terms of section 36(1) of 
the Constitution and permitted the registrar to grant the order.104  Rules of practice 
were then formulated by the court to alert the registrar in order to assist him in 
determining abuses and in referring those applications for consideration by the 
court.105  
 
                                                          
100
 Paras 50-51. 
101
 R Brits Mortgage Foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, Housing and the National Credit Act LLD 
thesis University of Stellenbosch (2012) 75. 
102
 2005 6 SA 462 (W).  See in general Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-18(6) – 9-19. 
103
 Nedbank Ltd v Mortinson 2005 6 SA 462 (W) para 39. 
104
 Para 33. 
105
 Para 33.1. 
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In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson and Others106 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal made a distinction between a sale in execution of the judgement 
debtor‟s immovable property based on a trifling extraneous debt and a judgement 
based on arrear mortgage payments in respect of a mortgage bond registered over 
the property.107  In this case the mortgage creditor, Standard Bank of SA Ltd, in 
separate actions issued summons against the respondents in the High Court 
requesting judgement against each of the respondents and in accordance with the 
normal procedure, for ancillary orders declaring the mortgaged properties 
executable.  Failure on behalf of the respondents to defend the actions resulted in 
Standard Bank of SA Ltd approaching the registrar for default judgements in terms of 
rule 31(5) of the Uniform Rules of the High Court.  It was, however, ordered that the 
matters be adjudicated in open court rather than by the registrar.  The High Court 
then granted judgement by default in each case, but declined to order the mortgage 
properties to be executable.  It reasoned that Jaftha108 had held that section 26 of 
the Constitution was compromised whenever execution against residential property 
was sought and that, in all such cases, it had to be shown that execution was 
permissible under section 26(3).  The reasoning of the High Court was that since the 
appellant‟s summonses lacked averments to the effect that the alleged facts were 
sufficient to justify an order in terms of section 26(3), they could not sustain an order 
of execution.109 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal pointed out that this was a test case as hundreds of 
similar cases came before the courts each year.110  The routine practice in the courts 
has become controversial because of uncertainty as to what must be alleged to 
justify an order for execution.  In the Western Province, applications for default 
judgements and orders declaring residential property executable have all but ground 
to a halt.111  The interpretation of Jaftha112 in the High Court was rejected by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal.  The Supreme Court of Appeal found that the issue in 
                                                          
106
 2006 2 SA 264 (SCA).  For a detailed discussion of this judgment see Steyn Statutory Regulation of Forced 
Sale 205-210. 
107
 Para 18.    
108
 2005 2 SA 140 (CC). 
109
 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson and Others 2006 2 SA 264 (SCA) 265C-F; see also Van der 
Merwe Sectional Titles 9-19. 
110
 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson and Others 2006 2 SA 264 (SCA) para 6. 
111
 Para 14. 
112
 2003 3 All SA 690 (C). 
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Jaftha113 was not section 26(3) of the Constitution but section 26(1) relating to the 
impact of the right to adequate housing on execution against residential property.  
The latter case did not decide that the right to adequate housing was compromised 
in every case where execution was levied against residential property but that a writ 
of execution that would deprive a person of „adequate‟ housing would compromise 
his rights in terms of section 26(1) and would, therefore, need to be justified as 
contemplated by section 36(1) of the Constitution.114 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal also found that section 26(1) did not confer a right of 
access to housing per se but only a right of access to „adequate‟ housing, which is of 
necessity relative and fact-bound.115  For that reason Jaftha116 did not decide that 
section 26(1) afforded protection to the ownership of all residential property, even 
more so because the situation in Jaftha117 was radically different from that of 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson and Others.118  In Jaftha,119 the 
sale in execution deprived the debtor of ownership of her home because she had 
been unable to pay a trifling unrelated debt, and no judicial oversight was interposed 
to preclude an unjustifiably disproportionate outcome.  Furthermore, the judgement 
creditor in Jaftha120 had not been a mortgage creditor with rights over the property 
which was derived from an agreement with the owner.  By contrast in Standard Bank 
of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson and Others,121 the property owners had willingly 
mortgaged their property to the bank in order to obtain a loan.  Their debt was not 
extraneous but fused into the title to the property.  Jaftha122 did not deal with the 
effect of section 26(1) on such cases.123 
 
It was also found that cases where execution against mortgaged property conflicts 
with section 26(1) were rare.  In practice the right of the mortgage creditor to reclaim 
                                                          
113
 2005 2 SA 140 (CC). 
114
 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson and Others 2006 2 SA 264 (SCA) para 15. 
115
 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson and Others 2006 2 SA 264 (SCA) para 16.  For this the 
Court relied on Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 1 SA 46 
(CC).  See paras 36-37 of the latter case. 
116
 2005 2 SA 140 (CC). 
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 2005 2 SA 140 (CC). 
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 2006 2 SA 264 (SCA). 
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 2005 2 SA 140 (CC). 
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 2005 2 SA 140 (CC). 
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 2006 2 SA 264 (SCA). 
122
 2005 2 SA 140 (CC). 
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the debt is seldom denied and it would be unacceptable to allow a different 
approach, depending on the reasons for bonding the property or the objects on 
which the loan was expended.  In essence the mortgage creditor‟s claim is against 
the property and its entitlements originate from the fact that the mortgage debtor 
chose to accept a limitation in his ownership or title when the loan was obtained.124 
 
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the fact that an execution order 
was sought in respect of residential property was not sufficient to constitute an 
infringement of section 26(1) of the Constitution.  Consequently, the orders ought to 
have been granted since no such infringement had been alleged or shown by the 
defendant mortgage debtors and the mortgage creditor had not been called upon to 
justify the orders sought.125  The Supreme Court of Appeal also found that this 
implied that the registrar of the High Court had been entitled to dispose of the 
applications for orders of execution by default.126  Rule 31(5) of the Uniform Rules of 
the High Court requires only a formal evaluation of whether a summons discloses a 
proper cause of action and, if the constitutionality of an order is not challenged, 
allows the registrar to enter a judgement.  This does not mean that the registrar must 
exercise judicial discretion regarding justifiability or that he would automatically grant 
an order in circumstances in which it would be constitutionally impermissible.127  
Since the mortgage debtors would have no defence against payment in most cases 
in which orders against mortgaged property are sought and would therefore not seek 
legal advice, the Supreme Court of Appeal proposed a prospective rule of practice to 
apply in cases where a plaintiff claims relief that includes declaring immovable 
property executable.  In terms of this rule of practice the summons in such cases 
must inform the defendants that the order might infringe their rights to adequate 
housing and must encourage them to place information before the court to convince 
the court to grant extenuation (moderation) in the execution of the order.128  The 
Supreme Court of Appeal therefore upheld the appeal and declared the properties 
executable.  In the course of judgment, the Supreme Court of Appeal acknowledged 
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that a mortgage bond is a vital tool for spreading home ownership129 and that 
execution against mortgaged residential property should in most cases take its 
normal course.130  
 
After Saunderson, the position with regard to execution against mortgaged sectional 
title units can be summarised as follows.  Saunderson confirmed that the decision of 
the Constitutional Court in Jaftha does not necessarily apply in every case of 
execution against residential property.  It is, however, possible for the defendant to 
plead an infringement of his right to adequate housing in all cases where execution 
is attempted, but this plea is unlikely to succeed in cases of execution against 
mortgaged residential property.  If the constitutionality of the order is not challenged, 
section 26(1) of the Constitution is no obstacle to the granting of such an order by 
the registrar.131  As a rule of practice, to protect the mortgage debtor‟s right to access 
to adequate housing, the summons must include a statement that the mortgage 
debtor‟s right to access to adequate housing may be infringed by the execution 
procedure.  If the mortgage debtor proves that his right to adequate housing has 
been infringed, the mortgage creditor must show that such infringement is justifiable 
in terms of section 36(1) of the Constitution.132  It is important to note that this is the 
position with regard to mortgaged residential property when being sought to be 
declared executable.  Where the residential property that is sought to be declared 
executable is not mortgaged, the averments referred to in Mortinson would have to 
be made by the applicant, following the rules of practice adopted in the Cape, 
Transvaal and Natal High Courts.133  
 
                                                          
129
 Para 1: “The mortgage bond is an indispensable tool for spreading home ownership.  Few people can buy a 
home immediately: by providing security for a loan, the mortgage bond enables them to do so.  There can hardly 
be a private residence in this country that has not at one time or another been mortgaged, nor a homeowner who 
has not at some time been a mortgagor.  We were told by the appellant bank that in August 2005 loans secured 
by mortgage bonds on residential property in this country amounted to almost R500 billion”.    
130
 Para 3: “The value of a mortgage bond as an instrument of security lies in confidence that the law will give 
effect to its terms.  That confidence has been shaken by a recent decision of the Cape High Court that is the 
subject of this appeal.  The decision must be seen against the background of the ordinary legal process for 
recovering debts.  When judgement is given against a debtor and the debtor fails to satisfy the judgement debt 
the process for recovery of the judgement debt is by execution against the judgement debtor‟s belongings.  It is a 
long-standing practice of our courts that execution must be directed first against the debtor‟s moveable property 
and only thereafter, if the movables are insufficient, against immovable property.” 
131
 Paras 20-21 and 23-24.  See also Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-22 and Pienaar Sectional Titles 219.    
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 Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson and Others 2006 2 SA 264 (SCA) para 25.  See also Van 
der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-22 and Pienaar Sectional Titles 219-220.    
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However, in Gundwana v Steko Development and Others134 the Constitutional Court 
confirmed that execution may only follow upon judgment in a court of law, and that 
judicial oversight is required where execution is sought against the primary homes of 
indigent debtors after judgement on a monetary debt.  It was also found that the High 
Court Rules and practice allowing registrars to grant orders declaring primary homes 
executable was unconstitutional in view of the right to housing entrenched in the 
Constitution.  Bondholders who wish to execute on a mortgage bond must therefore 
first approach a court of law to determine whether the sale in execution of a person‟s 
home is justifiable in the circumstances of the case.135  Therefore, it was ordered that 
it is unconstitutional for a registrar to declare the judgement debtor‟s primary home 
specially executable when ordering default judgement under rule 31(5) of the 
Uniform Rules of the High Court to the extent that this permits the sale in execution 
of such property.136  The effect is that the judgments in Mortinson and Saunderson 
are overruled, to the extent that they held that a registrar is constitutionally 
competent to make execution orders when granting default judgements in terms of 
rule 31(5)(b).137   
 
With the focus on retrospective relief, the Constitutional Court ruled that the persons 
affected by the above ruling must approach the courts to set aside the sales and 
transfers concerned.  Besides the normal requirements for rescission, aggrieved 
debtors will also have to show that a court, with full knowledge of all the relevant 
facts existing at the time of the granting of default judgement, would nevertheless 
have refused leave to execute against the debtor‟s home.  The consequences of 
invalid execution sales and subsequent transfers must now be considered in the light 
of the applicable principles.138  To conclude matters the Constitutional Court noted 
that the prospective effect of the order was overtaken by the amendment effective 
from 24 December 2010, of rule 46(1) of the Uniform Rules of the High Court, which 
provides that where either the court or the registrar had declared the property 
encumbered with a mortgage specially executable, and the property sought to be 
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 2011 3 SA 608 (CC).  For a detailed discussion of this judgment see Steyn Statutory Regulation of Forced 
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attached was the primary home of the judgement debtor, no writ should be issued 
unless the court, having considered all the relevant circumstances, orders execution 
against such property.139  
 
The main implication of Gundwana v Steko Development and Others140 and the 
amended rule 46(1) of the Uniform Rules of the High Court is that if a mortgaged 
creditor wants to execute against the immovable property of a debtor (sectional 
owner) without first seeking to execute against the debtor‟s movables (which is the 
normal steps of debt enforcement), a court must in all such instances assess 
whether this would be justifiable.  The mortgage creditor‟s entitlement to direct 
execution against hypothecated immovable property is thus subject to intervention 
by a court where it would lead to an unjustifiable limitation of section 26(1) of the 
Constitution.141      
 
In Firstrand Bank Ltd v Folscher and Another, and Similar Matters142 it was pointed 
out by the court that the judicial supervision under the amended rule 46(1)(a)(ii) of 
the Uniform Rules of the High Court and Gundwana is limited to those instances 
where the execution orders relate to the debtor‟s principal or generally his only 
dwelling and not a holiday home or a second house that is not usually occupied by 
the debtor.143  The court also pointed out that the term „judgement debtor‟ refers to a 
natural person owning a primary residence144 and not to property owned by a 
company, a close corporation or a trust, even if the property is the shareholder‟s, 
member‟s or beneficiary‟s only residence.145 
 
This outcome requires the court to take regard of the relevant circumstances and 
ensure that a judgement debtor does not become a victim of an abuse of the 
execution process.  Firstly, it must be considered that the creditor and debtor 
voluntarily concluded an agreement to enable the debtor to acquire the property 
against the security of the mortgage registered over the property.  Without 
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extraordinary circumstances the judgement creditor will normally be entitled to 
enforce his judgement by executing against the property encumbered with a 
mortgage which was consciously registered for mutual benefit as security for the 
moneys advanced for the purchase of the home.146 
 
The court found it impossible to provide an exhaustive list of extraordinary 
circumstances, which would persuade a court to decline a writ of execution.  They 
would usually consist of factors that would render enforcement of the judgement debt 
an abuse of process.  The creditor‟s conduct need not be wilfully dishonest or 
vexatious to constitute an abuse of intended writs against mortgaged properties.  
Although bona fide the creditor‟s conduct may be iniquitous if the debtor loses his 
home while alternative methods of satisfying the creditor‟s debt exist that would not 
prejudice the creditor.147  The court did, however, identify numerous factors which a 
court may need to take into consideration in deciding whether a writ should be 
issued or not.148  It was also emphasised that these facts must in each case be 
established as legally relevant.149  
 
Furthermore, the court detailed the manner in which the relevant information should 
be placed before the court.  It was emphasised that the court should not normally be 
expected to take proactive steps to establish whether the debtor is the victim of 
abusive legislation, although it will have to do so in the extraordinary instance where 
there is no reason to suspect that execution should not be levied against the debtor‟s 
home, and no alternative way exists of establishing the true state of affairs.  In the 
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ordinary course of events the creditor will be able to inform the court of when the 
debt was created, the manner in which it was repaid and comment on the debtor‟s 
ability to effect payment of arrears by means other than allowing execution against 
his home.  In default proceedings the creditor is in a similar position to that of an 
applicant in unopposed motion proceedings, and is, as any litigant in that role, duty 
bound to make full disclosure to the court of all facts that might influence the court in 
coming to a conclusion.150 
 
The creditor, while under oath, must furnish the court with essential information 
relating to the debtor and his residence when application is made for default 
judgement.  All the factors that are within the creditor‟s knowledge must be dealt with 
prior to judgement being granted and execution being affected.  This includes 
disclosure of the debtor‟s current address if such address is not the same as that of 
the mortgaged property.  If all the facts that might be relevant are not known to the 
creditor, the court will have to consider the available known and relevant facts.151 
 
Lastly, the court focussed on the matter of informing the debtor.  The court found that 
service on the domicile of the debtor was normally sufficient.  When summons is 
issued the debtor is entitled to be informed of his right to access to adequate housing 
in terms of section 26(1) of the Constitution; of the fact that default judgement might 
be granted against him in the absence of any reaction on his part; and that execution 
against his home with subsequent eviction from the home might follow.  It was 
suggested that this could be met (at least partially) by including a warning to this 
effect in a notice under section 129 of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 where the 
act was applicable.  In addition, a writ of execution should include a reference to the 
provisions of rule 31(5)(d), dealing with the consequences of a default judgement, to 
ensure that the debtor is aware of his rights.152 
 
In Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Bekker and Another and Four Similar 
Cases153 the court once again addressed the issue of judicial oversight.  Due to 
conflicting judgments and the amendment to rule 46 of the Uniform Rules of the High 
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Court, it became unclear what information a bondholder had to place before the 
court to enable it to decide whether to grant a writ of attachment and sale in 
execution of a judgement debtor‟s home.  Therefore, the court had asked counsel 
representing the bondholders in five applications for default judgement against 
mortgagors to formulate specific questions to be addressed by the court.  The 
following questions were submitted.154  Firstly, what were the „relevant 
circumstances‟ which a court had to consider before ordering execution against 
mortgaged property specially hypothecated to satisfy the debt secured by such 
mortgage.  Secondly, who had to plead such circumstances and, finally, whether the 
new rule 46(1) set up any substantive requirements on the part of the mortgage 
creditor in order to obtain the relief sought. 
 
With regard to the first question, the court found that no definitive answer can be 
given.  However, relevant circumstances included evidence of an infringement of 
constitutional rights or an abuse of process, as well as evidence in support of any 
contention by the bondholder that an alleged or demonstrated infringement was 
justifiable.  The court then answered the second question as follows: allegations that 
execution against the hypothecated property would infringe the debtor‟s 
constitutional rights or that the application for a writ of execution was an abuse had, 
in principle, to be pleaded by the judgement debtor, and any rebutting allegations by 
the bondholder.  Lastly, the court decided that the amended rule 46(1)(a) did not give 
rise to new substantive obligations on bondholders seeking orders for execution 
against the hypothecated property.  The court also pointed out that the proviso made 
it clear that execution against the judgement debtor‟s primary residence (home) 
entailed a potential infringement of the right to housing and could therefore only 
occur under judicial oversight.155 
 
As far as the procedural requirements were concerned, the court decided that 
mortgage creditors had (apart from the special requirements in terms of Practice 
Note 33 of the Western Cape Consolidated Practice Notes relating to proceedings 
instituted in terms of the National Credit Act and those set out in the practice note in 
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Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Saunderson and Others156) to comply with the 
following guidelines.157  Firstly, where a declaration of special executability was 
sought ancillary to the judgement in the money claim, the bondholder had to indicate 
in the summons whether or not execution was being sought against the judgement 
debtor‟s home.  If the bondholder was unable to do so because of a lack of 
knowledge this had to be stated in the summons.  Secondly, where the bondholder 
was able to state that the property was not the debtor‟s home, the matter, where 
possible, had to be disposed of by the registrar.  In such cases the bondholder had 
to submit to the registrar an affidavit confirming the fact that the property was not the 
debtor‟s home.  Lastly, where the property might be the debtor‟s home, and the 
secured debt was repayable in periodic instalments, it could be to the advantage of 
the bondholder to assist the court by stating the amount of arrears; and where this 
was relatively low, by stating why it was resorting to direct realisation of the security. 
 
The current position is thus that it would be unconstitutional for an execution order to 
be granted against a mortgaged unit without judicial oversight.  This means that 
courts can now, based on the relevant circumstances, decline to grant an execution 
order, which was not previously the case.  Accordingly only a Magistrate or Judge 
has the power to make such an evaluation.  Therefore, mortgage creditors would 
now have to convince a Magistrate or Judge that the sale in execution would be 
justified, which means that they can no longer circumvent the courts by simply 
approaching the clerk or registrar for execution orders by default.158   
 
5 3 3 Impact of PIE on the sale in execution of mortgaged sectional title units   
 
In terms of section 26(3) of the Constitution no one may be evicted from their home 
without a court order being issued after all the relevant circumstances have been 
considered and no legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.  The preamble to PIE 
strengthens this constitutional right not to be evicted arbitrarily or without due 
process of law by stating the following:  
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“WHEREAS no one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general 
application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property;  
 
AND WHEREAS no one may be evicted from their home, or have their home 
demolished without an order of court made after considering all the relevant 
circumstances; 
 
AND WHEREAS it is desirable that the law should regulate the eviction of unlawful 
occupiers from land in a fair manner, while recognising the right of land owners to 
apply to a court for an eviction order in appropriate circumstances; 
 
AND WHEREAS special consideration should be given to the rights of the elderly, 
children, disabled persons and particularly households headed by women, and that it 
should be recognised that the needs of these groups should be considered.” 
 
In terms of PIE the relevant circumstances that would have to be considered include 
the following.  In the event that the unlawful occupation lasted for less than six 
months, relevant circumstances to be considered are the rights and needs of elderly 
persons, children, disabled persons and households headed by women.159  In the 
event that the unlawful occupation lasted for more than six months, the availability of 
suitable alternative accommodation must be considered together with the above 
mentioned circumstances.160  
 
In Brisley v Drotsky161 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that all relevant 
circumstances do not have to be taken into consideration when an eviction order is 
granted in the application of the common law eviction procedures, but that all legally 
relevant circumstances should be considered.162  The Supreme Court of Appeal also 
confirmed that section 26(3) of the Constitution applies horizontally and is binding on 
all natural and juristic persons.163  However, the Supreme Court of Appeal decided 
that socio-economic and other circumstances are not legally relevant circumstances 
in the case of common law provisions regarding evictions due to the fact that section 
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26(3) does not grant the courts the discretion or prescribe the circumstances when 
they can divert from the common law position.  Such circumstances should be 
considered only in the case of evictions in terms of PIE because it specifies the 
considerations upon which the courts have the jurisdiction to override the legally 
relevant circumstances.164  However, the application of the provisions of PIE was not 
at issue in Brisley v Drotsky.165 
 
In Ndlovu v Ncgobo; Bekker and Another v Jika166 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
limited the application of PIE to residential occupiers, thus excluding occupiers of 
commercial land from the protection of PIE.167  The Supreme Court of Appeal also 
held that „hold over‟ cases do indeed fall under the provisions of PIE.168   „Hold over‟ 
cases refer to cases where the occupation was initially lawful and then became 
unlawful.169  Examples of such cases would be where the mortgage debtor refuses 
to vacate the sectional title unit or where tenants and sectional owners who have 
sold their properties refuse to vacate after foreclosure.  The common law 
requirements for evictions were not amended by section 26(3) of the Constitution but 
by the provisions of PIE, which explicitly prescribes that courts may grant an eviction 
order only if it is fair and equitable with reference to all the relevant circumstances.170  
Moreover, it was held that the courts do not mero motu take note of all the relevant 
circumstances in eviction cases but that the onus of proof rests on the respondent 
who has to bring such circumstances to the court‟s attention.171    
 
The Constitutional Court then authoritatively stated the requirements for an eviction 
order in the case of Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers.172  The 
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Constitutional Court also confirmed that section 26(3) of the Constitution places an 
obligation on courts to find a reasonable and just balance between the rights of the 
applicant in eviction matters and the right of unlawful occupiers not to be arbitrarily 
evicted from their homes.173  This does not only apply to classical squatter cases but 
also to cases where previously lawful occupiers have been evicted in terms of an 
eviction order.174  Under common law unlawful occupiers do not have any occupation 
rights, but their vulnerable position and human dignity must still be taken into 
consideration by the courts.175  Consequently, eviction orders should not be granted 
too easily and not before all the relevant circumstances have been taken into 
consideration.  This does not mean that it is impossible to obtain an eviction order 
since it may still be granted in just and equitable circumstances.176  
 
In City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 
(PTY) LTD and Another177 one of the main issues was the constitutionality of a 
differentiation made by the appellant in its housing policy, between persons evicted 
from so called „bad buildings‟ and persons evicted by private landowners.  It was 
common cause that Blue Moonlight was the owner of the property concerned, that 
the occupiers‟ occupation was unlawful and that they had occupied the property for 
more than six months.  The crucial question before the Constitutional Court was 
therefore whether it was just and equitable to evict the occupiers, considering all the 
relevant circumstances including the availability of alternative land, as well as the 
date the eviction must take place.178  The appellant noted that Blue Moonlight was 
entitled to eviction if PIE was complied with, but emphasised that they cannot be 
held liable for providing accommodation to all people who are evicted by private 
landowners.179  The Constitutional Court held that to determine what was just and 
equitable consideration must be given to an open list of factors.  In this case the 
relevant factors were the following: the occupiers had been in occupation for more 
than six months; the occupation was once lawful; Blue Moonlight was aware of the 
occupiers when it purchased the property; and the eviction would render the 
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occupiers homeless.180  The Constitutional Court held that to the extent that Blue 
Moonlight was the owner of the property and the occupation was unlawful, they were 
entitled to an eviction order.  Furthermore, it was held that all relevant circumstances 
must be taken into account when determining under which conditions, and by which 
date, eviction would be just and equitable.  The availability of alternative housing was 
one of the circumstances.  In this regard it was decided that the appellant was 
obliged to provide temporary accommodation to the occupiers.181  Moreover, it was 
held that the appellant‟s housing policy was unconstitutional in that it excluded 
people evicted by private landowners from its temporary housing programme, as 
opposed to those relocated by the appellant.  One cannot expect from Blue 
Moonlight to indefinitely provide free housing to the occupiers, but the property 
owner‟s rights must be interpreted within the context of the requirement that the 
eviction must be just and equitable.  The Constitutional Court then concluded that 
the eviction of the occupiers would be just and equitable under the circumstances, if 
linked to the provision of temporary accommodation by the appellant.182   
 
From the above it is evident that the objective of PIE is not to protect wealthy 
unlawful occupiers against eviction, since eviction is still possible if there are no 
relevant circumstances or if it just and equitable in the light of all the relevant 
circumstances.  By contrast the objective of PIE is rather to increase the procedural 
and substantive hurdles that are faced by landholders who apply for eviction orders 
against certain occupiers who are in direct need of protection.183  Therefore, when a 
sectional title unit is attached for non-payment of a sectional owner‟s contributions to 
the administrative fund or for the non-payment of instalments on a mortgage loan, 
PIE creates an obstacle for the body corporate or mortgage creditor who has 
secured an execution order.  If the defaulting owner or mortgage debtor (both being 
the sectional owner) refuses to vacate the premises after the sectional title unit has 
been sold in execution, the body corporate or the mortgage creditor must bring an 
action for eviction.  At this stage, PIE kicks in.  This means that legal practitioners 
representing bodies corporate and mortgage creditors must follow the tough and 
costly route prescribed by PIE in cases where the eviction of sectional owners or 
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mortgagees who had defaulted or foreclosed on their assessment payments or 
bonds is sought.184 
 
The Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Amendment 
Bill185 aims to limit the application of PIE so that it would not be applicable to „hold 
over‟ cases.  The Memorandum to the Bill clearly states that the act should only 
cover those persons who unlawfully invade land without the landowner or person in 
charge of land having consented thereto.186  This amendment will place mortgage 
debtors who refuse to vacate the premises after the sectional title unit has been sold 
in execution outside the scope of PIE which means that the common law eviction 
procedures, without the prescribed procedure of PIE and the consideration of 
relevant circumstances, will then again be applicable.187 
 
However, in August 2008 the Amendment Bill was rejected and due to the existing 
backlog in the approval of legislation by Parliament, the Amendment Bill was 
withdrawn.188  Therefore, until the Amendment Bill is put into effect PIE will be 
applicable in circumstances where mortgage debtors refuse to vacate the premises 
after the sectional title unit has been sold in execution.    
 
5 4 Rates clearance certificates   
 
Section 2(1) of the Property Rates Act entitles a municipality to levy rates on 
property in its area and section 24(1) then states that the owner of a property (unit) 
must pay the rates levied by the municipality on the property.  We have already 
seen, at 2 3 above, that the definition of property in terms of the latter act includes 
immovable property registered in the name of a person, including, in the case of a 
sectional title scheme, a sectional title unit registered in the name of a person.189  We 
have also seen that this act introduced a new rating dispensation.  It removed the 
responsibility placed on the body corporate to pay rates and taxes, which the body 
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corporate collected from individual owners in proportion to their participation quotas 
or in a proportion altered by special resolution.  Instead this act requires that rates 
and taxes must be levied on individual sectional title units, each owner being 
responsible for payment of his own rates to the municipality.  This system of 
individual rating of sectional title units was first introduced in the Cape Town 
Metropole from 1 July 2007.  Individual rating in Johannesburg, Durban and most 
parts of the rest of the country only came into operation from 1 July 2008.190   
 
Section 15B(3)(b) of the Act provides that where provision is made by law for the 
separate rating of units the registrar is not entitled to transfer a unit unless he is 
furnished with a clearance certificate from the local authority confirming that all rates 
and moneys due to it under any law in respect of the land and buildings of the 
scheme have been paid.191  Section 51(3) of the Act also provides that when 
provision has been legally made for the separate rating of units, each relevant unit is 
for the purposes of valuation and the levying and recovery of rates by a local 
authority deemed to be a separate entity.  Section 51 of the Act was, however, 
repealed but not re-enacted in the Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 
2011 (the STSMA) because of the uncertainty surrounding the relationship between 
the relevant provisions of the Act, the Property Rates Act and the Systems Act.  
Section 51 of the Act may indeed have been superseded by the relevant provisions 
of the above mentioned acts which by their provisions for the separate rating of units 
made the application of section 15B(3)(b) of the Act a reality.      
 
All of these provisions must be read in conjunction with section 118 of the Systems 
Act which provides that a registrar of deeds may not register the transfer of property 
except on production of a prescribed certificate issued by the municipality where the 
property is situated.  This certificate must certify that all amounts that became due in 
connection with that property for municipal service fees, surcharges on fees, 
property rates and other municipal taxes, levies and duties during the two years 
preceding the date of application for the certificate have been paid in full.192   
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The fact that provision has been made for the separate rating of units means that a 
clearance certificate must be furnished to the registrar before a unit may be 
transferred.  There used to be uncertainty as to whether two clearance certificates 
were needed.  One certificate stating that all rates, taxes and moneys due in respect 
of the unit had been paid, as well as a another certificate from the local authority 
stating that all rates and moneys due to such local authority in terms of any law in 
respect of the land and buildings of the scheme had been paid.193  This uncertainty 
was resolved at the Registrars Conference in 2009 where it was decided that only 
one and not two clearance certificates must be handed in on the transfer of a unit.194      
 
The Property Rates Act does not deal directly with the issue of a clearance certificate 
to the registrar.  There is, however, such a close correspondence between section 
15B(3)(b) of the Act and the Systems Act that it seems that the payment of both 
rates and service charges should be certified.  Therefore, it seems that section 
118(1) of the Systems Act would be applicable to the clearance certificate under 
section 15B(3)(b) of the Act.  This would mean that the certificate must certify that 
not only rates but also all amounts that became due in connection with that unit for 
municipal service fees, surcharges on fees, property rates and other municipal taxes, 
levies and duties during the two years preceding the date of application for the 
certificate have been paid in full.195  
 
In addition section 118(2) of the Systems Act provides that in the case of the transfer 
of immovable property by a trustee of an insolvent estate, the provisions of section 
118 are subject to section 89 of the Insolvency Act.196  Furthermore, section 118(3) 
of the Systems Act states that an amount due for municipal service fees, surcharges 
on fees, property rates and other municipal taxes, levies and duties is a charge or 
hypothec upon the property for which the amount is owing, and enjoys preference 
over any mortgage bond registered against the property.   
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An important question is whether the word „an amount‟ in section 118(3) should be 
interpreted as referring to all amounts which implies that the charge would not be 
limited to municipal debts that became due in the two years preceding the date of 
application for the certificate.197  This question was then answered in the Supreme 
Court of Appeal in BOE Bank Ltd v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality.198   In 
the latter case the Supreme Court of Appeal held that section 118(3) did not only 
refer to a category or class of debts, but to the aggregate of different debts secured 
by a single charge or hypothec.  In terms of section 118(3), it therefore did not matter 
when the component parts of the secured debt became due since the amounts of all 
debts which arose from the stipulated causes were added up to become one 
composite amount secured by a single hypothec which ranked above all mortgage 
bonds over the property.199 
 
A practical consequence of the application of section 118 of the Systems Act would 
be that if a sectional owner sells a unit occupied by a tenant, the municipality will not 
issue a clearance certificate until the tenant, the owner or a third party has paid the 
charges for electricity and water consumed by the tenant.  However, if none of the 
latter parties is in a position to pay the municipal service charges incurred at the 
leased property, the owner would have no other option as to settle the amount owed 
by the tenant in order to obtain the required clearance certificate.  The impact of 
section 118 has therefore given rise to much concern on the part of property owners.  
A group of landlords formed the organisation Transfer Rights Action Campaign 
(TRAC), which has questioned the use of section 118 which allows local 
governments to hold landlords liable for tenants‟ water and electricity arrears.  The 
organisation‟s argument was that since section 118 came into operation, the 
municipalities have had less incentive to collect municipal debts from users of 
electricity and water because they are now able to force property owners to settle the 
outstanding amounts before allowing them to sell or re-let.  In their opinion, since 
individual contracts for the supply of municipal services like water and electricity are 
concluded between municipalities and tenants, it is the responsibility of the 
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municipalities to collect the tenants‟ arrears for water and electricity and property 
owners should not be held liable.200   
 
Constitutional challenges of section 118 of the Systems Act, based on the ground 
that it provides for the arbitrary deprivation of property contrary to section 25 of the 
Constitution in that it authorises interference with the transfer of property which is 
one of the constituent entitlements of the right of ownership, failed.201  In Geyser and 
Another v Msunduzi Municipality and Others202 the KwaZulu-Natal High Court found 
that section 118 did contemplate deprivation, but that the deprivation was not 
arbitrary and so the section was not unconstitutional.203  Therefore, the court 
dismissed the challenge to the constitutionality of section 118(1) and (3).   
 
However, in the unreported case of Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality and Others; Bisset and Others v Buffalo City Municipality and Others204 
the South Eastern Cape Local Division of the High Court ruled that the provisions of 
subsection 118(1), as they applied to these two cases, did constitute arbitrary 
deprivation of property in conflict with section 25(1) of the Constitution205 and then 
referred the declaration of invalidity for confirmation to the Constitutional Court in 
terms of section 172(2) of the Constitution.206   
 
These two conflicting judgments on the constitutionality of section 118(1) was 
brought to an end by the Constitutional Court in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bisset and Others v Buffalo City Municipality 
and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government 
and Housing, Gauteng and Others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi 
                                                          
200
 See M Kelly-Louw “The Preferential right of the Local Government or the Body Corporate above that of the 
Mortgage Bondholder during Insolvency Proceedings” (2004) 18 Speculum Juris 168 177-178 and M Kelly-
Louw “Selling or Leasing Property? Beware of Municipal Debts! A Note in two Parts (Part II)” (2005) 122 
SALJ 778 778-779. 
201
 For a detailed discussion of these cases see Kelly-Louw (2004) Speculum Juris 178-181; M Kelly-Louw 
“Owners Liable for Tenants‟ Arrear Water and Electricity Consumption Charges” (2004) 12-3 JBL 132 133-
135; and Kelly-Louw (2005) SALJ 779-792.  
202
 2003 5 SA 18 (N). 
203
 38A-39A. 
204
 SECLD 30-09-2003 case no 1238/02 and 903/02. 
205
 Paras 67-68. 
206
 See also Kelly-Louw (2004) Speculum Juris 178-179 and Kelly-Louw (2004) JBL 134. 
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Municipality as Amici Curia).207  Yacoob J, who delivered the majority judgment, held 
that section 118 does deprive persons of their property208 but that such a deprivation 
is not arbitrary.209  He also held that the deprivation is not insignificant and that the 
purpose of the provision is to place the risk on the owner if the occupiers did not pay 
for the electricity and water they used.  The purpose of this is important and 
commendable since it encourages payment and a sense of civic responsibility.210  
The court reasoned that the consumption charge is connected both to the property 
and the owner, even if the owner is not the occupier.211  Therefore, it was held that 
the purpose of the deprivation is compelling and that it is not unreasonable, in all the 
circumstances, to expect the owner to bear the risk if the occupier does not pay.212  
Accordingly, the Constitutional Court ruled that the owner of a property is effectively 
obliged to make sure that certain consumption charges owing to the municipality in 
connection with a property is paid before such property can be validly transferred.213  
Yacoob J also held that section 118(1) does not infringe upon the right to equality;214 
the right of access to housing;215 and the right of access to courts216 as enshrined in 
the Constitution.217  
 
The latter judgment of the Constitutional Court can be criticised because of the 
practical consequence that municipalities now have even less incentive to take legal 
action for arrear consumption charges because there is no need for municipalities to 
act against tenants.  Owners are now forced to pay the arrears of their tenants 
despite the fact that individual contracts are concluded between municipalities and 
tenants.  Municipalities can now simply refuse to issue a clearance certificate if an 
                                                          
207
 2005 1 SA 530 (CC). 
208
 Para 33. 
209
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210
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211
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212
 Para 51-60. 
213
 Par 73. 
214
 S 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
215
 S 26. 
216
 S 34. 
217
 Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and Another; Bisset and Others v Buffalo City 
Municipality and Others; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and Others v MEC, Local Government and 
Housing, Gauteng and others (KwaZulu-Natal Law Society and Msunduzi Municipality as Amici Curia) 2005 1 
SA 530 (CC) paras 68-71. 
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owner tries to sell his property unless the outstanding consumption charges are paid 
by the owner.218         
 
5 5 Evaluation 
 
In Body Corporate of Geovy Villa v Sheriff, Pretoria Central Magistrate’s Court, and 
Another219 Hartzenberg J highlighted the difficulties experienced by bodies corporate 
faced with defaulting owners and the socio-economic problems that resulted from 
inadequate funds to execute necessary repairs to sectional title buildings.220  We 
have seen that this only applies in circumstances where the defaulting unit owner is 
not insolvent.  Unfortunately, the uncertainty created by the differing outcome for 
solvent versus insolvent sectional owners whose units are attached in execution, 
makes it problematic for bodies corporate to decide when to attach the units of 
defaulting owners. 
  
A possible accommodation between the interests of both first mortgage creditors and 
bodies corporate might be the creation of a statutory hypothec in favour of the body 
corporate for 6 months‟ arrears ranking above first mortgages based on the model of 
the United States of America‟s Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act of 2008 (the 
UCIOA).221   
 
The UCIOA offers an ingenious compromise that strikes an equitable balance 
between the need to collect unpaid levies swiftly and the necessity to retain the 
continued investment of lenders in condominiums (sectional title schemes), since it 
grants the condominium association (body corporate) a super priority lien over 
previously registered (first) mortgages for unpaid contributions for up to six months 
before the foreclosure action.222   Computation of the amount of the lien is based on 
a periodically adopted budget.223  In reality what is created is a lien with a split 
priority.  This perpetually renewable lien comes into existence once the assessment 
                                                          
218
 Kelly-Louw (2004) Speculum Juris 181. 
219
 2003 1 SA 69 (T). 
220
 Paras 6-7. 
221
 See in general Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-18(1). 
222
 Ss 3-116(a),(b), (c), (e) and (i) of the United States of America‟s  Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act 
of 2008. 
223
 Ss 3-116(i) and 3-103(c). 
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or fine becomes due and as soon as a unit owner defaults on his payments the 
amount is transformed into a lien with super priority.224  Any excess on the assessed 
defaults and fines or costs over the six month period remains a lien on the property.  
The portion of the association lien that secures this excess will be junior to the first 
mortgage on the unit, but senior to other mortgages and encumbrances not recorded 
before the declaration.  Thus, even though the association‟s lien is a single lien, it is 
split into two liens holding varying priority.225 Subject to any contrary language in the 
declaration, the assessment lien covers regular monthly dues, as well as fees, 
charges, fines and interest.226  Furthermore, the lien and its statutory priority may not 
be waived.227  
 
Associations can only benefit from this mechanism if they recorded a verified claim 
for unpaid contributions, which describes the amount due, the name of the owner, 
and the common elements of the scheme.  The lien does not need to be recorded 
since the recording of the declaration on establishment of the scheme is considered 
notice of any future claim of the association and perfection of the lien.228  If the owner 
fails to pay, the association can collect the assessment by taking advantage of the 
local jurisdiction‟s expedited foreclosure or holdover-tenant procedures.229  The 
association can also wait and use the lien to prevent the sale of the unit until the lien 
is paid off.  If a unit owner resists, or brings an action to challenge the imposition of 
fees or the lien, or contests foreclosure and loses, the association is entitled to 
attorney‟s fees.230  
 
An association lien may be foreclosed in a similar manner to a mortgage on real 
estate or by power of sale if the declaration allows for such an option.231  The 
association would join the holders of any mortgage, deeds of trust or other interest 
junior to the super lien as necessary parties to a judicial foreclosure, or formally 
                                                          
224
 S 3-116(b)(2). 
225
 JL Winokur “Meaner Lienor Community Associations: The “Super Priority” Lien and Related Reforms 
under the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act” (1992) 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 353 366.  See also Van der 
Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 148-149. 
226
 S 3-116(a) of the United States of America‟s Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act of 2008. 
227
 S 1-104. 
228
 S 3-116(e). 
229
 S 3-116(k). 
230
 S 3-116(h). 
231
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notify these parties of the sale in non-judicial foreclosure.  Holders of junior interest 
would have the right to receive any excess of the foreclosure sale price over the 
amount of the super lien in order of their priorities.  The association‟s lien on an 
outstanding amount exceeding six months from the date of action would be among 
those junior interests.232  
 
If the first mortgagee institutes foreclosure proceedings on any ground, the mortgage 
and its foreclosure would be subject to an existing super lien.233  As a senior interest, 
the association‟s super lien could probably not be forced into the mortgage 
foreclosure, but if the association participates, payment of the super lien will be 
necessary to clear title for resale or for presentation of mortgage insurance.234 
 
The super priority lien of the UCIOA is thus intended to encourage the association to 
react timeously in collecting unpaid assessments while simultaneously allowing it 
sufficient time to enforce its security right, if necessary.235  Since first mortgagees 
have an interest in keeping the association solvent they will, in practice, probably 
prefer to pay the six months‟ assessment demanded by the association rather than 
permit foreclosure and the sale of the apartment.  Another alternative is that the 
mortgagee could discount the value of the apartment by an amount equal to the six 
months‟ assessment and adjust the size of the loan according to this.  Although 
assessments will probably increase in time in an inflationary economy, the owners‟ 
equity would almost invariably raise significantly more rapidly if the value of the 
apartment is discounted in such a manner.  A third alternative is that the mortgagee 
could require that an amount of money be put in a trust account for rectifying any 
defaults on the payment of assessments, with the stipulation that any surplus would 
be returned to the apartment owner when the loan is extinguished.236  
 
                                                          
232
 Winokur (1992) Wake Forest Law. Rev. 377.  See also Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 150. 
233
 See Winokur (1992) Wake Forest Law Review 371-374.  See also Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) 
Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 150. 
234
 See Winokur (1992) Wake Forest Law Review 377-378.  See also Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) 
Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 150.    
235
 CG Van der Merwe “Apartment Ownership” in International Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law Vol VI 
“Property and Trust” (1994) s 268.  
236
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-18(1); CG Van der Merwe “The Sectional Titles Act in the light of the 
Uniform Condominium Act” (1987) 20 CILSA 1 36; and Van der Merwe Apartment Ownership s 268. 
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The obstacles facing the mortgage creditor (or body corporate), when it comes to the 
sale and execution of a sectional title unit, looks more severe than they actually are.  
Firstly, the requirement of a court order before a mortgaged unit can be sold in 
execution does not threaten the real security of the mortgage, nor does it mean that 
the mortgage is no longer the same strong and valuable security right that it always 
was.  It simply means that courts can now, based on the relevant circumstances, 
decline to grant an execution order, which was not previously the case.237  It may, 
however, cause practical difficulties for courts that are running at full capacity and for 
judges with full schedules, but the practical difficulties cannot outweigh the prejudice 
and hardship some owners might face due to the potentially unjustifiable sale in 
execution of their units.  Therefore, judicial oversight seems like an obvious 
requirement even though it has taken a number of years, numerous court decisions 
and amendments to court practice to finally establish this requirement.238  
 
Secondly, the impact of PIE can be seen more as an irritation than an obstacle 
because it does not prohibit the attachment and sale in execution of sectional title 
units.  But it does mean that legal practitioners representing bodies corporate and 
mortgage creditors would have to follow the tough and costly route prescribed by PIE 
where the eviction of sectional owners who have defaulted or foreclosed on their 
assessment payments or bonds is sought.  The Impact of PIE will be more limited 
when the Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Amendment Bill239 
comes into operation since PIE would then not be applicable to holdover cases.  
 
If section 118(1) of the Systems Act is proved to be applicable to the clearance 
certificate under section 15B(3)(b) of the Act the certificate would have to certify that 
not only rates but also all amounts that became due in connection with that unit for 
municipal service fees, surcharges on fees, property rates and other municipal taxes, 
levies and duties during the two years preceding the date of application for the 
certificate have been paid in full.  This position is similar with the super lien of the 
UCIOA, but one major difference is that it is not limited to six months because the 
„amounts‟ (in terms of section 118(3)) of all debts which arose from the stipulated 
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causes gets added up to become one composite amount secured by a single 
hypothec which ranks above all mortgage bonds over the property and would thus 
not be limited to the two year period preceding the date of application for the 
certificate.240  Separate meters would, however, have to be installed before separate 
service charges can be charged and for section 118(1) of the Systems Act to be 
applicable to the clearance certificate under section 15B(3)(a) of the Act.  To avoid 
situations where sectional owners would be responsible for the service charges of 
tenants, when the unit is sold to an outsider, it would be wise to install prepaid 
meters.  Furthermore, in terms of section 118(3) of the Systems Act the municipality 
would have a preferent right ranking above that of bodies corporate and even 
mortgagees when a unit gets attached and sold in execution.  This indicates that the 
attachment and sale in execution procedure for the recovery of arrear contributions 
become less successful since the proceeds of such forced sales would more often 
than not be insufficient to cover the debt towards the body corporate. 
 
                                                          
240
 See BOE Bank Ltd v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality SCA 29-03-2005 case no 240/2003 para 10.  
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Chapter 6:  Social Obligations 
 
6 1 Introduction 
 
When taking occupation of a sectional title unit for the first time, the new sectional 
owner enters a specific communal way of life.1  He most probably chooses to join a 
particular sectional title scheme on account of the lifestyles, attitudes and practices 
shared in that scheme.  Sectional title schemes are, however, rarely homogeneous.  
They frequently consist of groups of people who do not represent an ideally suited 
selection of owners.  Furthermore, the composition of a particular sectional title 
scheme will change in the course of time due to market forces and a fluctuating 
membership on account of individual mobility and mortality.2       
 
In the introductory chapter, at 1 2, we have seen that one of the main aims of 
sectional title schemes is to strive for happiness and harmony in an intensified 
community where the objects of ownership, the individual units, are physically 
interdependent.  Since sectional owners live in close proximity to each other and use 
common facilities the most extensive freedoms inherent in their ownership need to 
be restricted.  Accordingly, each owner must give up a certain degree of freedom 
that he might otherwise enjoy in separate, privately owned property.3   
 
Therefore, in order to enjoy the advantages offered by sectional title schemes, 
sectional owners are subjected to numerous social obligations.4  It is the extent to 
which owners are prepared to comply with these social obligations that will 
determine their ability to enjoy a harmonious living environment, as well as the 
quality of the scheme‟s common facilities and amenities.  Even so, striking the ideal 
                                                          
1
 T Maree Sectional Titles on Tap Volume 1 2ed (2006) 10.1. 
2
 MC Kim “Involuntary Sale: Banishing an Owner from the Condominium Community” (1997-1998) 31 J. 
Marshall. L. Rev. 429 429-430; see also CG Van der Merwe & L Muňiz-Argüelles “Enforcement of Conduct 
Rules in a Condominium or Apartment Ownership Scheme” (2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 
247 247.  
3
 CG Van der Merwe & JC Sonnekus Sectional Titles, Share Blocks and Time-Sharing Volume 1 Sectional 
Titles (Service Issue 16 May 2013) 9-32; see also Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006)  Liber Amicorum 
Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 247. 
4
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balance between individual freedom and the demands of a harmonious community is 
often a difficult goal to achieve. 5    
 
In this chapter I shall discuss the various non-financial obligations, grouped together 
under the term „social obligations‟, imposed on sectional owners with regard to their 
sections, exclusive use areas and the common property.  The Sectional Titles Act 95 
of 1986 (the Act) provides the broad framework and sets the standards for owners‟ 
behaviour, complemented by the common law concept of nuisance.6  It is the 
Annexures to the Act, mainly the management and conduct rules, which prescribe 
more precisely what is expected from sectional owners living in a particular sectional 
title scheme.  Consequently, it is crucial for purchasers buying units in a sectional 
title scheme to carefully examine the rules adopted for the scheme.7  Although most 
schemes are regulated by the prescribed management and conduct rules, the 
developer and sectional owners have the ability to amend the prescribed rules by 
introducing special rules which might impose additional social obligations on owners, 
further restricting the use and enjoyment of their sections, exclusive use areas and 
the common property.8   
 
I shall now proceed to discuss the various social obligations imposed on a sectional 
owner with regard to his section, an exclusive use area and the common property in 
terms of the Act, the prescribed management and conduct rules and the common 
law of nuisance.  The chapter will be concluded with the assessment that these 
social obligations are essential to preserve the tranquility and harmony of a sectional 
title scheme in view of the peculiar physical features of the building and the unique 
community of owners gathered almost permanently within the confines of the 
scheme.  The surrender of freedoms inherent in the imposition of social obligations 
on sectional owners is the price to be paid for a contented and harmonious sectional 
title community.   
 
                                                          
5
 Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 247-248. 
6
 GJ Pienaar Sectional Titles and other Fragmented Property Schemes (2010) 233. 
7
 M Constas & K Bleijs Demystifying Sectional Title 1ed (2004) 51. 
8
 Ss 35(2)(a) and (b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 
2011 ss 10(2)(a) and (b)).   
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6 2 Social obligations pertaining to a section and an exclusive use area   
 
6 2 1 Social obligations imposed in terms of the Act  
 
It is generally accepted that the social obligations of a landowner towards his 
neighbours are less intensive than the social obligations owed by a sectional owner 
to other members of a sectional title community.  Besides all the statutory limitations 
that might exist on ownership in general, a sectional owner‟s use and enjoyment of 
his section and an exclusive use area are further limited by the social obligations 
imposed by the Act.9  From the outset it is important to note that these social 
obligations are mandatory and cannot be excluded in terms of the rules of the 
sectional title scheme or in any other manner.10 
 
The Act imposes the following social obligations on a sectional owner with regard to 
his section and an exclusive use area:   
 
Firstly, an owner is obliged to permit any person authorised in writing by the body 
corporate to enter his section or exclusive use area for inspecting and maintaining it; 
repairing or renewing pipes, wires, cables and ducts in the section being used in 
connection with the enjoyment of any other section or the common property; or 
ensuring that the provisions of the Act and rules are being observed.  The entry is 
only allowed at reasonable hours and on written notice, except in the case of 
emergency.11 
 
Entry into the premises without a warrant or consent generally infringes a person‟s 
right of privacy protected under the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(the Constitution).12  However, this infringement is mitigated by the goal of such 
entry, namely to preserve the physical condition of the building and its facilities and 
to ensure that the owners comply with the behavioural rules of the scheme.  
Furthermore, to protect an owner‟s right to privacy the Act only allows access under 
                                                          
9
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5ed (2006) 477. 
10
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-7. 
11
 S 44(1)(a) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
13(1)(a)). 
12
 S 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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certain conditions.  Firstly, only a person authorised in writing by the body corporate 
will have access and since a sectional owner is a member of the body corporate with 
a right to vote at a general meeting, he has some control over the number and type 
of people who can obtain this authorisation from the trustees.  Secondly, entry is only 
allowed at reasonable hours except in the case of an emergency.  For instance, 
where a water pipe has burst it would obviously be to the advantage of the whole 
sectional title scheme that no written notice is required.13   
 
Moreover, the written authorisation must be in the form of an appropriate trustees‟ 
resolution authorising such entry.  This implies that the trustees must apply their 
minds to the matter and comprehensively minute their resolution to prove that this 
was the case.  Therefore, written authorisation detailing what is required must be 
provided by the person prior to entering an owner‟s section or exclusive use area.  
The sectional owner or occupier must be notified of the aspects requiring attention 
and his responsibility with regard to the matter.  Finally, if the trustees resolve to 
perform the work required in his section or exclusive use area and recover the 
expenses from the owner, such owner should be notified.14 
 
In addition, the Act also makes provision for implied reciprocal servitudes of 
subjacent and lateral support;15 and for the passage or provision of certain services 
such as electricity, water and sewerage through pipes, wires, cables or ducts.16 
These servitudes in favour of each section17 and against each section18 and relevant 
portions of the common property are deemed to be incorporated without registration 
in the sectional title deeds of each sectional owner.19  The ancillary rights to make 
these servitudes effective are also included.20  Consequently, these servitudes 
burden a sectional owner with the obligation to provide subjacent and lateral support 
for the other sections and the common property and to allow for the passage of the 
services mentioned through his section.  Here again a sectional owner is obliged to 
                                                          
13
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-7 – 8-8. 
14
 T Maree “Do the Trustees have a Duty to Maintain Sections?” (June 2007) 24 MCS Courier Newsletter 1 2-3. 
15
 Ss 28(1)(a)(i) and (b)(i) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986.    
16
 Ss 28(1)(a)(ii) and (b)(ii). 
17
 S 28(1)(a). 
18
 S 28(1)(b). 
19
 S 28(2)(a). 
20
 S 30.  
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grant access to his section or exclusive use area to the body corporate from time to 
time during reasonable hours in order to maintain, repair or renew any part of the 
building or any pipes, wires, cables or ducts in the building, or for emergency repairs 
necessary to prevent damage to the common property or any other section or 
sections.21 
 
Secondly, a sectional owner is obliged to carry out all work that may be ordered by a 
competent public or local authority in respect of the section.22  This obligation is 
similar to that applicable in the case of conventional ownership of land.  For 
example, the obligations imposed by the National Buildings Regulations and 
Buildings Standard Act 103 of 1977 apply equally to land and sections.23  In terms of 
the latter act no person (sectional owner) shall erect any building in respect of which 
plans and specifications are to be drawn and submitted without the prior written 
approval of the local authority.24  The definition of „erect‟ includes the alteration, 
conversion, extension, re-building, re-erection, sub-division of or addition to, or repair 
of any part of the structural system of any building (in our case the sectional title 
building).25  Consequently, a sectional owner may not make alterations to his section 
(including the extension of his section) without the prior written approval of the local 
authority in question.  Where a section is leased or occupied by a non-owner, this 
obligation will still rest on the owner unless specifically provided for in the lease or 
occupation agreement.26  This obligation is again justified by its goal, namely the 
prevention of damage to the physical integrity of the building by unauthorised 
alterations inside a section. 
 
Thirdly, an owner is obliged to maintain his section in a state of good repair and, in 
respect of an exclusive use area, keep it in a clean and neat condition.27  This 
                                                          
21
 Ss 28(2)(b), 30 and 44(1)(a). 
22
 S 44(1)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
13(1)(b)).  S 13(1)(b) of the Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 obliges the owner to carry out 
all work ordered by a competent authority instead of by a competent local or public authority as worded under s 
44(1)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986, but the substance of the duty is not changed by this amendment. 
23
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-7. 
24
 S 4(1) of the National Buildings Regulations and Building Standard Act 103 of 1977. 
25
 S 1(1) sv “erection”. 
26
 Pienaar Sectional Titles ch 5 n 8. 
27
 S 44(1)(c) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
13(1)(c)).  Annexure 8 r 70(a) and (b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 provides that an owner‟s failure to 
repair or maintain his or her section or an exclusive use area, if such failure persists for a period of thirty days 
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obligation may at first glance seem an excessive limitation on the ownership of a 
section.  In principle the owner of a building may demolish it or allow it to fall into 
disrepair since he is the only one who suffers a loss if it depreciates in value.  
However, the various sections in a sectional title scheme are part of an interrelated 
and interdependent complex and therefore the state of repair of each section 
inevitably affects the tone and value of the whole building.  If sectional owners are 
allowed to demolish their sections or to let them fall into disrepair it would 
immediately affect the soundness and existence of adjoining sections and the 
building as a whole and diminish the value of every unit in the scheme.  Therefore, 
this positive obligation to preserve the good condition of a section must be seen as a 
natural extension of the rule of neighbour law that an owner is not allowed to do 
anything on his land which would cause unreasonable prejudice to his neighbour.28  
Obliging an owner to maintain his section thus ensures that the stability of the 
building is maintained to the benefit of the other sections and the common property 
and that the sectional title scheme does not degenerate and depreciate in value.29  
Maintenance of an exclusive use area is restricted to keeping it in a „clean and neat‟ 
condition which aims to preserve the overall outward appearance of a sectional title 
scheme. 
 
Fourthly, an owner is obliged to use his section or exclusive use area in such a 
manner or purpose that it will not cause any nuisance to any other occupier of 
another section.30  This obligation is common in various jurisdictions and is a normal 
feature in leases.  Furthermore, the prevention of nuisance is one of the basic rules 
of neighbour law that requires one to use one‟s property without prejudicing others.31  
This obligation enshrined in the Act is thus a confirmation that the common law 
concept of nuisance applies perhaps even more strictly in an intensified sectional 
title community.  This notion is also fortified in the Act by the provision that this 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
after a written notice by the trustees or managing agent, empowers the body corporate to remedy such failure 
and recover the reasonable cost for such repairs and maintenance from the owner. 
28
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-7 – 8-8(1). 
29
 Pienaar Sectional Titles ch 5 n 9. 
30
 S 44(1)(e) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
13(1)(e)). 
31
 Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedes.  See in general Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-8(1).  
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obligation does not only rest on sectional owners but also on the members of his 
family, tenants and other occupants in a sectional title scheme.32  
 
Finally, an owner is obliged to use a section or an exclusive use area only for the 
purpose expressly or by implication shown on the registered sectional plan.  This 
obligation is subject to the proviso that a section or exclusive use area may be used 
for another purpose with the written consent of all owners.33  Unfortunately, the 
sectional plan itself gives little information as to whether the units in the scheme are 
intended for residential, commercial, office or mixed-use purposes.  An indication of 
the type of scheme may perhaps be gleaned from the name of the scheme on the 
title page of the sectional plan, but apart from that a perusal of the further pages of 
the sectional plan gives no concrete evidence of the kind of scheme we are dealing 
with.  We shall see below, at 6 2 2, that this is fortunately embroidered upon to some 
extent by the provision in Annexure 8 rule 68(1)(v).  
 
Sections intended for residential purposes should therefore not be turned into 
commercial premises or vice versa.  It is not clear whether this obligation only 
pertains to the broad categories of schemes mentioned above and thus whether 
sectional owners may use premises designated for a particular kind of business to 
conduct another kind of trade.  Clarity should be provided in this regard.34  The 
justification for this rule is the preservation of a particular sectional title scheme‟s 
characteristics by avoiding the disruption of harmony that various uses of sections or 
exclusive use areas are likely to cause.  The harmonious co-existence in a 
residential scheme is therefore maintained by preventing any disturbance that might 
occur if owners are allowed to conduct different kinds of commercial activities in their 
sections.  
 
In order to provide a measure of flexibility an owner is allowed to change the use of 
his section or exclusive use area with the written consent of all the sectional 
                                                          
32
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-8(1). 
33
 S 44(1)(g) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
13(1)(g)). 
34
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-8(1) - 8-9. 
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owners.35  Any owner who feels that the refusal of consent by another owner is 
unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to him, may within six weeks after the date 
of such refusal make an application to the High Court to have the refusal 
reconsidered.36  If the refusal is found to be unfairly prejudiced, unjust or inequitable 
to the applicant, and if the court considers it just and equitable, it may with a view to 
settling the dispute make such order as it deems fit.  This order may include: the 
requirement that section 44(1)(g) is deemed to have been met; that section 14 of the 
Act is deemed appropriate with reference to the amendment of the registered 
sectional plan; any other supplementary order the court deems fit; and a 
determination on costs as the court deems appropriate.37   
 
The Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 (the STSMA) now states 
that any owner who is of the opinion that the refusal of consent of another owner is 
unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable to him, may, within six weeks after the date 
of such refusal, make an application to a regional ombud instead of the High Court 
as directed by section 44(2) of the Act.38  An application to an ombud instead of the 
High Court will be more cost effective and will deliver swifter results.  Furthermore, 
the adjudicator appointed by the ombud would have the benefit of at least two 
precedents, handed down by the two High Courts in South Africa, dealing with this 
issue.39    
 
In Cujè-Jacoby and Another v Kaschub and Another40 the applicants have since 
1995 conducted the business of letting out and cleaning the sectional title units at the 
Glen Abbey sectional title scheme at Erinvale Estate in Somerset West.  It was well 
known that many of the owners of the units in this scheme did not reside in their 
units on a full time basis and that it was a widespread practice for owners to let their 
                                                          
35
 See proviso to s 44(1)(g) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 
of 2011 s 13(1)(g)). 
36
 S 44(2)(a) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 read with s 1 sv “court”.   
37
 S 44(2)(b). 
38
 S 13(2) of the Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011. 
39
 Cujè- Jacoby and Another v Kaschub and Another 2007 3 SA 345 (C) and Bonthuys and Others v Scheepers 
ECD 17-09-2007 case no CA 303/2006. 
40
 2007 3 SA 345 (C).  Commented on by T Maree “Kan jy Deel vir Nuwe Doel gebruik?” (April 2008) 29 MCS 
Courier Newsletter 7 7-8  and CG Van der Merwe “Refusal to Consent to the Change of Use of a Sectional Title 
Unit” (2008) 71 THRHR 692 692-698. 
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units when they were not personally occupying them.41  The applicants owned seven 
units and let a further five units on behalf of other owners.  The applicants converted 
three of their garages so as to provide ablution facilities for their staff and the 
gardener employed by the body corporate and to provide a rest, administration, 
laundry and ironing room for conducting their business.  All the sectional owners 
except the first respondent had given their written consent42 for the use of the 
garages being changed in the above manner.43  
 
It is common cause that the applicants originally did the laundry in a washing 
machine and tumble dryer in their own unit, but that the noise of the washing 
machine disturbed the first respondent.  When she complained about the noise, they 
moved the washing machine and tumble dryer to garage 14.  This was done in 2001 
and the first respondent did not complain about the change of use of garage 1444  
until four years later.  In a letter written on 19 January 2005 the respondent detailed 
her complaint about the change of use of garage 14 and proposed that the dispute 
be resolved by moving the laundry from garage 14 to garage 11 and by blocking up 
the side door in garage 10.  Subject to this she did not seem to have any objection to 
the change of use of the other garages.45  At an annual general meeting held on 25 
January 2005 the first respondent voted in favour of the change of use of garages 9, 
10 and 12, but voted against the existence of the side door in garage 10.  Then in a 
letter dated 24 October 2005 the first respondent repeated her suggestion that the 
laundry be moved from garage 14 to garage 11 and that the side door be closed.  
She was, however, not prepared to give an undertaking that if these changes were 
made, she would withdraw her objection and reserved all her rights even if her 
proposal was implemented.  Understandably the applicants were not willing to incur 
enormous costs to accommodate the first respondent without any guarantee that it 
would conclude the matter.46 
 
                                                          
41
 Cujè- Jacoby and Another v Kaschub and Another 2007 3 SA 345 (C) para 3. 
42
 Under s 44(1)(g) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
43
 Cujè- Jacoby and Another v Kaschub and Another 2007 3 SA 345 (C) para 4. 
44
 Para 8. 
45
 Para 6. 
46
 Para 7. 
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Therefore, the applicants applied to the court for an order that consent was deemed 
to have been given47 on the ground that the refusal of the first respondent was 
„unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable‟ to them.48  The court found that the words 
„unfairly prejudicial, unjust or inequitable‟ denoted conduct which departed from the 
accepted standards of fair play and that the word „unfairly‟ should be equated with 
the word „unreasonably‟.49  The court decided that the first respondent‟s objections to 
the change of use were fanciful and irrational and her refusal to give consent was 
prejudicial to the applicants and ordered that the first respondent was deemed to 
have given the necessary consent.50 
 
In reaching this conclusion, Traverso DJP indicated that the respondent already 
consented to the change of use of three of the garages, that neither her security nor 
her privacy would be impacted by the change in use and that she exaggerated the 
amount of movement of staff between the washing and the ironing room.  
Furthermore, the change in use would not devalue her property because the judge 
found it self-evident that the availability of an efficient on-site and centralised letting 
arrangement was likely to make the properties more attractive to prospective owners 
who wished to occupy them on a part-time basis.  In contrast the removal of the 
business to other premises would have a devastating impact on the business and on 
those people who make use of the services of the applicants.51  Finally, any 
objections of the respondent could be met by moving the laundry in garage 14 to 
garage 11 and since the applicants had no objection to this, such an order was 
made.52 
 
In the unreported case of Bonthuys and Others v Scheepers53 the High Court of the 
Eastern Cape reversed the decision of the Magistrate‟s Court  granting consent to 
the sectional owner in a residential sectional title scheme to run her hairdressing 
salon in her unit.  The appeal of the other owners was allowed because the lady 
                                                          
47
 Under s 44(2)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
48
 S 44(2)(a). 
49
 Cujè-Jacoby and Another v Kaschub and Another 2007 3 SA 345 (C) para 10. 
50
 Paras 12, 15 and 16. 
51
 Paras 11-14. 
52
 Para 15. 
53
 ECD 17-09-2007 case no CA 303/2006, commented on by M Botha “Is Consent by the Trustees of the Body 
Corporate of the Sectional Title Scheme to Conduct Business in a Residential Unit, Sufficient? Lessons from 
Body Corporate of Algoa Bay and 13 others v Scheepers” (March 2008) 12 Property Law Digest 3 3-8. 
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started the business without obtaining the written consent of the other owners and, 
second, because it found that the refusal of thirteen of the sectional owners to grant 
their consent was not unfairly prejudicial to the applicant.54   
 
The same line of reasoning as in the case of Cujè- Jacoby and Another v Kaschub 
and Another55 was followed in interpreting the word „unfairly‟ as „unreasonably‟ and it 
was found that the prejudice suffered by the other sectional owners far outweighed 
the prejudice that may be suffered by the applicant.  The court reasoned that the 
construction of a separate entrance for her clients to the hairdressing salon would 
affect the peace and tranquility associated with a residential scheme.  Moreover, the 
evidence at hand did not indicate any value added to the scheme but rather 
suggested an adverse effect on the other owners.56  It was stressed that the 
personal circumstances of the applicant, namely that she lost her job because the 
salon she worked for closed down and that she struggles to maintain a four year old 
child, did not justify a departure from the established scheme.57 
 
6 2 2 Social obligations imposed in terms of the model management rules 
 
Besides the social obligations imposed by the Act, the model management rules also 
contain a number of provisions which subject sectional owners to social obligations 
regarding their sections and exclusive use areas.58  They include the following:  
 
Firstly, an owner is under an obligation not to use his section or exclusive use area, 
or allow it to be used, for any purpose injurious to the reputation of the building.59  It 
is unclear what exactly is meant by the word „reputation‟.60  Reputation can have a 
moral connotation or it could refer to the prestige or status of a certain building.  
However, where a section or exclusive use area is used for, or seen or heard to be 
used for, immoral purposes like a brothel, it would certainly affect the reputation of 
                                                          
54
 See in general Botha (March 2008) Property Law Digest 5; Van der Merwe (2008) THRHR 697; and Van der 
Merwe Sectional Titles 8-12. 
55
 2007 3 SA 345 (C) para 10. 
56
 Bonthuys and Others v Scheepers ECD 17-09-2007 case no CA 303/2006 para 15.   
57
 Para 16.   
58
 Annexure 8 r 68-70 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
59
 Annexure 8 r 68(1)(i). 
60
 Maree Sectional Titles on Tap 10.9. 
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any sectional title scheme.  Furthermore, the reputation of the high-class sectional 
title scheme may also suffer if the owners were to hang their washing on the 
balconies.61  The aim of this obligation is to protect the reputation of the scheme in 
order to preserve harmony in the scheme and to safeguard the financial investment 
of sectional owners.  
 
Secondly, an owner is under an obligation not to contravene or permit the 
contravention of any law, by-law, ordinance, proclamation, regulation, or the 
conditions of any license with regard to the occupation of the building or the carrying 
on of business in the building.  In terms of this rule an owner is obliged not to 
contravene the conditions of title62 applicable to his or any other section or exclusive 
use area.63  This rule thus obliges sectional owners to be aware of and abide by any 
law or license condition that affects the residential or commercial use of his unit and 
any conditions of title that apply to his section and exclusive use area.64  For 
example, it is an offence under section 20(1A)(a) of the Sexual Offences Act 23 of 
1957 for any person 18 years or older to have unlawful carnal intercourse, or commit 
an act of indecency, with any other person for reward.  Furthermore, licenses are 
required to conduct certain kinds of businesses in the building.65  The patent goal of 
this obligation is to prevent illegal and unwanted activities from being conducted in 
the sections or exclusive use areas in order to safeguard the social standing and 
harmony of the scheme. 
 
Thirdly, an owner is under an obligation not to make alterations to his section or 
exclusive use area which are likely to impair the stability of the building or the use 
and enjoyment of other sections, the common property or any exclusive use area.66  
This obligation does not only concretise, but also extends a sectional owner‟s 
existing obligations in terms of the servitude of support.67  The intention, to preserve 
                                                          
61
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-16 – 8-17. 
62
 In terms of s 11(3)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 conditions of title are contained in a 
conveyancer‟s certificate filed as an annexure to the sectional plan at the Deeds Registry. 
63
 Annexure 8 r 68(1)(ii) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
64
 G Paddock Sectional Title Survival Manual 6ed (2008) 10-34. 
65
 Licenses are required for the following businesses: the sale or supply of perishable foodstuffs; the provision 
of certain types of health facilities or entertainment; and the hawking of meals or perishable foodstuffs.  See the 
Businesses Act 71 of 1991, Schedule 1. 
66
 Annexure 8 r 68(1)(iii) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
67
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 8-17. 
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the physical integrity of the building to the greatest possible extent, once again 
validates the rule. 
 
Fourthly, an owner is under an obligation not to do anything to his section or 
exclusive use area which is likely to prejudice the harmonious appearance of the 
building.68  The difficulty in discovering what is meant by the term „harmonious 
appearance‟ is compounded by the fact that the Afrikaans version of the rule, which 
is the official version of the Act, uses the expression estetiese voorkoms, meaning 
„aesthetic appearance‟.  For example, enclosing a balcony on the ground floor with 
glass will spoil the harmonious appearance of the building, but might still look 
beautiful and would thus not necessarily prejudice the aesthetic appearance of the 
building.69   
 
Fifthly, when the intended usage of a section or exclusive use area is shown 
expressly or by implication on or by a registered sectional plan, or on the original 
approved building plan, or can be inferred from the provisions of the rules or is 
obvious from its construction, layout and available amenities, an owner is under an 
obligation not to use, nor permit, such section or exclusive use area to be used for 
any other purpose except with the written consent of all the sectional owners.70  This 
management rule is an elaboration of section 44(1)(g), as discussed above at 6 2 1, 
in that the intended purpose for which a section or exclusive use area must be used 
must not only be inferred from the registered sectional plan but also from the original 
approved building plan, the provisions of the rules and its construction, layout and 
available amenities.  Unfortunately, except for the name of a sectional title scheme 
and the manner in which the participation quota is calculated, the intended use of a 
section or exclusive use area in a sectional title building is not easily noticeable.  
This is aggravated by the fact that most developers simply adopt the prescribed 
management and conduct rules as the rules for a particular sectional title scheme 
without any attempt to change the rules for non-residential schemes.  Furthermore, 
the original approved building plan usually contains little, if any, indication of the use 
                                                          
68
 Annexure 8 r 68(1)(iv) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
69
 See J Maree “Confusion Regarding the Harmonious Appearance Rule” (April 2008) 29 MCS Courier 
Newsletter 5 5-6. 
70
 Annexure 8 r 68(1)(v) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 as amended by GN R 805 in  GG 34639 of 28-
09-2011. 
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of a section or exclusive use area.  The intended use of sections or exclusive use 
areas in residential buildings can, however, to a certain extent be inferred from its 
construction, layout and available amenities.  In chapter 2, at 2 2 6, we have seen 
that a management rule may not be in conflict with a provision of the Act.  A wise 
suggestion by Van der Merwe is thus to delete subsection (v) of management rule 
68(1) and to amend section 44(1)(g) of the Act so as to provide that the purpose and 
intended use of a section or exclusive use area can also be inferred with reference to 
the construction, layout and available amenities in a particular sectional title 
scheme.71  The justification for this rule is similarly to preserve the characteristics of 
a particular sectional title scheme and to avoid any disruption of harmony by allowing 
all kinds of incompatible and unsuited uses of sections or exclusive use areas.     
 
Finally, an owner shall not construct or place any structure or building improvement 
on his exclusive use area, without the prior written consent of the trustees.  This is 
subject to the proviso that such consent must not be unreasonably withheld.72  It is 
important to note that this social obligation applies solely to exclusive use areas.  
Maree argues that if the sectional owner had failed to apply for prior consent, but 
applied and obtained consent after erection of the structure, he should be deemed to 
have complied with the provisions of this rule.  In the event that it comes to the 
attention of the trustees that a sectional owner has erected a structure without their 
consent, the trustees should require the sectional owner to make written application 
for the necessary consent.  If the sectional owner fails to respond or his application is 
rejected, the trustees should request him to remove the structure and, if necessary, 
apply for a court interdict ordering the removal of the structure.73  The main reason 
for imposing this obligation solely in respect of exclusive use areas is to preserve the 
pleasing appearance of the sectional title scheme from the outside.  For example, 
the trustees may withhold their consent for the erection of a carport which will disturb 
the attractive exterior of the scheme because of its rudimentary design.   
 
                                                          
71
 These proposals by Van der Merwe have been triggered by the observations of T Maree “Permitted Usage of 
Sections and Use Areas” (March 2013) 43 MCS Courier Newsletter 2 2-3.  See in general Van der Merwe 
Sectional Titles 8-17. 
72
 Annexure 8 r 68(1)(vi) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986.  Such construction or structure may not be in 
contravention of the requirements of ss 24 and 25 or other relevant provisions of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 
1986 or the rules of the scheme. 
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 Maree Sectional Titles on Tap 10.12. 
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6 2 3 Social obligations imposed in terms of the model conduct rules 
 
Several model conduct rules, in Annexure 9, impose social obligations on sectional 
owners in accordance with the demands of the high-density living conditions 
prevailing in most sectional title schemes.74  They include the following: 
 
Firstly, an owner must obtain the written consent of the trustees to keep any animal, 
reptile or bird in his section.  The trustees may not unreasonably withhold their 
approval and when granting such consent may prescribe any reasonable condition 
on breach of which their approval may be withdrawn.75  Reasonable conditions could 
include a requirement that the owner must immediately clean up the mess the pet 
makes on the common property, that the pet may not cause a nuisance or be 
present on the common property unless on a lead.76 
 
Secondly, an owner must maintain in his section or exclusive use area a receptacle 
for refuse in a hygienic and dry condition and ensure that any refuse placed in such 
receptacle is securely wrapped or completely drained.77  The trustees may determine 
the area where such receptacle may be placed for refuse collection, and the 
receptacle must be promptly returned after the refuse has been collected.78  Even 
though this rule contains provisions which represent the legislature‟s attempt at 
drafting a rule of general application, it may be unsuitable in many instances 
because the layouts of sectional title schemes and other factors differ greatly from 
scheme to scheme.79  The aim of this obligation is to regulate the disposal of refuse 
in an orderly manner and to prevent owners from placing their rubbish in boxes on 
any part of the common property, which would impair the attractive external look of 
the sectional title scheme.  Furthermore, the orderly regulation of refuse disposal 
diminishes health risks to owners and occupiers of the scheme.   
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 Pienaar Sectional Titles 242. 
75
 Annexure 9 r 1(1)-(3) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
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 J Paddock “The Three P‟s: Pets, Parking and difficult People” Paddocks Press 
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Thirdly, no owner is permitted to dismantle or effect major repairs to any vehicle on 
his exclusive use area or in his section.80  This obligation clearly aims to ensure that 
the attractiveness and cleanliness of the exterior parts of the scheme are 
maintained.  It would also prevent sections and exclusive use areas from being used 
as workshops to repair vehicles for monetary reward. 
    
Fourthly, an owner of a section used for residential purposes must not place or do 
anything on a balcony, stoep or patio, forming part of the section or exclusive use 
area, which, in the discretion of the trustees, is aesthetically displeasing or 
undesirable when viewed from outside the section.81  The placing of a roughly 
constructed doll‟s house on an exclusive use area or the erection of a washing line 
on a balcony may render the exterior aesthetics of the scheme displeasing. 
 
Fifthly, an owner must obtain the written consent of the trustees to place any sign, 
notice, billboard or advertisement on any part of his residential section which is 
visible from outside the section.82  This obligation is again a concretisation of the 
principle that an owner is not allowed to do anything in his section that may 
jeopardise the harmonious appearance of the outside of the building or the view from 
the staircase or corridors inside the building.  This rule only refers to sections used 
for residential purposes, and, in the case of sections used for commercial or mixed 
purposes this rule should accordingly be amended.83 
 
Sixthly, an owner is not permitted to store any inflammatory material or do, or allow 
to be done, any other dangerous act in a section or exclusive use area that may 
increase the rate of the premium payable by the body corporate on any insurance 
policy.84  The objective here is to avoid damage to or destruction of the building by 
fire or other dangerous acts conducted within a section or on an exclusive use area. 
 
Finally, an owner is under an obligation to keep his section free of insects and pests 
and must permit the trustees, the managing agent, or their employees or agents, to 
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 Annexure 9 r 3(4) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
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 Annexure 9 r 5. 
82
 Annexure 9 r 6.  
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 Pienaar Sectional Titles 243. 
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enter his section from time to time for the purpose of inspecting the section and 
taking any action as may be reasonably necessary to eradicate such pests.  The 
cost of inspection, eradication of pests, and replacement of any woodwork or other 
material forming part of the section is borne by the owner of the section.85  This rule 
is a reification of the owner‟s obligation to keep his section in a state of good repair in 
order to prevent the degeneration of the building. 
 
6 2 4 Evaluation 
 
The main objectives of the above mentioned social obligations can be fitted into one 
of the following three general categories: the preservation of the physical features of 
the building, the preservation of the harmonious appearance of the sectional title 
scheme when viewed from outside the section or the preservation of the social 
coherence and harmony in the scheme. 
 
The following social obligations aim to preserve the physical features of the building: 
that authorised persons may enter the owner‟s section or exclusive use area to 
inspect the physical condition and to repair defects that might impair the physical 
integrity of other sections or the sectional title building as a whole;86 the provision of 
subjacent and lateral support to other sections and the common property;87 the 
carrying out of all work that may be ordered by a competent public or local authority 
in respect of the section;88 the maintenance of the section in a state of good repair;89 
not to make alterations which are likely to impair the stability of the building or the 
use and enjoyment of other sections, the common property or any exclusive use 
area;90 not to store any inflammatory material or do, or allow to be done, any other 
                                                          
85
 Annexure 9 r 11. 
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 Ss 44(1)(a) and 28(2)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 
of 2011 s 13(1)(a)). 
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 Ss 28(1)(a)(i) and (b)(i) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986.   
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 S 44(1)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
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 S 44(1)(c) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 ; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
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dangerous act in a section or exclusive use area;91 and the keeping of the section 
free of insects and pests.92  
 
The purpose of the second category of social obligations is to preserve the 
harmonious appearance of the sectional title scheme from the outside.  These duties 
include: to keep an exclusive use area in a clean and neat condition;93 not to do 
anything to a section or exclusive use area which is likely to prejudice the 
harmonious appearance of the building;94 not to construct or place any structure or 
building improvement on an exclusive use area, without the prior written consent of 
the trustees;95 to maintain in or on a section or exclusive use area a receptacle for 
refuse in a hygienic and dry condition and to ensure that any refuse placed in such 
receptacle is securely wrapped or completely drained;96 not to dismantle or effect 
any major repairs to any vehicle in or on a section or exclusive use area;97 not to 
place or do anything on a balcony, stoep or patio, forming part of the section or 
exclusive use area, which, in the discretion of the trustees, is aesthetically 
displeasing or undesirable when viewed from outside the section;98 and not to place 
any sign, notice, billboard or advertisement on any part of the residential section so 
as to be visible from outside the section, without the written consent of the trustees.99 
 
The focus of the last category of social obligations is the preservation of the social 
coherence and harmony in the scheme.  The social obligations that relate to this 
aspect include the following: to use a section or exclusive use area in such a manner 
or purpose that it will not cause any nuisance to any other occupier of another 
section;100 not to use, nor permit a section or exclusive use area to be used for any 
other purpose except with the written consent of all the sectional owners;101 not to 
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 Annexure 9 r 11. 
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 S 44(1)(c) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
13(1)(c)). 
94
 Annexure 8 r 68(1)(iv) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
95
 Annexure 8 r 68(1)(vi). 
96
 Annexure 9 r 2. 
97
 Annexure 9 r 3(4). 
98
 Annexure 9 r 5. 
99
 Annexure 9 r 6.  
100
 S 44(1)(e) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
13(1)(e)). 
101
 S 44(1)(g) and Annexure 8 r 68(1)(v) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes 
Management Act 8 of 2011 s 13(1)(g))  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
183 
 
use a section or exclusive use area, or allow it to be used for any purpose injurious 
to the reputation of the building;102 not to contravene or permit the contravention of 
any law, by-law, ordinance, proclamation, regulation, or the conditions of any license 
with regard to the occupation of the building or the carrying on of business in the 
building;103 and not to keep any animal, reptile or bird in a section without the written 
consent of the trustees.104  
 
Furthermore, it is important to note that it is possible for both the developer, upon 
application for the opening of the sectional title register, and subsequently the body 
corporate, through passing unanimous or special resolutions,105 to impose additional 
social obligations on sectional owners with regard to the use and enjoyment of their 
sections and exclusive use areas.  This can be done by supplementing the 
management and especially the conduct rules of a particular sectional title scheme 
with special rules.  These special rules may for instance regulate specific matters 
such as when and how loud music may be played within a section.   
 
6 2 5 Special note on the keeping of pets 
 
Due to the fact that the keeping of pets is one of the most contentious and 
problematic issues in sectional title schemes, this part of the chapter will be 
concluded with a discussion of applicable case law on this topic.106  Restrictions on 
the guardianship of animals are designed to minimise nuisance being caused to 
neighbouring residents.107  In Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass’n 
Inc108 the Californian Supreme Court decided that a virtual ban on pets was not 
unreasonable and could be enforced against the owner of three cats even though 
the animals remained inside the unit at all times, did not make noise or generate 
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smells, and was not a nuisance to other residents.  The court denied Nahrstedt‟s 
relief on the following terms: 
 
“[a]s a matter of law,… the recorded pet restriction…is not arbitrary, but is rationally 
related to health, sanitation and noise concerns legitimately held by residents.”
109   
 
However, an absolute prohibition on the keeping of pets militates against the 
sectional owner‟s true ownership of his section and should be justified only in 
exceptional circumstances.  Nonetheless the trustees have the power to limit the 
number of pets per section or even the kind of pets allowed.110  Any sectional owner 
who feels aggrieved by a refusal of the trustees to allow him to keep a particular pet 
can approach the court for a declaratory order that the written consent of the trustees 
has been unreasonably withheld.111  Fortunately, South African courts have ruled 
that the wording of this conduct rule implies that the trustees are obliged to consider 
each case or application for the keeping of pets on its own merits.112   
 
Body Corporate of the Laguna Ridge Scheme No 152/1987 v Dorse113 dealt with the 
rule which granted the trustees the discretion to grant or refuse permission to keep 
pets in the units or common property of a scheme.  When the trustees refused 
permission to keep her dog in her flat an elderly lady challenged the refusal by taking 
the trustees to court.  The court held that each request for permission to keep an 
animal had to be considered on its own merits and the decision of the trustees had to 
be based on facts and circumstances relevant to the particular case.114  It appeared 
that there was never a danger that the respondent‟s small dog could cause a 
nuisance, as it, as testified by the respondent, did not bark and was never allowed to 
                                                          
109
 Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass‟n, Inc. 878 P.2d 1275, 1278-79 (Cal. 1994) (en banc) 1290. 
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applicable to the particular scheme; see J Paddock “The Three P‟s: Pets, Parking and difficult People” Paddocks 
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111
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wander freely around the common property.115  The court found that the decision of 
the trustees to refuse permission for the pet to be kept on the premises was heavily 
influenced by policy considerations such as the fear to create a precedent rather 
than contextual circumstances pertaining to the particular dog and whether its 
presence in the respondent‟s apartment could possibly constitute a nuisance.  The 
court argued that their decision was grossly unreasonable and warranted the 
inference that they failed to apply their minds to the matter.  On this basis the 
trustees‟ decision was reviewable under the common law.116  The matter concluded 
when the court found it proper to substitute the trustees' decision with its own and 
ordered that the elderly lady should be allowed to keep the dog in her apartment.117 
 
The New South Wales situation regarding the keeping of pets is similar to the 
position in South Africa.  There the courts also decided that the decision of the 
executive council (trustees) on the keeping of pets must be based on the facts and 
circumstances of each case.  In Johnson v The Owners – Strata Plan118 the 
adjudicator of the strata title tribunal reasoned that precedent concerns were not 
valid and it was therefore inappropriate for an owners corporation (body corporate) to 
have a policy which it arbitrarily sought to apply in every instance.  This judgment 
was given because the owners‟ corporation was obliged to consider each request for 
the keeping of an animal on merit.  Furthermore, in Montagna v The Owners – Strata 
Plan119 the tribunal found that it was not open to the owners corporation to decide 
that it does not want animals in the scheme and that the executive council was 
obliged to consider any request for permission to keep an animal on its merits.  The 
tribunal also found that it was not simply a matter that the majority rules, but rather 
that the owners corporation are obliged to reasonably consider every request put to 
it.120    
 
In the event that the prescribed conduct rules are applicable in a particular scheme 
and the owners want to adopt a „no pets‟ rule as an amendment to Annexure 9 rule 
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1, the body corporate can pass a special resolution and have it filed at the Deeds 
Registry.  Since all rules must be reasonable, the new rule must honour the vested 
rights of current sectional owners who have pets residing with them in the sectional 
title scheme.  In such circumstances the „grandfathering‟ or „twilight‟ principle must 
be observed and pet owners should not be forced to get rid of them.  However, once 
the pets die the owners concerned would not be automatically entitled to replace 
them.121   
 
6 3 Social obligations pertaining to the common property 
 
Having dealt with the social obligations of a sectional owner pertaining to sections 
and exclusive use areas, I now turn to the social obligations of owners with regard to 
the common property in terms of the Act and the prescribed management and 
conduct rules.    
 
6 3 1 Social obligations imposed in terms of the Act 
  
In terms of the Act sectional owners own the common property in undivided shares 
in accordance with the provisions of the Act.122  The extent to which a sectional 
owner owns and may, therefore, use and enjoy the common parts of the scheme, 
technically depends on the size of his section relative to that of the other sections in 
the sectional title scheme.123  In practice it is difficult to divide the use and enjoyment 
of land and the common parts of the buildings in accordance with a participation 
quota system based on size in residential schemes and the quota allotted by the 
developer in non-residential schemes.  Therefore, the Act incorporated a general 
principle whereby a sectional owner must:  
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“use and enjoy the common property in such a manner as not unreasonably to 
interfere with the use and enjoyment thereof by other owners or other persons 
lawfully on the premises”.
124   
 
Each sectional owner is thus entitled to substantially the same rights of use and 
enjoyment of the common property.  This is irrespective of whether his undivided 
share is of equal size or not since a higher participation quota cannot, as such, 
confer special or greater rights of use.125 
 
Therefore, a sectional owner is under an obligation to use and enjoy the common 
property in such a manner so as not to interfere with the concurrent rights of other 
lawful owners and residents.126  This accord with the principles of neighbour law that 
sectional owners are obliged to allow other sectional owners or occupiers to use and 
enjoy the common property in a reasonable way.127  To determine the parameters of 
reasonable usage Van der Merwe suggests the following four guidelines:128 no 
owner has an ius prohibendi against another owner or lawful occupant; no owner 
may appropriate for himself the exclusive use of any part of the common property; no 
owner may decide unilaterally on work to be done in connection with the common 
property; and no owner may use the common property for an abnormal purpose or in 
an unusual way. 
 
Consequently, no sectional owner may prevent another sectional owner or person 
lawfully on the premises to use any part of the common property for lawful purposes 
such as using the lifts, lawn or swimming pool.  Furthermore, no sectional owner 
may appropriate for himself the exclusive use of any part of the common property 
and therefore cannot, for example, erect a washing line, a doll‟s house for his 
daughter or carport.  Moreover, a sectional owner may not in his own discretion 
decide to redecorate any part of the common property, for instance a common 
games room or gym area.  Finally, no sectional owner may use the common property 
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for an abnormal purpose or in an unusual way.  Abnormal or unnatural usage of 
common property occurs where parts of the common property are utilised in a 
manner contrary to its nature or accepted usage, for instance where the scheme‟s 
lawn is used for playing a rugby or soccer match.129 
 
Furthermore, the implied reciprocal statutory servitudes against each section in 
favour of the common property, and in favour of each section against relevant 
portions of the common property, as discussed at 6 2 1, apply to the same extent in 
respect of the common property.  We have seen that these servitudes include a 
reciprocal servitude for subjacent and lateral support130 and a reciprocal servitude for 
the passage or provision of certain services through pipes, wires, cables and 
ducts.131  We have also seen that the implied servitudes confer on the body 
corporate the right to have access to each section and exclusive use area to 
maintain, repair or renew any part of the building or any pipes, wires, cables or ducts 
in the building, or for emergency repairs necessary to prevent damage to the 
common property or any other section or sections.132  The impetus for this social 
obligation is, as already indicated, to preserve the physical features of the building.           
 
6 3 2 Social obligations imposed in terms of the model management rules 
 
The prescribed management rules impose the following social obligations on 
sectional owners in respect of the common property:   
 
Firstly, an owner is obliged to refrain from using the common property in such a way 
or for such a purpose as to cause harm to the reputation of the building.133  We have 
already commented, at 6 2 2, that this obligation is unfortunately fairly vague. 
Nevertheless it would presumably prevent sectional owners from entering the 
common property indecently clothed or from leaving dust-bins or bicycles in the 
drive-way.  Consequently, it would be advisable for sectional owners to obtain the 
trustees‟ consent before they do anything on the common property which may impair 
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the reputation of the scheme.134  By protecting the reputation of the building, the 
social harmony in the scheme is preserved and the financial investment of sectional 
owners safeguarded.  
 
Secondly, an owner is obliged to refrain from contravening any law, by-law, 
ordinance, proclamation or statutory regulation, or the conditions of any license 
affecting the occupation or the carrying on of business in any part of the building that 
is defined as common property.135  Consequently, sectional owners are obliged to be 
aware of and abide by any law or license condition that affects his residential or 
commercial use of any part of the common property.  An example of such a law was 
already mentioned in 6 2 2, when I unpacked section 20(1A)(a) of the Sexual 
Offences Act which makes it an offence for any person 18 years or older to have 
unlawful carnal intercourse, or commit an act of indecency, with any other person for 
reward.  A sectional owner would thus commit an offence if he performed any of the 
above-mentioned acts for reward on any part of the common property.  Furthermore, 
licenses are required to conduct certain kinds of businesses in any part of the 
building that is defined as common property.  Licences are for instance required for 
the sale or supply of perishable foodstuffs; the provision of certain types of health 
facilities or entertainment; and the hawking of meals or perishable foodstuffs.136  
From the latter examples, it is reiterated that this social obligation aims to prevent 
illegal and unwanted activities from taking place on any part of the common property 
in order to protect the lawful order and social harmony in the scheme.  
 
6 3 3 Social obligations imposed in terms of the model conduct rules 
 
The model conduct rules of Annexure 9 impose several further social obligations on 
sectional owners regulating their use and enjoyment of the common property.  Most 
of these obligations, which I will now analyse, reiterate the social obligations with 
regard to sections and exclusive use areas discussed above. 
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As in the case of a section, an owner is not allowed to keep an animal, bird or reptile 
on the common property without the written consent of the trustees, which consent 
may not be unreasonably withheld.  Again, the consent may be given subject to 
certain conditions which if breached may lead to the withdrawal of approval.137  An 
example of animals kept on the common property would be the keeping of horses in 
an environment friendly rustic sectional title scheme at the boundaries of a city. 
 
An owner must maintain a receptacle for refuse in a hygienic and dry condition on 
such part of the common property as authorised by the trustees in writing.138  Refuse 
placed in this receptacle must be securely wrapped and completely drained.139  
Furthermore, the receptacle must be placed within the area and at times designated 
by the trustees140 and after the refuse has been collected the receptacle must be 
returned promptly to the section or exclusive use area concerned.141  The aim of this 
obligation is to regulate the disposal of refuse in an orderly manner and to prevent 
owners from placing their refuse in a haphazard manner on any other part of the 
common property with disastrous consequences to the external appearance of the 
scheme.  In addition the disposal of refuse in an orderly manner would reduce the 
health risks that scheme owners and occupiers may be exposed to. 
 
Furthermore, an owner is not allowed to deposit, throw, or permit or allow to be 
deposited or thrown, any rubbish on the common property.  This includes not only 
any dirt, cigarette butts, food scraps but any other kind of litter whatsoever.142  This 
social obligation is closely related to the previous obligation and therefore also works 
towards preventing the attractive outside appearance of the sectional title scheme 
from being prejudiced.   
 
An owner must not park or stand any vehicle on the common property, or permit or 
allow any vehicle to be parked or remain standing on the common property, without 
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the written consent of the trustees.143  Regulating parking on the common property is 
one of the most difficult issues that the body corporate and the trustees face.  
Allowing owners or their visitors to park their vehicles at random on the common 
property will cause chaos and conflict amongst owners and other residents of the 
scheme.  
 
An owner must also ensure that his vehicles, and the vehicles of his visitors and 
guests, do not drip oil or brake fluid on to the common property or in any other way 
deface the common property.144  In addition, as in the case of a section or an 
exclusive use area, an owner is not permitted to dismantle or effect major repairs to 
any vehicle on any portion of the common property.145  The intention of this 
obligation is again the preservation of the exterior aesthetics of the scheme.  
 
In addition, an owner must not mark, paint, drive nails or screws into, or otherwise 
damage, or alter, any part of the common property without the written consent of the 
trustees.146  Exceptions are, however, made in respect of the installation of any 
locking device; safety gate; burglar bars; or other safety device; or any screen or 
other device to prevent the entry of animals or insects.  Even though the rule confers 
a right on owners to install such items, they may only do so after the trustees have 
provided written approval of the nature and design of the device and the manner of 
its installation.147  This rule was undoubtedly formulated to allow owners to improve 
their security and prevent disturbance by insects and other pests.  
 
Moreover, an owner of a section used for residential purposes is not allowed to place 
or do anything on any part of the common property, including balconies, patios, 
stoeps, and gardens which, in the discretion of the trustees, is aesthetically 
displeasing or undesirable when viewed from the outside of the section.148  This 
obligation is somewhat ambiguous since balconies, patios and stoeps are usually 
structured as part of a section or as exclusive use areas.  Only the reference to the 
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garden makes sense because it is always part of the common property.  It is also 
confusing that the prohibited placement or action on the common property must be 
visible from the outside of the section.  This would thus apply to balconies, patio‟s 
and stoeps that are structured as part of the common property, but not to gardens. 
Even so the aim of this obligation is to ensure that the harmonious external 
appearance of the building is preserved. 
  
An owner of a residential section must also not place any sign, notice, billboard or 
advertisement of any kind whatsoever on any part of the common property so as to 
be visible from outside the section, without the written consent of the trustees.149  
This obligation, which also applies to a section, requires owners of residential units 
to first obtain the written consent of the trustees before placing nameplates or other 
signs on the outside walls adjoining their units or in the entrance of the building 
which forms part of the common property.  The aim of this obligation is yet again to 
preserve the harmonious external appearance of the building by regulating the 
advertisements and notices that may be affixed to the external walls.    
 
The repercussions of this rule are more problematic when it comes to non-residential 
sectional title schemes.  The entitlement of non-residential owners to place signs and 
other items on the outside walls of a unit can be summarised as follow.  Firstly, the 
outside walls of a unit fall under the definition of common property and therefore the 
owner may only make reasonable use thereof.  Such unit owners therefore do not 
have complete freedom to erect whatever signs they want on the outside walls.  
Secondly, if it is accepted that one-sided appropriation of any part of the common 
property always amounts to unreasonable use thereof, the affixing of signs and other 
items would be considered unreasonable and the necessary authorisation must be 
obtained from either the trustees or the body corporate.  Lastly, it might well be 
argued that moderate use of outside walls for identification and advertising purposes 
could be considered reasonable use of outside walls in a commercial or mixed 
sectional title scheme where such displays are natural and appropriate.  Because of 
all the difficulties that are encountered in applying Annexure 9 rule 6, it is suggested 
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that the developer should either insert special rules in this regard in the model 
conduct rules or that the owners themselves should later adopt special rules.150   
 
Another social obligation pertaining to the common property is that an owner must 
not, without the written consent of the trustees, erect his own washing lines, nor 
hang any washing or laundry or any other items on any part of the building or the 
common property so as to be visible from the outside or from any other sections.151  
The purpose of this obligation is thus to ensure that the attractive external 
appearance of the scheme is not impaired.  
 
Again, as applies in the case of a section or exclusive use area, an owner must not 
store any inflammatory material on the common property or perform or permit any 
other dangerous act in the building or on the common property which will or may 
increase the rate of the premium payable by the body corporate on any insurance 
policy.152  We have seen that the intention of this obligation is to prevent the building 
being damaged or destroyed by fire or other dangerous acts conducted on the 
common property.  
 
From the above, it is clear that most of these social obligations attempt to prevent 
the common property from being used unreasonably by the owners of the scheme.  
We have, however, seen that unreasonable use of the common property may in 
some cases be permitted with the written consent of the trustees acting on behalf of 
the body corporate.153   
 
6 3 4 Evaluation 
 
As in the case of social obligations pertaining to sections and exclusive use areas,154 
the social obligations pertaining to the common property can again be summarised 
according to the same three categories.  These categories, which I will now unpack, 
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are the preservation of the physical features of the building, the preservation of the 
harmonious appearance of the sectional title scheme when viewed from outside the 
section and the preservation of the social coherence and harmony in the scheme. 
 
Firstly, the physical features of the building are preserved by the obligations to 
provide subjacent and lateral support to parts of the common property;155 not to 
damage, alter or make additions to the common property without the written consent 
of the trustees156 and not to store any inflammatory material on the common property 
or perform or permit any other dangerous act in the building or on the common 
property.157  
 
Secondly, the outside attractiveness and harmonious appearance of the sectional 
title scheme is guaranteed by the obligations to maintain a receptacle for refuse in a 
hygienic and dry condition on such part of the common property as authorised by the 
trustees in writing;158 not to deposit, throw, or permit or allow to be deposited or 
thrown, any rubbish on the common property;159  to ensure that the vehicles of 
owners and their guests, do not drip oil or brake fluid on to the common property or 
in any other way deface the common property;160 not to dismantle or effect major 
repairs to any vehicle on any portion of the common property;161 not to place or do 
anything on any part of the common property which, in the discretion of the trustees, 
is aesthetically displeasing or undesirable when viewed from the outside of the 
section;162 not to place any sign, notice, billboard or advertisement of any kind 
whatsoever on any part of the common property so as to be visible from outside the 
section, without the written consent of the trustees;163 and not, without the written 
consent of the trustees, erect washing lines, nor hang any washing or laundry or any 
other items on any part of the building or the common property so as to be visible 
from outside the buildings or from any other sections.164   
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Finally, the social obligations to use and enjoy the common property in such a 
manner as not unreasonably to interfere with the use and enjoyment thereof by other 
owners or other persons lawfully on the premises165 are concretised by the social 
obligations not to use the common property in such a way or for such a purpose that 
is injurious to the reputation of the building;166  to refrain from contravening any law, 
by-law, ordinance, proclamation or statutory regulation, or the conditions of any 
license affecting the occupation or the carrying on of business in any part of the 
building that is defined as common property;167 and not to keep any pet on the 
common property without the written consent of the trustees.168  The ultimate aim of 
these obligations is to preserve social harmony and to protect the financial 
investments of sectional owners in the scheme.               
 
As in the case of sections and exclusive use areas, it is also possible for both the 
developer and the body corporate in general meeting to impose additional social 
obligations on sectional owners regarding the use and enjoyment of any portion of 
the common property.  An example of a special rule imposing additional social 
obligations on sectional owners regarding the use of the common swimming pool 
reads as follow: 
 
“Swimming pool 
(1) Not pets or animals are permitted in the pool area. 
(2) The body corporate absolves itself from any responsibility concerning the use of 
the pool and requires adult supervision of children under 12 years of age. 
(3) No surf boards or the like are permitted in the pool area. 
(4) Resident‟s visitors using the pool must be accompanied by a resident who will be 
responsible for the behaviour of the visitors. 
(5) All persons using the pool area are to keep it in a neat and tidy condition and all 
refuse must be removed from the area after use. 
(6) Any trustee shall have the right in his own discretion to demand that anyone 
using the pool area in an unacceptable manner shall leave and such persons 
shall comply therewith immediately. 
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(7) Braais are permitted in designated areas only.”169 
 
From the discussion of the social obligations imposed on sectional owners with 
regard to the use of the common property it becomes evident that a sectional 
owner‟s powers of use and enjoyment of the common property are more restricted 
than his powers of use and enjoyment of his section.  This is understandable since a 
sectional owner does not have the same exclusive individualistic powers inherent in 
the ownership of a section with regard to the common property.  A sectional owner is 
only a co-owner in undivided shares of the common property and must share the 
common property with all the other sectional owners.170  Furthermore, most of the 
individualistic characteristics of traditional co-ownership have been limited in the 
modified concept of co-ownership adopted by the Act.171  The imposition of stricter 
and more specific social obligations on sectional owners with regard to the use and 
enjoyment of the common property are thus justifiable.  
 
6 4 Social obligations imposed by neighbour law  
 
Apart from the provisions of the Act and the model rules, the social obligations of 
sectional owners with regard to the use of their sections, exclusive use areas and the 
common property are also regulated by intensified common law principles of 
neighbour law.  These are required by the dense living and usage conditions 
prevailing in most sectional title schemes.  Therefore, a greater measure of care 
towards neighbours in the exercise of usage rights must be observed on the one 
hand, and a greater measure of tolerance towards the exercise of usage rights of 
neighbours must be accepted on the other hand.172 
 
In terms of the Act, as discussed at 6 3 1, sectional owners are obliged not to use 
and enjoy the common property in a manner that will result in unreasonable 
interference with the use and enjoyment by other owners and persons lawfully on the 
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premises.173  Since neither the Act or the rules contain express provisions indicating 
how the principle of reasonable use of the common property, the sections and 
exclusive use areas are to be understood, the concept of reasonableness should be 
interpreted in terms of common law neighbour law principles.174  
 
The purpose of neighbour law is the harmonisation of the interests of neighbouring 
owners or users of immovable properties by weighing their rights and obligations in 
the exercise of entitlements against each other in order to balance conflicting 
interests.175  A sectional owner must therefore exercise his entitlements in respect of 
a section, an exclusive use area and the common property reasonably, and, on the 
other hand, the neighbour must tolerate this within reasonable bounds.176   
 
Neighbour law is based on the notion that the sectional title property must be used in 
such a way that a neighbouring owner or occupier is not unreasonably prejudiced or 
burdened by such use.177  This is encapsulated in the Roman maxim sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas.178  Any form of annoying or unreasonable conduct which 
interferes with or causes actual damage to a neighbour‟s health, well-being or 
comfort in his occupation of a sectional title unit or the common property, is regarded 
as a nuisance.179   
 
It is a question of fact and often a matter of degree whether the conduct of the 
sectional owner is sufficiently serious to constitute a nuisance.180  The reasonable 
test poses the question whether a normal person, finding himself in the position of 
the plaintiff, would have been expected to tolerate the interference concerned.181  
This test is an objective one and has to be applied in the light of the prevailing 
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 S 44(1)(d) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
13(1)(d)). 
174
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175
 Gien v Gien 1979 2 SA 1113 (T) 1123E. 
176
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177
 Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1963 1 SA 102 (A) 120G. 
178
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Juridica 123 123-269; CG Van der Merwe Sakereg 2ed (1989) 185-197; and AJ van der Walt The Law of 
Neighbours (2010) ch 6. 
180
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circumstances.182  In terms of case law several factors can be taken into account to 
ascertain whether a sectional owner‟s intrusive conduct is objectively reasonable:183  
 
In the first place the conduct concerned must be repetitive or continuous, since a 
single action of short duration must normally be tolerated, except if there is a 
reasonable expectation that the activity will be repeated.184 
 
Secondly, the displeasing conduct must, according to the prevailing social views of 
the community (secundum bonos mores), be objectively unreasonable.185  This 
means that objectively intolerable conduct is not acceptable. 
 
The test employed is further „not [that] of the perverse or finicking or over-scrupulous 
person, but [that] of the normal man of sound and liberal taste and habits‟.186 
Consequently, plaintiffs who are abnormally or extraordinarily sensitive or neurotic 
will not be entitled to relief even though they may personally suffer substantial 
discomfort and inconvenience.187  For example, a woman who suffers from acute 
attacks of migraine would not be able to complain about ordinary noises made by 
children playing in an adjoining apartment.188 
 
Furthermore, aspects such as the location of an apartment or unit in the building, the 
nature of the scheme as residential, commercial or mixed-use, the customs of the 
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 Vogel v Crewe and Another 2003 4 SA 509 (T) 512E. 
183
 See in general CG Van der Merwe, MJ De Waal & D Carey Miller Property and Trust Law in the 
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Hime 1912 33 NLR 72 76; Leith v Port Elizabeth Museum Trustees 1934 EDL 211 213; Van den Berg v OVS 
Landbou Ingenieurs (Edms) Bpk 1956 4 SA 391 (O) 400; Die Vereniging van Advokate (TPA) v Moskeeplein 
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Merwe & Blumberg (1998) Stell LR 354. 
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188 (D) 192. 
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residents and the question whether the health of the neighbour may be affected are 
important in the determination of the reasonableness of the activities practiced at 
neighbouring apartments.189 
 
Moreover, the harm suffered by the plaintiff must be weighed against the benefit and 
utility of the activity to the sectional owner.  If the harm suffered were 
disproportionally serious in comparison with the trivial benefits gained by the activity, 
the interference would be considered unreasonable.  Conversely, substantial 
benefits derived from a particular activity could render an activity that causes minor 
harm reasonable in the circumstances.190 
 
In addition, the motive of a certain activity may determine its objective 
reasonableness.  If the activity is motivated solely by an intention on the part of a 
sectional owner to harm his neighbour (animo vicino nocendi) this fact may turn an 
otherwise lawful activity into an unreasonable activity which cannot be expected to 
be tolerated.191  Banging on the walls with the sole intention of interrupting piano 
lessons conducted in a neighbouring apartment would be considered 
unreasonable.192  The reasonableness of the conduct of a neighbouring sectional 
owner can thus be determined by the wrongfulness of his conduct.193  In this regard 
the expression of „abuse of rights‟ is often used.194  
 
Another important factor which may be taken into account is the fact that the same 
goal could have been achieved by the sectional owner by measures less harmful to 
the plaintiff.  Therefore, where precautionary measures are used to limit harm the 
less likely a particular activity will be assessed as unreasonable.  Thus an 
interference with the comfort and convenience of a neighbour which could have been 
prevented or at least diminished by the sectional owner carrying on the activity at a 
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different time, in a different manner, in a different part of his section, or with greater 
expertise is more likely to be considered unreasonable than one which could not 
have been prevented by such measures.195  For example, a musician living in a 
sectional title scheme can play his guitar during the day instead of the late hours of 
the night and he can minimise the noise made by not using an amplifier. 
 
If a sectional owner inherits a certain state of affairs that is injurious to his 
neighbours, the practicability of preventing harm to his neighbour is also taken into 
account in assessing the reasonableness of his continuing the state of affairs.  The 
sectional owner is only expected to take steps „reasonably practicable‟ in the 
circumstances.  The courts do not regard harm that could not have been avoided, 
even if reasonably practicable measures had been taken, as unreasonable.196 
 
A final factor which may be taken into account in assessing the reasonableness of a 
sectional owner‟s activity is whether the activity complained about was carried on 
prior to the plaintiff „coming to the nuisance‟.197  For example, where a sectional 
owner gave guitar lessons during the day for the last 15 years before the plaintiff 
bought into the scheme. 
 
After assessing the factors that are relevant in a particular situation, the court has to 
balance all probabilities and decide whether the sectional owner‟s conduct was 
reasonable in the circumstances or was such that the plaintiff could not be expected 
to tolerate such conduct.198  In the context of a sectional title community the following 
activities will constitute an actionable nuisance if conducted in a section, an 
exclusive use area or on the common property:199 causing excessive noise;200 the 
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emission of an unreasonable amount of smoke, fumes or smells;201 carrying on a 
business in a residential scheme without the necessary consent;202 hurling stones, 
balls or other objects into a section or onto an exclusive use area;203 allowing leaves 
or roots to intrude into neighbouring exclusive use areas;204 and the leakage of fluids 
from a neighbouring section or exclusive use area.205  
 
6 5 Evaluation 
 
The adage that you can choose your friends, but you cannot choose your family is 
extended in the sectional title context, as you certainly cannot choose your 
neighbours in a sectional title scheme.  A clash of personalities is often prevalent in 
sectional title schemes which are seldom homogeneous.206  Therefore, in order to 
obtain social harmony the Act; the model rules; neighbour law principles; and special 
rules impose social obligations on sectional owners with regard to the use and 
enjoyment of their sections, exclusive use areas and the common property.  Without 
these obligations there will certainly be chaos in sectional title schemes all over 
South Africa.  The importance of these social obligations can never be 
overemphasized and sectional owners should be properly informed and educated 
about their existence.   
 
On closer examination it will become apparent that social obligations are essential 
for the preservation of the unique characteristics of a sectional title scheme.  In 
chapter 2, at 2 2 1, we have seen that these characteristic features include the 
following: 
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Firstly, the object of sectional ownership is not indestructible land as in the case of 
landownership, but apartments which form part of a destructible building.  In fact the 
very existence of a section in a sectional title scheme depends on the preservation of 
the floors, walls and ceilings of the section to the median lines which form the 
boundaries of that particular section.  
 
Secondly, the apartments of a sectional title building are not structurally 
individualised but structurally interdependent.  This means that the very existence of 
the sections is dependent on the continued physical existence of all the sections in 
the scheme. 
 
Thirdly, the community life in a sectional title scheme is much more intensified than 
the community life of a group of neighbouring landowners.  Sectional owners live in a 
close-knit community.  In high-rise sectional title buildings sectional owners would 
have neighbours on either side and on top and below them.  This feature has been 
judicially recognised in Body Corporate of Albany Court and 17 Others v Nedbank 
and Others207 where Gautschi AJ stated: 
 
“The interdependence of owners within a single building or complex logically requires 
co-operation, and compliance with and subservience to the will of the majority.”
208  
                   
Fourthly, the legislature intended that the community of unit owners established in 
terms of the Act should be more or less permanent and should only be terminated on 
compliance with the strict conditions set for the dissolution of a sectional title 
scheme.  In terms of the Act a sectional title scheme can only be dissolved where 
the building is in fact physically destroyed; where the owners unanimously resolve 
that the building be regarded as destroyed and the holders of registered real rights 
give their written consent thereto; and where the court on application of an interested 
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party209 finds it just and equitable that the building be deemed to be destroyed and 
makes an order to that effect.210 
 
These basic features of sectional ownership merit the imposition not only of stricter 
social obligations on a sectional owner, but also social obligations of a different kind.   
Put differently, these features justify more intensive restrictions on the powers and 
entitlements of a sectional owner with regard to his section, exclusive use area and 
the common property.  This does not mean that sectional ownership is degraded to a 
lesser limited real right or a „nebulous something‟ as suggested by Professor De Wet 
in the early days of sectional ownership.211  Although sectional ownership has 
different features, it is still genuine ownership and should be placed on the same 
footing as the ownership of land.212  This was judicially confirmed by the same High 
Court Judge in Body Corporate of Albany Court and 17 Others v Nedbank and 
Others:213  
 
“[T]he powerful right of ownership of an immovable property is not an absolute right.  
Indeed, the very essence of the [Sectional Titles] Act is to render many of the 
interests of owners of units in a sectional title scheme subservient to the will of the 
majority.  Certain of the normal rights of an owner, for instance the right to keep pets 
or make building alterations, may be curtailed by the rules imposed by the 
majority.”
214  
                      
The evolution of the concept of ownership is perfectly encapsulated in the following 
words of Van der Merwe: 
 
“The influence of social, economic and political forces led to a reformulation of the 
traditional notion of ownership, which no longer regards ownership as autonomous 
and individualistic, but recognises that ownership carries with it social obligations and 
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that the concept needs to be broken down and rendered more amenable to comply 
with the requirements of the day.”
215
  
 
Therefore, it is clear that the social obligations discussed above are indispensable in 
the maintenance of the basic framework of sectional ownership.  Due to the fact that 
a section forms part of a destructible building, the social obligation to maintain the 
section in a good condition216 prevents destruction or damage to the walls, floors and 
ceilings that form the physical boundaries of all the sections in the building.  
Furthermore, to avoid destruction to the building sectional owners are obliged to 
carry out all work that may be ordered by a competent public or local authority in 
respect of the section;217 not to make alterations which are likely to impair the 
stability of the building;218 and not to store any inflammatory material or do, or allow 
to be done, any other dangerous act in the building or on the common property.219  
 
That the sections of a sectional title building are structurally interdependent and that 
the very existence of sections are dependent on the continued preservation of all the 
sections in the scheme, is reinforced by the following two social obligations: the 
reciprocal servitudes of subjacent and lateral support;220 as well as the obligation to 
allow authorised persons to enter a section to investigate the physical condition of a 
section and to repair items that might impair the physical integrity of other sections or 
the sectional title building as a whole.221  The latter obligation is concretised by the 
duty to keep a section free of insects and pests and to allow authorised persons to 
enter the section from time to time to inspect the section and to take any action 
reasonably necessary to eradicate such pests and to repair damaged woodwork 
within the section.222 
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We have also seen that the aim of several of the social obligations mentioned above 
is to maintain the social harmony in the intensified community of sectional owners.  
This applies not only to the obligations with regard to a section, but also with regard 
to exclusive use areas and the common property.  Thus the obligation imposed on 
sectional owners in terms of the common law principles of nuisance, which has 
stricter application in the sphere of sectional ownership and is reified by the 
obligation against nuisance223 in the Act, plays an important role.  Moreover, the 
obligations imposed on sectional owners in terms of the management rules and 
especially the conduct rules, as well as special rules adopted for particular schemes, 
performs an important function in regulating the affairs of the intensified community 
of owners.   
 
Lastly, the legislature intended to establish a more or less permanent community of 
sectional owners which is fortified by all the obligations which work towards 
preserving the physical integrity of the building as well as the obligations aimed at 
maintaining a harmonious community.  This reinforces the main purpose of sectional 
titles schemes, namely to provide affordable housing to as large a segment of the 
population as possible to promote social, economic and ultimately political stability.  
One of the main objectives for the introduction of apartment ownership in post-war 
Europe, which suffered from a severe housing shortage, was to satisfy the 
psychological and social need most persons have to own their own home.  By 
placing sectional ownership and house ownership on the same level, the dream of 
home ownership is placed within reach of an ever growing number of citizens.224 
 
The various social obligations imposed on sectional owners with regard to their 
sections, exclusive use areas and the common property are thus essential to 
preserve the tranquility and harmony of a sectional title scheme in view of the 
peculiar physical features of the building and the unique community of owners 
gathered almost permanently within the confines of the scheme.  Consequently, the 
surrender of freedoms inherent in the social obligations imposed on sectional owners 
is the price to be paid for a contented and harmonious sectional title community. 
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Chapter 7:  Enforcement of Social Obligations 
 
7 1 Introduction 
 
As the saying goes „rules are there to be broken.‟  However, as was seen in the 
previous chapter, non-compliance with social obligations is capable of destroying the 
physical features and the external harmonious appearance of the building or 
buildings, as well as the social harmony in a sectional title community.1  Violations of 
social obligations should, therefore, be addressed swiftly and uniformly to prevent 
defenses against the body corporate based on waiver and selective enforcement of 
obligations.  Furthermore, an offending sectional owner should, as soon as possible, 
be warned appropriately and if required warned repeatedly.2      
 
The efficient enforcement of social obligations would preserve stability, foster 
harmony and protect the rights of those sectional owners who paid a premium to 
enter a particular sectional title scheme.  Ultimately it would benefit the sectional title 
community as a whole.3  Accordingly, effective sanctions to force owners to comply 
with their social obligations are a sine qua non for a viable and harmonious sectional 
title scheme.4  
  
Sectional title living, however, can trigger aggression and rage in South Africa today.  
We have seen, at 1 2, that the media reports on matters such as vehicles that have 
been scratched or even set alight; a young man killed as a result of a quarrel with a 
neighbour; pets that have been poisoned; and gunshots fired.  In addition, assaults 
are on the increase and elderly people especially are maltreated and emotionally 
and physically abused.  More subtle forms of harassment are also escalating.  There 
are accounts of neighbours stomping noisily on staircases and moving furniture 
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around at all hours of the day and night.  Apparently, some sectional owners invite a 
large number of their unruly friends to private parties which continue late into the 
night.5  Such offenders should be brought to book swiftly.  But the question is 
whether the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 (the Act) and the model management 
and conduct rules have sufficient mechanisms to deal with these outrageous 
situations.6  
 
In what follows the remedies provided for in the Annexure 8 and 9 model rules will be 
examined first.  We shall see that these rules provide for specific solutions to deal 
with particular kinds of non-compliance. 
 
Thereafter, the remedies available in South Africa that fall outside the confines of the 
Act will be explored.  In this regard it will be examined in how far sectional owners or 
the trustees acting on behalf of the body corporate can make use of court interdicts 
to prevent disturbances that breach social obligations.  The focus will then shift to the 
crucial question of whether it is possible to obtain an eviction order against a 
sectional owner who persistently contravenes the social obligations of a particular 
scheme.  This section will then conclude with a brief examination of the rarely used 
order to keep the peace, served on an offending owner by a Magistrate in terms of 
the Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955. 
 
The next section will examine the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
available in South Africa to resolve disputes resulting from non-compliance with 
social obligations.  These measures include negotiation; conciliation; arbitration; and 
mediation.  Thereafter we shall briefly review the exciting implications of the 
sectional title ombud dispute resolution service, which is governed by the Community 
Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011 (the CSOSA).  The advantages and 
disadvantages of each of these measures will be thoroughly investigated to 
determine their suitability to resolve non-compliance related issues.  
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From the above discussions it will become evident that the sanctions contained in 
the model rules and remedies outside the confines of the Act provide the body 
corporate with even less effective sanctions than those discussed in relation to the 
enforcement of financial obligations.7  The second part of the chapter will therefore 
examine enforcement measures employed in foreign jurisdictions, with the aim of 
identifying more effective sanctions that may be introduced in South Africa to render 
compliance with social obligations.  The less severe sanctions encountered in 
legislation and in model or amended by-laws will be dealt with first, while the 
concluding part of the chapter will focus on two drastic remedies found in the 
German, Swiss, Austrian and Spanish apartment ownership statutes, namely the 
permanent or temporary exclusion of recalcitrant owners from the sectional title 
community.  
 
7 2 Measures of enforcement in terms of the model management and conduct 
rules  
 
Several sanctions are encountered in the model rules to deal with badly behaving 
owners: 
 
Firstly, an owner who is persistently in breach of any of the Annexure 9 conduct 
rules, notwithstanding written warning by the trustees or the managing agent, is not 
entitled to vote for ordinary resolutions at a general meeting.8  Note that this rule only 
refers to the breach of conduct rules and not to the breach of social obligations 
imposed by virtue of management rule 68 of Annexure 8.9  The deterrent effect of 
this rule is, however, undermined as the mortgagee of the offending unit owner is 
entitled to vote as the sectional owner‟s proxy at any general meeting.  As argued at 
4 2 4 above, the deterrent effect of the suspension of the voting power of the 
offender is further limited by the circumstance that chronic offenders of conduct rules 
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are also not necessarily eager to attend general meetings and would therefore not 
be concerned if their votes were suspended.10 
 
Secondly, Annexure 8 model management rule 7 was recently amended by the 
addition of a second proviso stipulating that no person who is in breach of 
management rule 64(a) and (b)11 may be nominated or elected as trustee.12 
Management rule 64(b) deals with owners who, notwithstanding written warning by 
the trustees or managing agent, persist in breaching conduct rules.  A persistent 
contravener of conduct rules would thus forgo the possibility of being nominated or 
elected as trustee.  It is uncertain whether this exclusion would encourage social 
obedience.       
 
Thirdly, an owner who fails to repair or maintain his section or exclusive use area in 
a good condition can be given written notice to repair or maintain it by the trustees or 
the managing agent on their behalf.  If the sectional owner thereafter persists in such 
failure for a period of thirty days the body corporate is entitled to undertake the 
necessary maintenance or repairs and to recover the reasonable cost of such 
intervention from the owner.13   
 
Fourthly, as in the case of the enforcement of financial obligations, the owner is 
liable for and must pay all legal costs, including costs as between attorney and client, 
incurred by the body corporate in enforcing compliance with the model rules or the 
Act.14  The threat to pay all legal costs, including costs between attorney and client, 
might in practice force sectional owners to comply with their social obligations.   
 
Finally, in terms of the Annexure 9 model conduct rules, the trustees may cause any 
vehicle parked or abandoned on the common property without their written consent, 
to be removed, or towed away at the risk and expense of the owner.15  To implement 
this sanction, the trustees may consider employing the services of a reputable towing 
                                                          
10
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-33. 
11
 Not rule 64(1) and (2) as erroneously referred to in the Amendment Regulations. 
12
 GN R 196 in GG 36241 of 14-03-2013. 
13
 Annexure 8 r 70 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
14
 Annexure 8 r 31(5). 
15
 Annexure 9 r 3(2). 
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company that has a secure storage facility.  This course of action might, however, 
cause problems due to the fact that the trustees would most likely have to pay the 
towing company upfront and then attempt to recover this expense from the owner 
concerned.  Furthermore, there is the possibility that the vehicle may not be claimed.  
It would be good practice for trustees to inform the offender of their intention to 
remove the vehicle16 and if he does not respond, send him a letter demanding that 
the vehicle be removed.  If this is not successful, the trustees can arrange for the 
vehicle to be towed away.17  From the context of this rule, it is clear that it also 
applies to the vehicles of other residents in the scheme, as well as to the vehicles of 
guests since a sectional owner is obliged to ensure his guests‟ compliance with the 
rules.18     
 
7 3 South African measures of enforcement outside the confines of the Act 
 
7 3 1 General 
 
The measures discussed above deal with special offences for which appropriate 
sanctions are provided.  If an offender‟s misconduct is not covered by any of the 
special model rules, the aggrieved sectional owner or body corporate would have to 
resort to mechanisms outside the confines of the Act.  The most important remedies 
in this sphere are the mandatory and prohibitory interdicts which can be claimed in 
terms of the common law tort of nuisance.19  These particular remedies have been 
extensively examined under a sectional owner‟s social obligation not to cause a 
nuisance, at 6 4 above.  Consequently, the focus in this section will be on interdicts 
that can be requested outside the tort of nuisance.  Thereafter, we shall tackle the 
important question as to whether an owner or the trustees on behalf of the body 
corporate can obtain a court order to evict a sectional owner who makes life 
unbearable for his fellow owners.  In conclusion, reference will be made to a remedy 
available to the body corporate in terms of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure 
Act. 
                                                          
16
 J Paddock “Q & A with Jennifer Paddock” (December 2009) 4-12 Paddocks Press Newsletter 6 6. 
17
 6. 
18
 Annexure 8 r 69 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
19
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-34; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s 
The Law of Property 5ed (2006) 489.   
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It must be noted that in all these instances court proceedings may be initiated by a 
sectional owner, the trustees or managing agent on behalf of the body corporate.  If 
the body corporate fails to institute legal proceedings against a sectional owner who 
breaks the rules, an owner may approach the court for the appointment of a curator 
ad litem to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the body corporate. 20 
 
7 3 2 Interdicts not strictly confined to the tort of nuisance 
 
Where urgent relief is required, social obligations can be enforced by means of an 
application to court for an interdict.21  An interdict is a court order which can be used 
by a plaintiff to prevent harmful conduct or the continuation of harmful conduct.  
Interdicts are either of a mandatory or prohibitory nature.  A mandatory interdict 
requires a positive action on the part of the wrongdoer, whereas a prohibitory 
interdict requires the wrongdoer to desist from wrongful conduct or from continuing 
wrongful conduct.22  Interdicts can furthermore be classified as either temporary or 
permanent.  A temporary interdict prohibits the threatened conduct pending the 
outcome of another hearing.23  In an application for a temporary interdict, the 
applicant only has to establish a prima facie right and the court may grant the 
interdict on a balance of convenience.24  In order to obtain a final interdict the 
applicant will have to establish a clear right, an actual or threatened infringement of 
such right and the absence of another suitable remedy.25    
 
                                                          
20
 Ss 41-43 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986.  S 9 of the Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 
2011 streamlined the provisions of ss 41-43 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 dealing with proceedings on 
behalf of the body corporate. The powers of curator ad litem and the security for costs by applicants for 
appointment of a curator ad litem are contracted into one section.  This makes the proceedings more 
understandable and easier to read.   
21
 Annexure 8 r 71(1) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
22
 M Loubser , R Midgley, A Mukheibir, L Niesing & D Perumal The Law of Delict in South Africa 2ed (2012) 
432-433. 
23
 For example, if a newspaper wishes to print a story exposing a well-known rugby player, the rugby player 
may go to court to obtain a temporary interdict.  If the application is successful, the publication will be 
interdicted until the date of the hearing, on which day a court will either set aside the interdict, and the 
newspaper can print the story, or make a final order, in which case the interdict stands and the newspaper will 
not be allowed to print or continue with the story.  See Loubser et al The Law of Delict 433.  
24
 Badenhorst et al The Law of Property 309. 
25
 Badenhorst et al The Law of Property 309-310; see also Loubser et al The Law of Delict 433.  
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These interdicts could be used in neighbour disputes or persistent infringements of 
rules which cause or threaten damage.26  The aggrieved sectional owner or the body 
corporate on behalf of one or more of the aggrieved sectional owners can apply to 
court for an interdict.27  Prohibitory and mandatory interdicts may be granted by a 
Magistrate‟s Court or the High Court.  If a person willfully disobeys, or refuses or fails 
to comply with an order of court, they can by way of criminal prosecution be 
sentenced to payment of a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 6 
months.28 
 
The jurisdiction of the Magistrate‟s Court is limited in terms of section 29 of the 
Magistrates‟ Court Act 32 of 194429 which places monetary limits on the jurisdiction 
of Magistrates‟ Courts.  The difficulty of placing a monetary value on a claim for an 
interdict inhibits interdict proceedings in a Magistrate‟s Court.30  Moreover, in 
Badenhorst v Theophanous31 it was found that Magistrates‟ Courts do not have 
jurisdiction to grant a mandatory interdict which amounts to an order for specific 
performance of a sectional owner‟s contractual obligations under a sectional title 
scheme. 
 
From the above, it becomes evident that in most cases the High Court will be the 
realistic forum for dealing with an interdict.  However, such proceedings will not be 
ideal due to high legal costs and the protracted nature of the judicial process.  
Furthermore, the severity of an interdict would work against harmonious relations in 
a sectional title community.  In the final analysis a series of interdicts obtained 
against neighbouring sectional owners32 are an inadequate and inappropriate 
remedy in the sectional title context. 
 
                                                          
26
 GJ Pienaar Sectional Titles and other Fragmented Property Schemes (2010) 210. 
27
 S 36(4) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 read with s 36(6)(d) provides the body corporate with the 
capacity to act on behalf of an aggrieved owner; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 ss 2(5) 
and 2(7)(d)). 
28
 In terms of s 106 of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act 32 of 1944. 
29
 S 30(1) of the Magistrates‟ Courts Act 32 of 1944. 
30
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-35.  
31
 1988 1 SA 793 (C). 
32
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-36. 
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Body Corporate-Montpark Drakens and Others v Smuts33 illustrates a court case 
where the managing agent applied for various interdicts against a sectional owner 
who waged a vendetta against the management organs of a sectional title scheme.  
This vendetta started as a rebuttal to the resignation of the owner as chairman of the 
sectional title scheme after being in office for one week.34  Marcus AJ divided the 
various interdicts sought into „screening‟, „defamation‟ and „improper interference‟ 
interdicts.35   
 
The „screening interdicts‟ sought to restrain the sectional owner from acting in a 
variety of ways without the prior leave of the court.  These interdicts requested 
restraint in terms of the following: the lodgement of complaints against service 
providers, the trustees or the body corporate; threats to institute legal proceedings 
against the trustees or service providers; and the publication of information in local 
newspapers on how the body corporate conducts its affairs.  The applicants 
conceded that the offending owner might, in some cases, have good cause for such 
actions.  However, it was contended that to dispense with the requirement of prior 
leave would allow the offender to persist in vexatious or frivolous complaints with the 
mala fide purpose of disrupting the affairs of the body corporate.  On the other hand, 
an absolute prohibition of these actions would be too extreme as it would prevent 
legitimate complaints or grievances.36  The court found that this kind of relief was 
unprecedented except in circumstances where a person was declared a vexatious 
litigant under the Vexatious Proceedings Act 3 of 1956.37  After reviewing the 
constitutionality of this act,38 the court concluded that the present matter was not 
concerned with allegedly vexatious proceedings in courts of law and that the relief 
sought was not competent.39  With regard to the 35 threats of legal action by the 
offender, the court indicated that an alternative remedy was available, namely an 
edict of perpetual silence designed to put the offender on terms to proceed with the 
action or else be subjected to an edict of perpetual silence.40 
                                                          
33
 2007 JOL 19484 (W). 
34
 Para 4. 
35
 Para 8. 
36
 Para 9. 
37
 Para 10. 
38
 Para 11. 
39
 Para 13. 
40
 Para 14. 
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The „defamation interdicts‟ sought to restrain the offender from threats of negative 
publicity in the press, the distribution of defamatory circulars, attacks on the auditor 
and any defamatory correspondence.41  However, Marcus AJ found that the prayers 
were couched in such wide terms that they would impermissibly stifle the offender‟s 
right to freedom of expression.42  Furthermore, it was found that alternative remedies 
were available and that an action for defamation in terms of which compensation 
could be claimed for insult suffered would probably achieve the desired result and 
have the salutary effect of curtailing the offender‟s excesses.43   
 
Lastly, the „improper interference interdicts‟ sought to interdict the offender from 
disrupting or unlawfully interfering with the proper and efficient administration of the 
affairs of the body corporate as well as with the proper and efficient conduct of 
business at any annual or special general meeting.  This included, among other 
conditions, that he refrain from demanding information that he already possessed, 
demanding inclusion in the agenda of matters already dealt with and demanding 
urgent meetings.44  Having regarded all the evidence the court concluded that the 
offender‟s conduct had a deleterious effect on the administration of the scheme.  
Therefore, the court interdicted the offender from disrupting or unlawfully interfering 
in any manner with the proper and efficient administration of the affairs of the body 
corporate and the proper and efficient conduct of business at any annual or special 
general meeting of the body corporate, as well as at any meeting of the trustees.45  
 
7 3 3 Eviction instead of a prohibitory interdict?  
 
The crucial question as to whether it is possible to obtain an eviction order based on 
the tort of nuisance against a sectional owner who persistently contravenes the 
social obligations imposed on him, came up for decision in Body Corporate, 
Shaftesbury Sectional Title Scheme v Rippert’s Estate and Others.46  The body 
corporate (applicant) sought a final interdict against the respondents and in the event 
                                                          
41
 Para 15. 
42
 Para 18. 
43
 Paras 20-21.  Tsichlas and Another v Touch Line Media (Pty) Ltd 2004 2 SA 112 (W) was cited as support for 
this state of affairs. 
44
 Body Corporate-Montpark Drakens and Others v Smuts 2007 JOL 19484 (W) para 22. 
45
 Paras 26-27. 
46
 2003 5 SA 1 (C). 
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of non-compliance an order for temporary eviction until compliance with the interdict.  
In the alternative the body corporate sought a prohibitory interdict and in the event of 
non-compliance, leave to apply for an order holding second to fifth respondents in 
contempt of court and authorising warrants for their arrests.47  The respondents were 
occupiers of units holding through owners.  The alleged contraventions included drug 
dealing and prostitution.48  The occupants of one flat admitted that they were 
employed as escorts, but denied that they had contravened the conduct rules of the 
particular scheme.49  They also submitted that they were not bound by the conduct 
rules since they had not entered into any contract which submitted them to the 
conduct rules.50 
 
The court found that the respondents were bound by the conduct rules under the Act 
and that no contractual nexus was necessary.  The court, referring to the provisions 
of the Spanish Law on Horizontal Property,51 acknowledged the urgent necessity of 
ensuring compliance with scheme rules.  It generally approved the idea that owners 
or occupiers should be deprived of their right of residence in the scheme when they 
persistently and intentionally disregarded conduct rules or failed to pay their levies.52  
The court found, however, that neither the Act nor a special rule adopted by the 
general meeting authorised an eviction order under the circumstances at hand.53  All 
that was left for the court was to grant a prohibitory interdict to compel the 
respondents to abide by the conduct rules, failing which the applicant could apply for 
an order holding the respondents in contempt of court and warranting their arrest.54 
 
Under normal circumstances an eviction order can only be obtained by the owner of 
the premises against a person who occupies his premises unlawfully.  Before a body 
corporate has the power to evict an unruly owner or occupant, the Act or the 
Annexure 8 or 9 rules must grant the body corporate such a power.  It is, however, 
                                                          
47
 3G-H. 
48
 4D. 
49
 4E-F. 
50
 5 F-G. 
51
 The court referred to the Spanish Law on Horizontal Property which allows a court under certain narrowly 
defined circumstances to deprive a troublemaker of his right to reside in a unit for a period of up to three years 
depending on the seriousness of the contravention; Body Corporate, Shaftesbury Sectional Title Scheme v 
Rippert’s Estate and Others 2005 3 SA 1 (C) 7C-F. 
52
 Body Corporate, Shaftesbury Sectional Title Scheme v Rippert’s Estate and Others 2005 3 SA 1 (C) 7 F-G. 
53
 7G-H. 
54
 7I-8B. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
216 
 
highly improbable that a conduct rule authorising the body corporate to eject an 
unruly owner from the scheme would pass constitutional muster.  In the South 
African sectional title context such an extreme measure by the body corporate in the 
case of residential units would be contrary to the constitutional requirements of 
section 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the 
Constitution).  This section stipulates that persons may not be evicted from their 
homes without a court order made after careful consideration of all the relevant 
circumstances, and that no legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.55  However, 
whereas the power to evict an unruly owner might prove unconstitutional, the power 
to evict an unruly tenant or occupier should not.56  It is submitted that legislation 
containing an eviction provision for persistent offenders, as well as a management or 
conduct rule containing such a provision, would infringe upon the ownership rights of 
a sectional owner in terms of section 26(3) of the Constitution.  Therefore, a body 
corporate‟s only options would be to apply for an interdict or adopt a suitable 
management or conduct rule to recover fines from the offender.57 
 
7 3 4 Remedy in terms of the Criminal Procedure Act 
 
In the case of bodily threats or flagrant instances of nuisance58 the body corporate or 
a sectional owner can make use of section 384 of the old Criminal Procedure Act of 
1955, which was not repealed by the new Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.  In 
terms of this section a complaint under oath can be made to the Magistrate of the 
district where the scheme is situated.  The basis for such a complaint would include 
that a sectional owner has assaulted another or is conducting himself violently 
towards, or is threatening injury to the person or property of another, or has used 
language or behaved in a manner likely to provoke a breach of the peace.  It does 
not matter whether such threat, language or conduct occurred in a public or private 
place such as a sectional title scheme.59  On receipt of the complaint the Magistrate 
may order the offender to appear before him and, if necessary, may cause him to be 
                                                          
55
 See also Pienaar Sectional Titles 211 
56
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-39. 
57
 9-38 – 9-39.  
58
 For example, where an owner is drunk and wanders on the common property shouting abuse at any person he 
encounters; see Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-34. 
59
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-35. 
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arrested and brought before him.  Having investigated the complaint, the Magistrate 
may, in his discretion, order the offender to keep the peace towards the complainant 
and refrain from threatening his person or property for a period of six months.  To 
ensure obedience, the Magistrate may obtain a warranty with or without sureties in 
an amount not exceeding R2 000 from the offender.60  If the offender refuses or fails 
to give the guarantee, the Magistrate may commit him to jail for a period not 
exceeding six months unless such security is found.61  If the conditions of the 
guarantee are not observed, the Magistrate may declare the guarantee forfeited and 
this shall have the effect of a judgment in a civil action in the Magistrate‟s Court for 
the district.62  This remedy is rarely used in practice and has never been used to put 
a stop to violent assaults of a sectional owner causing public nuisance in a sectional 
title scheme.  
 
7 4 Alternative dispute resolution 
 
7 4 1 General 
 
Even though civil courts are open to hear disputes, they are often perceived to be 
inappropriate for the settlement of disputes in sectional titles schemes because of 
the high costs63 and the protracted procedures involved.64  Moreover, litigation 
occurs in public, the results are not confidential and the parties have limited control 
over the process or the outcome.65  Furthermore, the question of whether a particular 
conduct rule, such as the keeping of a pet in a section, should be allowed or 
disallowed may make a mockery of the judicial process.  Finally, litigation between 
sectional owners or between the body corporate and a sectional owner or owners 
                                                          
60
 S 384(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955. 
61
 S 384(3). 
62
 S 384(4). 
63
 See WD Ryan & GJ Pienaar “Geskilbeslegting by die toepassing van bestuursreëls van deeltitelskemas” 
(2007) 3 TSAR 437 442 for the high costs of litigation. 
64
 CG Van der Merwe “Sectional –Title Courts as an Alternative to Arbitration for the Settlement of Disputes in 
a Sectional-Title Scheme” (1999) 116 SALJ 624 624;  see also D Butler “The Arbitration of disputes in 
Sectional Title Schemes under Management Rule 71” (1998) 9 Stell LR 256 257. 
65
 G Paddock “Options for Resolving Sectional Titles Disputes” (January 2009) Paddocks 1 2. 
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may negatively affect the community spirit and social cohesion in a sectional title 
scheme.66   
 
Therefore, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as negotiation, 
conciliation, arbitration and mediation may be attractive alternatives for addressing 
non-compliance with social obligations.  It is, however, important to note that 
intervention by a competent court might be required in some instances.  Prescribed 
management rule 71(1) of Annexure 8 provides for such intervention in the form of 
interdicts or other forms of urgent relief obtained from a court of competent 
jurisdiction.  
 
The goals that can be achieved by alternative dispute resolution are numerous.  
They include saving time and money; rescuing the judicial system from being 
overloaded; having a more open, flexible and responsive process; achieving more 
appropriate results that serve the real needs of the participants or society; enhancing 
community involvement in the dispute resolution process; and broadening access to 
justice.67 
 
Various foreign law jurisdictions therefore resort to alternative dispute resolution to 
address non-compliance with social obligations.  For example, the Puerto Rican Law 
on Condominiums of 25 June 1958 requires that the general meeting appoint a 
special conciliation committee, consisting of three members, to solve disputes 
amongst unit owners, tenants and the association (body corporate) relating to the 
use of apartments and the common property.  Recourse to a court is only allowed 
once the dispute has been submitted to the conciliation committee.  If the committee 
is unable to solve a dispute the complainant can submit the dispute to the consumer 
affairs department where an administrative judge will attempt resolution subject to 
judicial review.68  
 
                                                          
66
 Pienaar Sectional Titles 221, See also J Nel “Afdwing van deeltitelskemareëls” (October 2003) 427 De Rebus 
29 31 where he warns that an interdict against a neighbour will shatter the harmony of the scheme. 
67
 H Batchelder “Mandatory ADR in Common Interest Developments: Oxymoronic or Just Moronic” (2000-
2001) 23 T. Jefferson. L. Rev. 227 228. 
68
 Arts 42(a)(1) and (cc) (codified in § 1293f) and 48 (codified in § 1294) of the Puerto Rican Law on 
Condominiums (Ley de condominios) of 25 June 1958 (Puerto Rico Laws Ann. Tit. 31 §§ 1291-1294d (2005)).  
See also Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 253. 
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The New South Wales Strata Titles Act 68 of 1973 also introduced a formal and 
comprehensive alternative dispute resolution system.69  Firstly, there is the strata 
titles commissioner who is empowered to make orders for the settlement of a dispute 
or the rectification of a complaint with respect to the exercise or performance of, or 
the failure to exercise or perform, any duty or function in terms of the act by any 
owner or official of the scheme.70  The powers of the commissioner include the 
investigation of the matter and enforcing any order, including an order for the 
payment of damages.71  Secondly, there is the strata titles board, which is 
constituted by a Magistrate and deals with matters referred to it by the 
commissioner.72  The strata titles board has additional jurisdiction over a number of 
specific matters which include the reasonableness of the original allocation of share 
values; the amendment or repeal of a by-law that does not serve the interests of the 
sectional owners; and disputes regarding the adoption of exclusive-use by-laws and 
inadequate or excessive levies.73  
 
In terms of South African law disputes arising out of non-compliance with social 
obligations can be settled by one of the following alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms: negotiation, conciliation, arbitration or mediation.  Each of these 
mechanisms will now be examined to determine whether they provide a workable 
solution for addressing non-compliance with social obligations.  This part will be 
concluded with a brief review of how disputes will be resolved by the newly 
introduced ombud service once the CSOSA comes into operation.  
 
7 4 2 Negotiation 
 
The most informal way to resolve a dispute is through direct negotiation between the 
parties involved.  This process can become more formal if each party is represented 
by attorneys.  Negotiation involves sitting down with the parties concerned and trying 
to come to an agreement that is acceptable to all.  The negotiator must objectively 
analyse the situation in order to overcome subjective positions.  In this way the 
                                                          
69
 See in general Pienaar Sectional Titles 226.  
70
 S 105 of the New South Wales Strata Titles Act 68 of 1973. 
71
 Ss 101 and 105(1A). 
72
 S 118. 
73
 Ss 119-127. 
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needs, desires and concerns are emphasized rather than the position parties 
assume to satisfy their own expectations.  Successful negotiation can only be 
achieved if all the parties involved co-operate in agreeing to a negotiated settlement.  
Furthermore, the settlement reached will not be binding unless the parties take steps 
to make it enforceable.74 
 
7 4 3 Conciliation 
 
Conciliation is a process whereby a conciliator, a neutral third party not involved in 
the dispute, assists the parties concerned to settle the dispute themselves.  The 
conciliator assists the parties in defining the dispute and achieving a settlement.  The 
focus is thus on consensus or agreement between the parties.  The conciliator does 
not impose a settlement on the parties but encourages the parties to agree to a 
settlement that is mutually acceptable.75   
 
The CSOSA makes provision for conciliation.  This act provides that on acceptance 
of an application, and receipt of submissions from affected persons and responses 
from the applicant, a regional ombud must refer the matter to conciliation if he 
considers that there is a reasonable prospect that the dispute in question can be 
resolved by a negotiated settlement.76  If the conciliation fails the ombud must refer 
the application, together with any submission and responses, to an adjudicator for 
mediation.77  
  
The shortcomings of conciliation are twofold.  Firstly, conciliation will only commence 
once the parties have agreed on a suitable conciliator.  This means that either one of 
the parties can easily delay the process.  Secondly, the settlement agreement if 
attained, lacks any binding effect and is not easily enforceable.  Therefore, this 
process will in all probability not be ideal for the settlement of disputes involving the 
enforcement of social obligations in the sectional title context.   
                                                          
74
 Paddock (January 2009) Paddocks 1, 3 and 4. 
75
 AC Basson, MA Christianson, C Garbers, PAK Le Roux, C Mischke and EML Strydom Essential Labour 
Law 4ed (2005) 336. 
76
 S 47 of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011. 
77
 S 48(1). 
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7 4 4 Arbitration 
 
Arbitration proceedings in terms of the Act is not always based on agreement 
between the parties,78 but is a form of statutory arbitration based on the provisions of 
regulation 39, Annexure 8 management rule 71 and section 40 of the Arbitration Act 
42 of 1965.  The arbitration procedure in terms of model management rule 71 is, 
therefore, compulsory in all matters if demanded by one of the parties, provided that 
court intervention is not required.79   
 
The words „may demand‟ in model management rule 71(2) could create the 
impression that arbitration is voluntary upon demand of one of the parties and that 
such dispute may also be resolved by litigation.80  However, in Body Corporate of 
Greenacres v Greenacres Unit 17 CC81 Cloete JA held that in determining the extent 
of matters that may be referred to arbitration, the wording of rule 71(1) should be 
interpreted widely to include almost every dispute that might arise between a body 
corporate and a sectional owner, or between the sectional owners themselves.  This 
interpretation is implied by the broad understanding of the operative part of the rule 
containing the word „any‟ and the phrases „arising out of‟, „in connection with‟ and 
„related to‟ the provisions of the Act and the management and conduct rules of the 
scheme.82  The Supreme Court of Appeal thus opened up the possibility that most 
disputes may be adjudicated by arbitration unless explicitly reserved in the Act or 
management and conduct rules for litigation.83  Van der Merwe, therefore, suggests 
that model management rule 71(2) should be amended by the developer or body 
corporate to read that the dispute „shall‟ be determined in terms of management rule 
71(1) if the complaint or dispute has not been resolved between the parties, and 
further steps in solving the dispute are required by one of them.84  
 
                                                          
78
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-46. 
79
 Body Corporate of Greenacres v Greenacres Unit 17 CC 2008 3 SA 167 (SCA) paras 9-10. 
80
 Pienaar Sectional Titles 222. 
81
 2008 3 SA 167 (SCA). 
82
 Para 5. 
83
 Pienaar Sectional Titles 222-223. 
84
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-54. 
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The procedure required for arbitration can be summarised as follows.85  As a first 
step, the aggrieved party must notify the affected party or parties in writing of the 
nature of the complaint or dispute, and serve copies of such notification on the 
trustees and managing agent.  In the event that an owner declares a dispute with the 
body corporate, notification will be sufficient if served on the trustees and managing 
agent, thereby dispensing the need to serve notice on each of the other owners.86  In 
the case of a dispute between the body corporate and more than one owner, or 
between a number of owners arising out of substantially the same cause of action, or 
where substantially the same order is sought against all the parties against whom 
the dispute is declared, such parties are automatically joined in the arbitration 
proceedings by receipt of the original notification of the dispute.87  
 
If the dispute or complaint is not resolved within fourteen days, either of the parties 
may demand that the matter is referred to arbitration.88  The second step is, 
therefore, to decide on an arbiter.  In this regard the nature and complexity of the 
dispute or complaint, and the costs that may be involved in the adjudication thereof, 
must be taken into consideration.  The arbiter sought to be appointed must be an 
independent and suitably experienced and qualified person.89  If the parties cannot 
agree to the appointment of an arbitrator within three days after arbitration has been 
demanded, in terms of management rule 71(3) the chief registrar of deeds or his 
nominee must upon written application and subject to the payment of a prescribed 
fee, appoint an arbitrator in writing.  This must be done within seven days to facilitate 
the arbitration being held and concluded without delay.90  
 
                                                          
85
 See in general Pienaar Sectional Titles 223-225. 
86
 Annexure 8 r 71(2) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
87
 Annexure 8 r 71(8) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986.  The Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 does not provide 
for the joinder of parties without their consent thereto, but the procedure to join affected parties to the arbitration 
is explicitly provided for by this sub-rule. 
88
 Annexure 8 r 71(2) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
89
 Annexure 8 r 71(3). 
90
 Annexure 8 r 71(4) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986.  This sub-rule does not mention what would 
happen if the appointment authority fails to make an appointment within the seven day period.  In terms of s 12 
of the Arbitration Act 42 of 1965, the court has the power to appoint an arbitrator, but it is not clear whether this 
power extends to situations where a third party vested with the power of appointment fails to act.  If the court 
needs to be approached valuable time would be lost and even if the court takes a robust view and makes the 
appointment, this should be a last resort.  Even if one argues that the power to make an appointment lapses on 
the expiry of the seven day period, and that any appointment made thereafter would be invalid, this could not 
have been the intention of the legislator in view of the stated object of management rule 71(4), namely, to enable 
the arbitration to be held and concluded without delay.  See Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-55.  
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The third step is to conduct the arbitration process without unnecessary formalities in 
accordance with the procedure determined by the arbitrator.  The provisions of the 
Arbitration Act are only applicable to the process insofar as they can be applied.91  
Security for the costs of arbitration may be required by the arbitrator and where 
possible, the arbitration must be concluded within twenty-one days after the matter 
has been referred to arbitration, or security for costs has been furnished.92    
 
The final step is for the the arbitrator to make an award within 7 days from 
completion of the arbitration process in accordance with the principles laid down in 
terms of the rules.93  This includes an appropriate cost order bearing in mind the 
outcome of the arbitration.94  The decision of the arbitrator is final and binding, and 
any party to the arbitration or any affected party may apply for the decision to be 
made an order of the High Court.95  
 
There are several advantages to statutory arbitration for the settlement of disputes in 
sectional titles affairs.  Compared with an ordinary court procedure, arbitration is a 
relatively swift and cost-effective way to settle disputes.96  It is also less formal than 
court proceedings and less destructive to the community spirit in sectional title 
schemes.97  Furthermore, the application of the Arbitration Act insofar as it is not 
contradictory to the provisions of the Act, ensures that it is procedurally fair.98  
Moreover, it is possible to appoint an appropriate professional with sufficient 
knowledge regarding the specific dispute.  Finally, entrusting the settlement of 
disputes to the trustees, the managing agent or even the general meeting may fail to 
                                                          
91
 Reg 39 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986.  See also Van der Merwe (1999) SALJ 624-625. 
92
 Annexure 8 r 71 (5) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
93
 Annexure 8 r 71(6) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986.  The arbitrator‟s jurisdiction would lapse if he fails 
to make an award within the seven day period, unless the parties extend the time for making the award by 
agreement or the time is extended by the court.  However, where the arbitration is complex, the parties should 
consider granting an extension of time if the arbitrator so requests.  See Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-57.  
94
 Annexure 8 r 71(6) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
95
 Annexure 8 r 71(7). 
96
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-45 and Pienaar Sectional Titles 225.  However, Maree argues that the 
period of times to appoint an arbitrator and for the conclusion of the arbitration are invariably too short and that 
further delays are caused by the practice to hire an attorney to represent parties.  See T Maree “Arbitration: Is it 
Worth the Effort?” (October 2007) 27 MCS Courier Newsletter 3 3-4.   
97
 Ryan & Pienaar (2007) TSAR 444. 
98
 Reg 39 of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986.  See also Van der Merwe (1999) SALJ 624-625  
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ensure impartiality and consistency in the application of rules.  In the case of 
arbitration, such impartiality is at least ensured.99 
 
Disadvantages100 of arbitration are, however, that the arbitration hearing is not held 
in public and the results of the proceedings are confidential.  Furthermore, unlike a 
judgment of a court, the reasoning behind an arbitrator‟s award, due to its 
confidential nature, does not constitute a binding precedent even if the award was 
made a judgment of the court.  Finally, arbitration is only available in disputes 
between the body corporate and sectional owners or between the sectional owners 
themselves.   
 
7 4 5 Mediation 
 
In mediation all the parties involved in a dispute meet and try to settle the matter with 
the help of an impartial mediator.101  The mediation of disputes is often handled by 
an ombudsman, established by legislation or agreement, which provides ombud 
services for a specific sector and to whom a dispute is referred for mediation.102  In 
other instances parties may refer a dispute to a mediator chosen by them according 
to a mutually agreed procedure.103  The public and the financial sector generally 
have a positive attitude towards these ombud services.  The increased number of 
disputes referred for mediation rather than making use of litigation in court or 
arbitration bears testimony to this.104  Above, at 7 4 3, we have seen that if 
conciliation fails in terms of section 48(1) of the CSOSA the ombud must refer the 
application together with any submission and responses to an adjudicator for 
mediation.  This implies that mediation should be seen as a measure of last resort to 
settle disputes regarding social obligations in terms of the CSOSA.    
 
                                                          
99
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-45 and Pienaar Sectional Titles 225. 
100
 See in general Butler (1998) Stell LR 257-258; Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-45 – 9-46 and Pienaar 
Sectional Titles 225. 
101
 Paddock (January 2009) Paddocks 5. 
102
 Pienaar Sectional Titles 226.  For examples of these ombuds services in the financial sector see Ryan & 
Pienaar (2007) TSAR 445-447.  
103
 Pienaar Sectional Titles 226 n 545. 
104
 Ryan & Pienaar (2007) TSAR 447 and Pienaar Sectional Titles 226. 
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Resolving disputes by mediation will be more cost effective than either litigation or 
arbitration and even though it normally takes some time to mediate the dispute 
properly, it will usually be less time-consuming than litigation.105  Furthermore, 
mediation occurs in private and is of a simple and informal nature.  Finally, the 
parties have some control over the process and outcome which entails that they can 
make settlements that might not have been possible in court.106   
 
7 4 6 Sectional title ombud dispute resolution service  
 
The new and exciting CSOSA introduced an ombud service to resolve disputes in 
sectional schemes.  Before examining the ombud‟s functions; structure; the 
particular prayers for relief with regard to the enforcement of social obligations; and 
the procedure provided to adjudicate disputes, a general background of the CSOSA 
needs to be sketched.   
   
After 2004, the Department of Land Affairs (now the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform) examined the possibility of alternative dispute 
resolution measures in the case of sectional title disputes.  They appointed the firm 
Paddocks as Lead Consultants on a tender basis to investigate the possibility of the 
establishment of a sectional title ombudsman and the separation of consumer issues 
from registration issues.107  The rationale for such an investigation was that access 
to courts to settle sectional title disputes is too expensive and time-consuming, and 
that the arbitration mechanism provided for in prescribed management rule 71, of 
Annexure 8, is ineffective in practice.108  The mandate of the consultants was 
threefold: to investigate, consult on and recommend an appropriate dispute 
resolution system; to draft and assist the Department in the passing of appropriate 
dispute resolution legislation and regulations; and to draft legislation to remove 
                                                          
105
 T Maree “How to Achieve the Impossible” (October 2001) 405 De Rebus 13 13-14; J Maluleke “Department 
considers Sectional Titles Ombudsman” (March 2005) 440 De Rebus 43 43; and Ryan & Pienaar (2007) TSAR 
447. 
106
 Paddock (January 2009) Paddocks 2. 
107
 Pienaar Sectional Titles 227.   
108
 Maree (October 2001) De Rebus 13-14; Maluleke (March 2005) De Rebus 43; and Ryan & Pienaar (2007) 
TSAR 447. 
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management issues from the Act.109  The investigation has, however, been 
transferred from the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform to the 
Department of Housing (now the Department of Human Settlements) which caused 
considerable delays in the implementation of the process.110  This eventually led to 
the promulgation in 2011 of both the Sectional Titles Scheme Management Act 8 of 
2011 (the STSMA), which separated registration and management matters by 
repealing the management provision of the Act and re-enacting these provisions in 
the STSMA, and the CSOSA which introduced a new dispute resolution mechanism 
to replace arbitration in terms of the Act.  The latter act makes provision for the 
establishment of an ombud service as an independent juristic person that will be 
known as the Community Schemes Ombud Service.111 
 
The functions of the Community Schemes Ombud Service include the facilitation of 
dispute resolution in a wide range of sectional title and other community scheme 
projects;112 the training of adjudicators and other employees;113 the monitoring and 
quality control of all scheme governance documentation;114 the custody of the 
scheme governance documentation in order to preserve and provide public access 
to such documents;115 the provision of educational material, information and 
documentation pertaining to community schemes;116 and the monitoring of 
community scheme governance.117   
 
                                                          
109
 G Paddock, CG Van der Merwe & J Maluleke Sectional Title Ombudsman investigation: Consultation paper 
to inform the design of a sectional titles dispute resolution system (2005) 6.7 unpublished report to Department 
of Housing. 
110
 Pienaar Sectional Titles 227. 
111
 S 3(1) of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011. 
112
 S 4(1)(a) of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011.  Community scheme is defined in s 1 as 
any scheme or arrangement in terms of which there is shared use of and responsibility for parts of land and 
buildings, including but not limited to a sectional titles development scheme, a share block company, a home or 
property owner‟s association, however constituted, established to administer a property development, a housing 
scheme for retired persons, and a housing co-operative as contemplated in the South African Co-operative Act 
14 of 2005 and “scheme” has the same meaning.  
113
 S 4(1)(b) of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011. 
114
 S 4(1)(c) of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011.  Scheme governance documentation is 
defined in s 1 as any rules, regulations, articles, constitution, terms, conditions or other provision that controls 
the administration or occupation of private and common areas in a community scheme.  
115
 S 4(1)(d) of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011. 
116
 S 4(2)(b). 
117
 S 4(2)(c). 
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The structure of the Community Schemes Ombud Service and its governing board is 
stated in chapter 2 of the CSOSA.118  The ombud service acts as a national public 
entity with its executive authority vested in the Minister of Human Settlements.119  
Regional offices for the ombud service are to be established, and all persons in the 
employ of the ombud services will become members of the Government Employees‟ 
Pension Fund.120  The service is to be financed by money appropriated by 
parliament; levies collected from community schemes; fees for services rendered; 
interest on investments; loans and donations; and subsidies and grants from organs 
of state.121 
 
The procedure to adjudicate disputes is provided for in chapters 3 to 5.  It is stated 
that any person,122 including an association,123 may apply to the ombud service if 
such a person or association is a party to or materially affected by a dispute.124  A 
dispute means any dispute in regard to the administration of a community scheme 
between persons who have a material interest in that scheme, of which one of the 
parties is the association, occupier or owner, acting individually or jointly.125  The 
CSOSA does, however, not explicitly state whether such an application suspends 
any court or arbitration procedure in terms of model management rule 71, of 
Annexure 8, thus forcing the other party to partake in the ombud procedure.  
Pienaar, therefore, submits that if management rule 71 is not amended it would not 
be compulsory for a party to take part in the ombud procedure.126   
 
                                                          
118
 Ss 2-37. 
119
 S 3(2). 
120
 S 21(5). 
121
 Ss 22(1)(a)-(g). 
122
 In terms of s 1 of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011 person is defined as including an 
association, partnership, trust, corporation, private or public entity and such person‟s representatives, successors 
and assignees. 
123
 Association is defined in s 1 of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011 as any structure that 
is responsible for the administration of a community scheme, which includes bodies corporate of sectional titles 
schemes. 
124
 S 38 of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011. 
125
 S 1 sv “dispute”.   
126
 Pienaar Sectional Titles 230. 
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The applicant is required to set out the relief sought and the name and addresses of 
affected parties.127  The particular prayers for relief with regard to the enforcement of 
social obligations are the following: 
 
In respect of behavioural issues the following orders can be applied for:  an order 
declaring that certain behaviour or the default of an owner or occupier constitutes a 
nuisance; an order declaring that an animal kept in a private area or in shared areas 
is causing a nuisance or hazard and is interfering with the use and enjoyment of a 
private area or shared areas necessitating measures to remedy the state of affairs or 
removal of the animal; an order declaring that an animal is kept in contravention of 
the scheme governance documentation; and an order requiring the removal of 
articles placed or attached illegally to parts of the common property.128  
 
In respect of works pertaining to private or communal areas, the following orders are 
pertinent: an order requiring an owner or occupier to carry out specified repairs, or 
have specified repairs made, or to pay the applicant for repairs carried out or to be 
carried out in respect of the property by the applicant;129 and an order obliging an 
owner or occupier to accept obligations in respect of a defined part of the common 
property.130 
 
We have seen above that access to courts to settle sectional title disputes is 
expensive and time-consuming, and that the arbitration mechanism provided for in 
prescribed management rule 71, of Annexure 8, is ineffective in practice.  In the 
future it would thus be wise for applicants to rather approach the Community 
Scheme Ombud Service‟s regional offices to settle disputes and enforce compliance 
with social obligations pertaining to behavioral and maintenance issues.  This 
approach will be less expensive and will also deliver swifter results.  
 
After examining the application and all other information required by the ombud 
office, including submissions by other affected persons, the ombud may reject the 
                                                          
127
 S 38(3) of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011. 
128
 Ss 39(2)(a)-(d). 
129
 S 39(6)(b). 
130
 S 39(6)(g).  
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application;131 try to facilitate a settlement of the dispute (conciliation as discussed at 
7 4 3 above);132 or refer the application to an adjudicator for mediation (as discussed 
at 7 4 5 above).133  If the application qualifies for waiver or discount of services fees, 
the ombud must refer the matter to an adjudicator appointed by the ombud.  Where 
the application does not qualify for a waiver of service fees, the parties may agree on 
an adjudicator from the ombud‟s list and if such agreement is not forthcoming, the 
ombud must choose an adjudicator to adjudicate the matter.134  
 
The adjudication procedure is relatively simple.  In the investigation of the 
application, the adjudicator must observe the principles of due process of law and 
act quickly and with little formality without being obliged to apply the exclusionary 
rules of evidence.135  The adjudicator also has specific investigative powers136 and 
legal representation is allowed.137  The order made by the adjudicator138 is 
enforceable in a Magistrate‟s Court or High Court depending on the nature and 
extent of the relief granted.139  It may unfortunately take some time to obtain an order 
of the Magistrate or High Court due to the considerably high workload of the clerks of 
the Magistrates‟ Courts and the registrars of the High Courts respectively.  Finally, 
an order as to the costs of the application may be made against the applicant, any 
affected party or apportioned between the parties concerned.140 
 
The complexity of sectional title disputes makes proceedings in ordinary courts an 
extremely lengthy and expensive process.141  The provisions of the CSOSA which 
allows for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in sectional title disputes in the 
form of conciliation142 or mediation143 must, therefore, be praised.  Both these 
processes will not only be simpler and less time consuming than litigation, but it will 
                                                          
131
 Ss 42(a)-(e). 
132
 S 47. 
133
 Ss 48(1)-(4). 
134
 S 48(3). 
135
 Ss 50(a)-(c). 
136
 S 51. 
137
 S 52. 
138
 Ss 53 and 54. 
139
 Ss 56(1) and (2) 
140
 Ss 53(2) and 54(1)(b). 
141
 Paddock (January 2009) Paddocks 1. 
142
 S 47 of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011. 
143
 S 48. 
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also prove to be less expensive than either litigation or arbitration.  The ombud 
service would therefore significantly improve the efficient and effective enforcement 
of social obligations, which has been long overdue in the sectional title industry.  The 
main drawback of mediation as a dispute resolution mechanism is that it is less 
binding on the parties than arbitration.144  Fortunately, this is not the case with orders 
issued under CSOSA due to the fact that such orders are, depending on the amount 
of money involved and the relief ordered, enforceable in a Magistrate‟s Court or High 
Court.145  
 
7 5 Foreign law suggestions for more efficient enforcement   
 
7 5 1 General 
 
In this section we shall first consider the less drastic measures for enforcing social 
obligations in sectional title or apartment ownership schemes in foreign jurisdictions. 
Thereafter we shall focus on the draconian sanctions of permanent or temporary 
exclusion from the community of sectional owners encountered in the German, 
Swiss, Austrian and Spanish apartment ownership statutes. 
 
7 5 2 Less drastic measures  
 
One of the less drastic measures to force owners to comply with their social 
obligations is the suspension of certain facilities.146  The British Columbia Strata 
Property Act of 1998, for example, provides that the strata corporation (body 
corporate) may, for a reasonable length of time, deny an owner, tenant, occupant or 
visitor the use of a common recreational facility if they have contravened a by-law or 
a house rule relating to the facility.147  The strata corporation must follow the rules of 
                                                          
144
 Pienaar Sectional Titles 388. 
145
 Ss 56(1) and (2) of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011. 
146
 See in general Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 256-
257. 
147
 S 134 of the British Columbia Strata Property Act of 1998 (SBC 1998 c.43).  See also Van der Merwe & 
Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 256. 
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due process.148  A similar sanction is found in the Colombian Law on How to 
Expedite the Horizontal Property Regime of 3 August 2001, which provides that the 
defaulter may, after notification, be deprived of the use of non-essential common 
facilities such as meeting rooms and sport facilities.149  Rules such as the above 
might encourage compliance with social obligations in a practical way.  For example, 
the deterrent effect of a rule threatening suspension of the use of the common 
swimming pool during summer might prove an effective means to ensure compliance 
with special rules pertaining to the use of the swimming pool.150 
 
A second less drastic measure is the so-called „name and shame‟ sanctions which 
aim to embarrass offenders into complying with the social obligations of the 
scheme.151  The Colombian Law on How to Expedite the Horizontal Property Regime 
provides that the offender must first be warned and given a time period within which 
to relent.  In the case of further non-compliance, the council (trustees) may publish in 
an accessible location a list of offenders together with the reason for their names 
appearing on the list.152  However, in chapter 4, at 4 4, we have seen that everyone 
has the right to privacy153 and dignity154 in terms of the Constitution and it is therefore 
difficult to see how the „name and shame‟ sanction would survive a constitutional 
challenge. 
 
A third and final less drastic measure is the imposition of monetary fines on sectional 
owners who contravene all or certain of their social obligations.155  The British 
Columbia Strata Property Act provides that if the owner, tenant, or any person 
visiting them or occupying the unit contravenes a by-law or rule, the strata 
                                                          
148
 S 135 of the British Columbia Strata Property Act of 1998 (SBC 1998 c.43).  See also Van der Merwe & 
Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 256. 
149
 Art 59(3) of the Colombian Law on How to Expedite the Horizontal Property Regime (Ley por medio de cual 
se expide el régimen de propriedad horizontal) of 3 August 2001.  See also Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles 
(2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 257. 
150
 Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 257; see also Fierro 
(1999) St. Johns’s L. Rev. 262-263. 
151
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-31. 
152
 Art 59 of the Colombian Law on How to Expedite the Horizontal Property Regime (Ley por medio de cual se 
expide el régimen de propriedad horizontal) of 3 August 2001.  See also Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles 
(2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 257. 
153
 S 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
154
 S 10. 
155
 See in general Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 257-
259.  
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corporation (body corporate) may fine the owner or tenant.156  The offender must first 
be warned or given a chance to comply with the by-law or rule.157  The by-laws or 
regulations may contain various limitations on fines for different contraventions, as 
well as detailing the frequency at which fines may be imposed for a continuing 
contravention.158  The maximum amount and the frequency for the imposition of fines 
must not exceed the parameters set out in the regulations.159  According to the 
British Columbia Strata Property Regulations the maximum fine is set at $200 for 
each contravention of a by-law, and $50 for the contravention of a rule.160  However, 
the maximum fine for the renting out of a residential strata unit in contravention of a 
by-law is $500.161  The regulations also state that the maximum frequency for a fine 
for the on-going infringement of a by-law or rule is every 7 days.162  The strata 
corporation may collect the fine from the tenant, the tenant‟s landlord if the unit is 
sublet, or the owner.  In the event that the landlord or owner pays the fine or a part 
thereof levied against the tenant, the tenant will be liable to repay that amount to the 
landlord or owner.163   
 
The strata corporation may only act if it has received a complaint about the 
contravention and has given the owner or tenant the particulars of the complaint, as 
well as reasonable opportunity to address the complaint.  Furthermore, written notice 
of the complaint must be given to the owner if the offender is a tenant and to the 
landlord if the offender is a subtenant. 164  The strata corporation must then, as soon 
as is reasonably possible, notify the offender in writing of its decision.  If the offender 
is a council member (trustee), he is not allowed to participate in the decision.165  
                                                          
156
 Ss 130(1) and (2) of the British Columbia Strata Property Act of 1998 (SBC 1998 c.43).  See also Van der 
Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 257. 
157
 Ss 130-132 of the British Columbia Strata Property Act of 1998 (SBC 1998 c.43).  See also Van der Merwe 
& Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 257. 
158
 S 132 of the British Columbia Strata Property Act of 1998 (SBC 1998 c.43).  See also Van der Merwe & 
Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 257. 
159
 S 132(3) of the British Columbia Strata Property Act of 1998 (SBC 1998 c.43).   
160
 Regs 7.1(1)(a) and (b) of the British Columbia Strata Property Act of 1998 (SBC 1998 c.43). 
161
 Reg 7.1(2). 
162
 Reg 7.1(3). 
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 S 131 of the British Columbia Strata Property Act of 1998 (SBC 1998 c.43).  See also Van der Merwe & 
Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 257-258. 
164
 S 135(1) of the British Columbia Strata Property Act of 1998 (SBC 1998 c.43).  See also Van der Merwe & 
Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 258. 
165
 S 136(1) of the British Columbia Strata Property Act of 1998 (SBC 1998 c.43).  S 136(2) provides that this 
does not apply if all the owners are on the council.  See also Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Liber 
Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 258. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
233 
 
When it comes to persistent contraventions, the strata corporation may impose 
further fines without resorting to the above-mentioned requirements.166  
 
The United States of America‟s Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act of 2008 
(the UCIOA) also imposes reasonable fines for violations of the declaration, by-laws, 
rules and regulations of the association (body corporate).  Appropriate notice as well 
as an opportunity to be heard must be given to the offender.167  Fines need not be 
established in advance for every violation and it need not be based on the expected 
damage caused by the violation.  These fines are not construed as personal 
obligations owed by unit owners, but rather as automatic liens against the unit that 
arise upon notice being given to the offender of the fine and the amount thereof.168  If 
the offender fails to pay the fine, the association can take advantage of the expedited 
foreclosure or holdover tenant procedures available in local jurisdictions to collect the 
fine.169  Alternatively, the association can decide to do nothing and simply use the 
lien to prevent the sale of the unit until the fine is paid.170  
 
It could be argued that the imposition of fines for non-compliance with social 
obligations may not always achieve the desired results.  Firstly, wealthy offenders 
might see the fine as an acceptable price to pay for their non-compliance, reducing 
the deterrent effect.  Secondly, less affluent offenders might pay the fine grudgingly 
and, therefore, minimalise the sanction‟s rehabilitative effect.  A culture of imposing 
fines in a sectional title scheme will most likely lead to suspicion and disharmony 
between the ordinary residents and the body corporate.171 
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 S 135(2) of the British Columbia Strata Property Act of 1998 (SBC 1998 c.43).  See also Van der Merwe & 
Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 258. 
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 S 3-102(a)(11) of the United States of America‟s Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act of 2008.  See 
also Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 258. 
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 S 3-116(a) of the United States of America‟s Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act of 2008.  See also 
Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 258. 
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 S 3-116(k) of the United States of America‟s Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act of 2008.  See also 
Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 258. 
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 See AB Elberg “Remedies for Common Interest Development Rule Violations” (December 2001) 101-8 
Columbia Law Review 1958 1975; see also Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Liber Amicorum 
Festschrift Tugrul Ansay 258.   
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7 5 3 More drastic measures  
 
7 5 3 1 Introduction 
 
We have seen, at 7 3 3 above, that the effect of Body Corporate, Shaftesbury 
Sectional Title Scheme v Rippert’s Estate and Others172 is that a body corporate 
would only have the power to evict an unruly sectional owner or occupant, if the Act 
or perhaps the Annexure 8 or 9 model rules grant the body corporate such power.  
Until then the only recourse for bodies corporate, besides inefficient sanctions, is to 
launch a court application for a mandatory or prohibitory interdict or to recover fines 
from the offender on condition that a suitable management or conduct rule 
authorises this.173  This case highlights the problem of having to enforce social 
obligations without effective sanctions.  It is indeed unfortunate that the only relief the 
court feels capable of granting is a criminal sanction for contempt of court, 
established in a roundabout way after a certain sequence of events.174 
 
Various foreign law statutes have, however, adopted more radical measures to 
enforce compliance with social obligations.  These measures include the permanent 
or temporary exclusion of a unit owner from the sectional title scheme.175  In the 
following analysis these more drastic measures will be examined to determine 
whether they may provide a workable solution for the enforcement of social 
obligations in the South African sectional title context.  
 
7 5 3 2 Permanent exclusion from sectional title scheme 
 
Permanent exclusion from the sectional title community of owners is without doubt 
the most drastic measure of enforcing an owner‟s social obligations.  Therefore, this 
measure needs to be critically examined to determine whether such a sanction is 
efficient and effective, as well as reasonable and justifiable in certain cases of grave 
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non-compliance.  In this regard, the relevant provisions of the German, Swiss and 
Austrian apartment ownership statutes will be subjected to critical analysis.   
 
In terms of the German Law on Apartment Ownership of 15 March 1951, a chronic 
troublemaker can be forced to leave the apartment ownership scheme after a 
majority resolution to this effect has been adopted at a general meeting.176  Such a 
meeting must be specially convened by the manager of the scheme, the chairman of 
the advisory board or by the manager at the request of a quarter of all the members 
of the scheme.  All the members present at the meeting are entitled to vote, except 
for the member against whom the resolution is aimed.  Voting then takes place 
according to „one member one vote‟, irrespective of the value of his or her vote.  If a 
scheme consists of more than one building all the owners are entitled to vote, 
irrespective of whether the troublemaker is resident in another building.  The 
resolution is then carried if half of the total number of owners entitled to vote in the 
scheme vote in favour thereof.177   
 
The general principle is that an owner can be excluded from the community if he has 
caused such a serious breach of the obligations owed to his fellow owners that they 
cannot be expected to continue living in the same community with him.178  A breach 
of duty is evidenced when the reputation of the particular community is negatively 
affected or where the internal harmony of the community or the fiduciary relationship 
amongst the apartment owners is interfered with.179  Case law has found the 
following breaches as having sufficient cause:180 permanent unjustifiable non-
compliance with administrative measures; grave defamation of other owners; serious 
neglect to maintain an apartment; breaking into the cellars of other owners; 
exploiting an apartment as a brothel; and sexual molestation of other occupants.   
Apart from the general principle, provision is also made for special cases that 
concern grave breaches of an owner‟s duties in terms of section 14 of the German 
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 § 18(3) of the German Law on Apartment Ownership (Wohnunseigentumsgesetz) of 15 March 1951. 
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 CG Van der Merwe “Sanctions in terms of the South African Sectional Titles Act and the German 
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85 90. 
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 Van der Merwe (1993) CILSA 91. 
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 C Mohr A Comparative Analysis of the Permanent Exclusion of a Troublemaker from the Apartment 
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Law on Apartment Ownership.  This section requires an owner to perform the 
following duties: to maintain and use the apartment and the common property with 
due consideration of the rights of other apartment owners; to see to it that members 
of his family, persons in his employ and persons to whom he has granted the right to 
use the apartment or the common property comply with the obligations; to allow use 
of an apartment and the common property within prescribed limits; and to allow 
admission to and use of apartments in so far as such admission and use are 
necessary for the maintenance and repair of the common property. 
 
If an apartment owner, despite repeated warnings, continues to commit serious 
breaches of these duties, he can be excluded from the apartment ownership 
community.  To warrant expulsion, a breach of at least one of the duties mentioned 
above is required, followed by a warning against non-compliance with that specific 
duty.  Thereafter, at least two similar offences must occur.  One offence will only 
form grounds for expulsion when the offence is so serious that the other apartment 
owners cannot reasonably be expected to continue living in the same community 
with the troublemaker.181 
 
If an owner does not challenge the resolution taken at a general meeting to exclude 
him, he is obliged to sell the apartment.  If this is done out of free will, the owner 
automatically ceases to be a member of the community; if not, legal proceedings 
must be instituted in order to give effect to the majority resolution.  The court must 
then consider whether the formal and material requirements for exclusion from the 
community have been complied with.  If this is found to be the case, the 
troublemaker is ordered to sell his apartment.  If the court order is not complied with, 
the apartment must be sold in execution at a public auction.182 
 
Like the German Law on Apartment Ownership the Swiss Civil Code of 1907 
expressly requires the agreement of the majority by a resolution of the general 
meeting, and that this resolution must be obtained prior to legal proceedings being 
instituted for the exclusion of the troublemaker.  The Swiss Civil Code specifically 
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states that a resolution by the majority of all the owners is required, and not only of 
the owners present or represented at the general meeting.183  The first draft of the 
Swiss Civil Code required a majority in value (calculated in accordance with 
participation quotas) and in number.  This provision was, however, substituted by the 
requirement of a majority in number only, which makes exclusion from the 
community easier.  In order to avoid a conflict of interest the troublemaker is not 
entitled to vote.184  Furthermore, if the community consists of only two co-owners, 
either of them can approach the court for an order to force the other owner to leave 
the community.185  In such a case a resolution is not required. 
 
The Swiss Civil Code also makes provision for a general ground of exclusion.  It 
states that a joint owner can be excluded from the community by a court order if his 
behaviour or the behaviour of another person, whom he allows to use the apartment 
or for whom he is responsible, results in a breach of his obligations to all the other 
members, or to particular members of the community, in such a serious manner that 
the continuation of his presence in the community is no longer reasonable.186  Unlike 
the German Law on Apartment Ownership, the Swiss Civil Code does not make 
provision for special cases in which an owner can be expelled from the scheme.  
However, the model Swiss by-laws (Reglement für Stockwerkeigentümer), although 
without legislative status, provide important indications of what is meant by the latter 
provision.  Paragraph 51 of the rules stipulate that an apartment owner can be 
excluded from the scheme in the following particular cases:187 if the apartment owner 
seriously breaches his duty to maintain his apartment, so that the reputation or the 
condition of the building is affected; if he persistently refuses inspection or 
maintenance of common installations or elements in his apartment; if the apartment 
owner carries out alterations to common parts of the apartment ownership scheme, 
which affect his fellow owners or the community and refuses to remove the 
alterations and to restore the building to its former condition or to pay compensation 
for the damaged caused; if the violent, harmful or malicious behaviour of an 
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 Art 649 para II of the Swiss Civil Code (Zivilgesetzbuch) of 1907. 
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apartment owner, or such behaviour of a person for whom he is responsible, makes 
harmonious co-existence in the community no longer possible; and if the apartment 
owner, despite repeated warnings, refuses to obey the manager‟s order to expel a 
chronic offender whom he has granted the use of his apartment. 
 
As is the case in Germany, an order of the court is necessary to enforce the majority 
resolution to exclude the troublemaker from the scheme.   If such an order is not 
complied with the apartment must be sold by public auction.188 
 
In terms of the Austrian Law on Apartment Ownership of 2002 an apartment owner 
can be excluded from the apartment ownership community by an action of the 
majority of the apartment owners.189  The statute does not describe the procedure by 
which the agreement of the majority of the other owners must be obtained.  It may be 
that a majority resolution of the general meeting is not required and that an informal 
agreement of the majority of the owners might be sufficient to approach the court for 
the troublemaker‟s exclusion.  Therefore, the court must determine whether the 
owners who institute the proceedings form the majority opinion of all the apartment 
owners.190   
 
However, if a directly prejudiced owner does not find the support of the majority for 
excluding the offender such an owner can institute an action to compel the 
troublemaker to stop his offensive conduct.  If the offender perseveres in his 
conduct, despite a court order, the prejudiced owner is allowed to institute an action 
for an order of exclusion of his own accord.191  This is a novel idea not catered for in 
the German Law on Apartment Ownership or the Swiss Civil Code.192 
 
Like the German Law on Apartment Ownership and Swiss Civil Code provision is 
also made for a general ground of exclusion.  An owner can generally be excluded, 
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when he does not fulfill his obligations to the community.193  „Obligations to the 
community‟ refers to all kinds of obligations, including the performance of certain 
duties as well as desisting from certain conduct.  These obligations are based on the 
close relationship between the owners of the apartment ownership community 
irrespective of whether they exist in relation to the community or to an individual 
owner.194  Similar to the German Law on Apartment Ownership, the Austrian Law on 
Apartment Ownership makes provision for two special cases in which an owner can 
be expelled from the scheme.  Firstly, an owner can be excluded if he uses the 
apartment or the common property in such a way that seriously prejudices the 
interests of the other owners.195  Breaches that have been considered sufficient in 
case law are the following: structural alteration and change of use of the apartment 
which affects the allocation of the utility area; the failure to repair water damage 
inside the apartment to such an extent that water seeps through and affects other 
apartments and/or the common property; cultivation of plants on the balcony, with 
the result that the roots or watering of the plants cause serious damage to the 
apartment below; the nuisance caused by allowing prostitution in an apartment which 
lowers the reputation of the building and endangers the ethical values of children; 
and the repeated removal of resolutions of the management body (trustees) from the 
notice board.196  Secondly, an owner may be expelled from the apartment ownership 
community if his inconsiderate, objectionable or otherwise grossly improper conduct 
unsettles the otherwise harmonious community or if he commits a serious offence 
against the property, the accepted moral standards of the community or the physical 
integrity of another owner or occupant of the apartment ownership scheme.197  It 
does not matter whether the offence has been committed by the owner himself, by 
his or her spouse, by other family members living in his household or by persons to 
whom he has granted the use of his apartment or whom he has allowed to use parts 
of the common property, provided he has failed to restrain these persons from 
committing the offence.198     
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In order to give effect to the decision of the majority a court order is once again 
required to consider whether the formal and material requirements for the exclusion 
from the community have been complied with.  If it is found to be the case, the 
troublemaker is ordered to sell his apartment.  The Austrian Law on Apartment 
Ownership gives the troublemaker at least three months to comply with the order to 
leave the community.199  This time limit allows the troublemaker a reasonable 
opportunity to alienate his apartment voluntarily, before the apartment must be sold 
in execution at a public auction.200  
 
From the above discussion of the provisions of the German, Swiss and Austrian 
statutes, it becomes evident that there are three main steps for the exclusion of a 
troublemaker for non-compliance with social obligations.  Firstly, an apartment 
owner‟s behaviour must cause his fellow apartment owner or owners to raise a 
complaint.  Secondly, an application must be made to the court and if the court finds 
that the material requirements are met, it must order the troublemaker to alienate his 
apartment.  Lastly, if the offender does not comply with the court order, the 
apartment must be sold by way of public auction.201   
 
It is debatable whether permanent exclusion from the apartment ownership scheme 
is an appropriate mechanism to enforce the social obligations of sectional owners.  
Before one can reach a conclusion on this issue the arguments for and against 
permanent exclusion must be considered. 
 
Various arguments can be advanced in favour of such a drastic remedy.  First, most 
apartment ownership statutes require less than a unanimous resolution for the sale 
or termination of condominium ownership.  This justifies forfeiture of ownership 
without the consent of all the owners of the scheme.  Again, when an owner acquires 
his apartment he is presumed to have committed to honouring the provisions of the 
apartment ownership act and by-laws.  Therefore, no owner should be allowed to 
conduct himself in a way that is wholly incompatible with the condominium lifestyle.  
If this is allowed, the very fabric of the community would be threatened.  Moreover, 
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the repeated exercise of other remedies, such as deprivation of voting rights, 
monetary fines, „name and shame‟ sanctions, and exclusion from facilities, may 
prove to be ultimately ineffective in extreme cases.  Such an outcome would leave 
the offender un-rehabilitated and damage the morale of the community.  
Furthermore, if the non-conforming member claims a right of dissent, the remaining 
members have a stronger right to claim that an owner who threatens the very 
essence of apartment ownership life should be excluded from the community.  In 
addition, there is generally no express statutory bar against the insertion of an 
exclusion clause in the scheme‟s by-laws or rules.  Finally, the public interest in 
stable, harmonious apartment ownership communities must be considered when 
weighing up the competing property rights of the offender and the remaining owners.  
The outcome would surely be that the property rights of the other owners would be 
regarded worthier of protection than those of the offender.202  
 
On the other hand there are economic and dogmatic arguments against excluding a 
serious offender permanently from the apartment ownership scheme.  Economically, 
the wrong signals may be sent out to prospective purchasers since they would in all 
probability harbor grave suspicion of purchasing an apartment with a title that is 
susceptible to forfeiture.  Moreover, institutional lenders may not regard a title with 
such an inherent potential risk as adequate security.  This might create a situation 
where such lenders are cautious to grant loans to prospective purchasers in 
apartment ownership schemes.  Furthermore, the dogmatic question arises of 
whether an apartment owner really acquires genuine ownership of an apartment 
when ownership is subject to forfeiture.203 
 
7 5 3 3 Temporary exclusion from use of a unit 
 
Some foreign statutes offer a less drastic solution than the permanent expulsion of 
the owner from the apartment ownership scheme.  These statutes settle for the 
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troublemaker‟s temporary rather than permanent exclusion from the occupation and 
use of his unit.204  
 
The best example is the Spanish Law on Horizontal Property of 21 July 1960.205  
This Law provides that the president of the condominium council (body corporate) or 
any of the owners or occupiers of the scheme may require a disorderly owner to stop 
certain outlawed activities and warn him that court proceedings will follow if he does 
not comply with the request.  Outlawed activities include all contraventions of by-
laws which result in damage to property, all harmful, dangerous or illegal activities 
and all activities that are dangerous to the health of occupiers or cause a nuisance.  
An owner, who takes part in any of these activities, must first be warned.  If the 
warning is ignored the general meeting can, by means of a majority resolution, 
institute an action in court with the object of depriving the owner and the other 
residents of the possession of the apartment.  Depending on the seriousness of the 
offence and the injury caused to the community, the judge may exclude the owner 
from the use of his unit for a maximum period of three years.  Such an order against 
the offending owner does not affect his remaining ownership entitlements.  
 
Where the offender remains recalcitrant this mechanism can be repeated as often as 
necessary.  If the offender is not the owner but an occupier, the general meeting can 
decide to institute court proceedings against him for either an eviction order or for the 
termination of the lease contract.  An action like this can, however, only be embarked 
upon once the owner has been given reasonable time to evict the occupier (offender) 
himself or to terminate the lease.  This time period must be fixed and clearly notified 
to the owner.206 
 
7 6 Evaluation 
 
The success of a sectional title scheme depends upon the co-operation and support 
of its members for ensuring compliance with their social obligations.  Minor or 
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unintentional breaches are susceptible to peer pressure, gentle reprimand and 
friendly admonition.  More serious offences and chronic offenders can, however, 
cause grave disharmony in a sectional title scheme.207  Consequently, it is clear that 
sectional title statutes must be given sufficiently sharp teeth to enforce social 
obligations imposed on sectional owners. This is not borne out by the current 
provisions of the Act and the model management and conduct rules annexed 
thereto. 
 
Suspension of the sectional owner‟s right to vote is not an effective deterrent since 
general meetings are usually held only once or twice a year and the persons at 
whom this sanction is directed would probably rarely attend.208  Furthermore, this 
sanction does not apply to unanimous or special resolutions and the sectional 
bondholder is entitled to vote as the offender‟s proxy at any general meeting.209  The 
suspension of voting rights may also be unconstitutional if not preceded by a due 
process hearing, especially where resolutions of the general meeting affect the 
property rights of the sectional owner in terms of section 25 and 26 of the 
Constitution.210  Again, the sanction in terms of model management rule 7, of 
Annexure 8, which prevents an offending owner from being nominated or elected as 
trustee, also lacks a deterrent effect since most sectional owners do not want to 
participate actively in the affairs of the body corporate and are therefore not 
interested in being nominated or elected as trustee.  We have also seen that it is 
difficult to implement model conduct rule 3(2), of Annexure 9, which grants authority 
to the trustees to remove any vehicle parked standing or abandoned on the common 
property without their written consent.211  In terms of the model rules the only 
measure of enforcement that might prove to be effective in practice is the sanction 
that the owner who breaches a conduct rule will be liable to pay all legal costs, 
including costs between attorney and client, expended on the enforcement of the 
rules.212    
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Besides the special sanctions provided for in the Annexure 8 and 9 model rules, 
there is the possibility of resorting to the common law remedy of interdicts.  Here a 
recalcitrant owner can be ordered to refrain from certain offensive conduct, or to 
perform some or other positive act in order to rectify an unlawful state of affairs 
which he brought about.  It was pointed out in Body Corporate, Shaftesbury 
Sectional Title Scheme v Rippert’s Estate and Others213 that where the troublemaker 
willfully disobeys, refuses or fails to comply with such a court order, an order for 
contempt of court may be obtained and the offender may be arrested and 
imprisoned.  However, in a sectional title scheme the interdependence and 
unavoidable requisite of harmonious co-existence between owners and occupants of 
units renders an interdict inadequate, and indeed inappropriate, in the sectional title 
context.  A successful application for an interdict could thus permanently damage the 
harmony of the sectional title scheme.  Moreover, the value of an interdict is limited 
as it must, in most instances, be sought in the High Court where the expense and 
protracted nature of the judicial process militates against its efficiency.214   
 
We have seen, at 7 5 2, that the imposition of monetary fines may be a more efficient 
way to enforce social obligations than a lengthy court process.  Care must, however, 
be taken to include a constitutionally acceptable rule in the model rules and the fine 
must be exacted in a constitutionally acceptable manner. 215  We have also seen, at 
7 5 2, that the imposition of fines may lead to suspicion and distrust, ultimately 
harming the necessary communal spirit.  Fines may only be effective if the offender 
is able to pay his monthly contributions regularly216 and would ultimately prove to be 
inefficient in persuading a chronic offender to mend his ways or leave the scheme.  
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The permanent or temporary exclusion of a recalcitrant sectional owner is without 
doubt the most efficient and effective ways to guarantee strict compliance with the 
social obligations in a sectional title scheme because of its deterrent and final effect.  
Both these radical measures do, however, infringe upon the ownership rights of a 
sectional owner.  For example, in the South African sectional title context such 
extreme measures by the body corporate in the case of residential units would be 
contrary to the constitutional requirements of section 26(3) of the Constitution, which 
provides that no one may be evicted from his or her home without an order of court 
made after considering all the relevant circumstances.   
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Chapter 8:  Conclusion 
 
In my Introduction I mentioned, at 1 1, that there are more than 780 000 sectional 
title units throughout South Africa today1 and that various economic and social 
factors will demand an increase in sectional title apartments over the years to come.2  
The importance of sectional ownership in providing residential accommodation and 
commercial units to thousands of South Africans can thus not be underestimated.  It 
is, therefore, imperative that prospective buyers and sectional owners understand 
certain basic concepts pertaining to sectional title schemes and, even more 
importantly, that they have a thorough knowledge of their rights and especially their 
obligations when becoming part of a sectional title community.3 
 
There are, however, many factors that need to be considered by a potential buyer 
before deciding to purchase a unit in a sectional scheme.  These factors may include 
the finances at his disposal, the value of the property, as well as other miscellaneous 
factors such as security, location, view, building standards and neighbourhood.4  
Many prospective purchasers focus on these factors but fail to realise the 
accompanying financial and social obligations relative to sectional title schemes.  
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that non-compliance with financial and social 
obligations is a common occurrence in the South African sectional title context.   
 
This thesis constantly highlights that non-compliance with sectional title obligations 
works against the incentive to strive for financial stability, as well as happiness and 
harmony in an intensified, diverse community where the individual units, the objects 
of ownership, are physically interdependent.5  For this reason the success of a 
sectional title scheme ultimately depends upon the necessary co-operation and 
support of its members in complying with the obligations imposed upon them.6 
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In the introductory chapter, at 1 3, it was argued that financial instability and conflict 
in sectional title schemes can be avoided by following a simple three step approach 
to give the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 (the Act) sharper teeth.  This three step 
approach involved the following.  Firstly, the importance of obligations in the 
sectional title context must not be taken lightly.  Secondly, the various financial and 
social obligations must be identified and understood, which enables the recognition 
of weaknesses and the ability to work towards their rectification.  Finally, the financial 
stability and social harmony envisaged by the imposition of these obligations can 
only be achieved if there are efficient and effective procedures in place for the 
enforcement of these obligations. 
 
Chapter 3 identified the financial obligations imposed on sectional owners.  We have 
seen that sectional owners are responsible for the payment of contributions to the 
administrative fund and the reserve fund in the form of ordinary levies,7 special 
levies,8 and additional levies.9  The timeous payment of these levies is critical for the 
proper management of the sectional title scheme and the adequate and regular 
maintenance of the common parts of the building and the common facilities.10  It is 
crucial that sectional owners should not withhold the payment of their contributions to 
off-set debts unless the matter has been adjudicated upon by an arbitrator or 
judge.11  It is also significant that sectional owners are not entitled to a refund of 
contributions lawfully levied upon them.12  The importance of compliance with 
financial obligations is evidenced when the non-payment of contributions leads to the 
unfortunate situation where sectional owners are held personally liable for the debts 
of the body corporate.13 
 
In chapter 6 it was shown that sectional owners are also saddled with numerous 
social obligations pertaining to their sections, exclusive use areas and the common 
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Management Act 8 of 2011 s 3(3)). 
9
 S 37(1)(b) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 
3(1)(c)).  
10
 CG Van der Merwe & L Muňis Argüelles “Enforcement of Financial Obligations in a Condominium or 
Apartment Ownership Scheme” (2006) 16 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 125 125. 
11
 See 3 6 above. 
12
 See 3 7 above. 
13
 S 47(1) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986; (Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 s 15).  
See 3 5 above. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
248 
 
property in terms of the Act, the prescribed management and conduct rules and the 
common law of nuisance.  This chapter persistently warned that strict compliance 
with social obligations is vital for the preservation of the physical features of the 
scheme, the protection of the harmonious external appearance of the building or 
buildings and the safeguarding of social harmony in the sectional title context.14  
Sectional owners should be aware that they have to surrender some of their 
personal independence and free will to preserve the peace and tranquility in the 
sectional title scheme which they have made their home.  Such surrender is required 
because of the peculiar physical features of the building and the intensified 
community of owners gathered almost permanently within the confines of the 
scheme.15 
 
It is thus evident that compliance with financial and social obligations cannot be 
taken lightly and effective procedures for enforcing such compliance are essential.  
Put simply, effective and efficient sanctions for the enforcement of financial and 
social obligations are a sine qua non for a viable and harmonious sectional title 
scheme.16 
 
Unfortunately, only a few measures of enforcement in terms of the Act and the 
prescribed rules have proved to be satisfactory for the enforcement of financial 
obligations.  In the event that arrear levies are recovered in a Magistrate‟s Court,17 
bodies corporate should act swiftly against levy defaulters to stay within the 
monetary claim value as determined by the Minister from time to time for 
Magistrates‟ Courts.18  Furthermore, the threat of financial liability for legal costs, 
including costs between attorney and client, collection commission, expenses and 
charges incurred by the body corporate in the collection of arrear levies19 might in 
practice force sectional owners to reconsider before defaulting on their levy 
payments.20  The fact that the trustees are entitled to charge interest on arrear 
                                                          
14
 See especially 6 2 4 and 6 3 4 above. 
15
 See 6 5 above. 
16
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-7. 
17
 S 37(2) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 read with Annexure 8 r 31(1)-(4). 
18
 See 4 2 1 above. 
19
 Annexure 8 r 31(5) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
20
 See 4 2 2 above. 
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amounts at such rate as they may from time to time determine should have a similar 
effect on sectional owners who are in a financially sound position.21 
 
The available sanctions in terms of the Act and the prescribed rules for the 
enforcement of social obligations have proven to be even less effective.  Alarmingly 
the only measure of enforcement that has proven to be satisfactory in practice is the 
liability of offending sectional owners for legal costs, including costs as between 
attorney and client, incurred by the body corporate in enforcing compliance with the 
model rules or the Act.22 
 
Apart from the abovementioned sanctions the Act or the prescribed rules contain no 
other efficient and effective enforcement measures.  Even the measures outside the 
confines of the Act have proven to be mostly inadequate.  The attachment and sale 
in execution of the movables and rental income of a defaulting sectional owner is not 
always plain sailing;23 emolument attachment orders, garnishee orders and 
administration orders are seldom used in practice;24 and the different results of the 
attachment and sale in execution of units of either solvent or insolvent sectional 
owners, makes it very problematic for bodies corporate to decide when to attach the 
units of defaulters.25  Finally, the use of mandatory and prohibitory interdicts for the 
enforcement of social obligations is not ideal because of the high costs and 
protracted procedure involved.  The repercussions of this remedy usually destroy 
what is left of the harmonious relations in a sectional title community.26 
 
The Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011 (the STSMA), has 
facilitated compliance with financial obligations.  Under this act, ordinary levies, 
additional levies, levies payable to the reserve fund and special levies will in future 
be recoverable by an application to a regional ombud.27  This procedure will in all 
                                                          
21
 Annexure 8 r 31(6) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986.  See 4 2 3 above. 
22
 Annexure 8 r 31(5) of the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986 .  See 7 2 above. 
23
 See 4 2 7 above. 
24
 See 4 2 8 above. 
25
 See 5 2 above. 
26
 See 7 3 2 and 7 6 above. 
27
 Ss 3(2) and (3) of the Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 8 of 2011.  
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probability be cheaper and less time consuming than proceedings in the Magistrate‟s 
Court or a High Court.28 
 
Furthermore, the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011 (the CSOSA) 
provides that an adjudicator may in appropriate circumstances make an order to 
compel a tenant of a sectional owner who defaults on his levies to pay all or part of 
the rentals payable under a lease agreement to the body corporate until his landlord 
has satisfied his debt to the body corporate.29  This would significantly improve the 
position of the body corporate in recovering arrear contributions, especially in 
schemes with a large number of absentee owners who let their apartments to 
tenants.  This sanction is less problematic and more efficient than the attachment of 
the rental of the tenant as part of the incorporeal movable assets of the defaulting 
owner.30 
 
The CSOSA provisions which allow for alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in 
the form of conciliation31 or mediation32 in sectional title schemes must also be 
welcomed.  If attempts at conciliation and mediation fail, the regional offices of the 
Community Schemes Ombud Service would be able to resolve social disputes and 
enforce social obligations in a much swifter and less costly and burdensome manner 
than the courts.  Further, experts in sectional title matters will adjudicate and be able 
to make several orders pertaining to behavioural and maintenance issues, as 
discussed above at 7 4 6, which could be enforced in Magistrates‟ Courts or the High 
Court.  In future when it comes to the enforcement of social obligations pertaining to 
behavioural and maintenance issues it would be wise for bodies corporate to rather 
make use of the regional offices of the Community Schemes Ombud Service than 
employing the sanctions in terms of the Act, the prescribed rules or the mechanisms 
that fall outside the confines of the Act.     
 
Due to the scarcity of efficient and effective enforcement measures in the South 
African sectional titles legislation, we might be forced to look at more robust foreign 
                                                          
28
 See 4 2 1 above. 
29
 S 39(1)(f) of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011. 
30
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-30 - 9-31. 
31
 S 47 of the Community Schemes Ombud Service Act 9 of 2011. 
32
 S 48. 
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law sanctions to achieve certainty and consistency in the South African sectional title 
industry.  The inclusion of some of these measures in the future might strengthen the 
Act without conflicting with constitutional requirements in the South African context. 
 
With regard to the enforcement of financial obligations a swift solution is needed to 
place the body corporate in a position where it can manage the scheme effectively 
and not postpone necessary maintenance and repairs.33  To obviate the unfairness 
of bodies corporate only being satisfied first in instances where the defaulting owner 
is insolvent, the legislator should seriously consider implementing a statutory 
hypothec in favour of the body corporate for 6 months‟ arrears.  This hypothec would 
rank above first mortgages, as is the case in the United States of America‟s Uniform 
Common Interest Ownership Act of 2008 (the UCIOA).  It was shown, at 5 5 above, 
that the UCIOA‟s super lien is a genuine attempt to protect the financial strength and 
vitality of bodies corporate.  Such a super lien would address the concerns of 
institutional lenders, such as commercial banks, by the limitation of the statutory 
hypothec to a claim for six months arrear contributions.  It also allays the fears of 
other unit owners that they would have to make up the shortfall in contributions.  
Moreover, we have seen that institutional lenders have various other means of 
protection, for instance by exacting additional deposits to be kept in trust.  Some 
added risk would, therefore, not seem overly burdensome in exchange for the proper 
maintenance of common property, thereby protecting their collateral in several other 
units mortgaged by them in the scheme.  A fair balance is thus struck between all the 
relevant parties involved.34  In addition, this will eliminate the uncertainty of bodies 
corporate whether or not to attach the units of defaulters because of the difference in 
outcome according to whether the attached unit belongs to a solvent or insolvent 
defaulter.  Such a super lien will enable the body corporate to promptly replace the 
defaulter with a solvent owner who is prepared to pay his contributions on time.35  
Another wise option would be to draw up a properly worded model rule that 
penalises owners for late payment, thereby reducing the body corporate‟s need to 
institute court proceedings for the collection of arrear levies.  Unfortunately, the effect 
                                                          
33
 Van der Merwe & Muňiz-Argüelles (2006) Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 154. 
34
 153-154. 
35
 155-156. 
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would be limited in the case of poor owners who simply do not have the money to 
pay either their contributions or a monetary penalty.36 
 
When it comes to the enforcement of social obligations, the imposition of fines would 
again reduce the need for the body corporate to institute court proceedings.  Another 
practical solution with limited application would be to amend the conduct rules to 
prevent owners from using certain facilities if they contravene the applicable rules.  A 
prohibition on the use of the sectional title swimming pool during the summer season 
would compel most owners and their children to obey the rules pertaining to the 
swimming pool.  See the discussion above at 7 5 2.  
 
Even so, the Act desperately needs a measure of last resort when all other 
measures have been exhausted without the desired results.  In the previous chapter, 
at 7 6, I argued that the threat of permanent or temporary exclusion from the 
sectional title community is the most efficacious guarantee for strict compliance with 
the social obligations in a sectional title scheme.  These measures can also be 
applied in the case of serious non-compliance with financial obligations.  I did 
indicate, at 7 3 3 and 7 6, that such legislative measures would infringe upon the 
property rights of a sectional owner in terms of section 26(3) of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution), which stipulates that no one 
may be evicted from their home without a court order.37  Section 36 of the 
Constitution, however, makes provision for the limitation of rights in the Bill of Rights 
which includes the property rights of section 26(3) of the Constitution.  Section 36(1) 
of the Constitution reads as follows:  
 
“The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors, including –  
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
                                                          
36
 132. 
37
 S 26(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 states the following: “No one may be 
evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an order of court made after considering all 
the relevant circumstances.  No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.” 
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(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.” 
 
Therefore, two requirements must be complied with in order to justify the limitation of 
the rights mentioned in the Bill of Rights, in our case the property rights in terms of 
section 26(3).38  Firstly, it must be a law of general application and, secondly, it must 
be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom.39 
 
With regard to the first requirement, „a law‟ includes all forms of legislation 
(delegated or original) as well as common and customary law.  „General application‟ 
requires, firstly, that the law must be sufficiently clear, accessible and precise so that 
those affected can ascertain the extent of their rights and obligations and, secondly, 
that the law must apply objectively and equally to all and not be arbitrary in 
application.40  Amending the Act to make provision for the permanent or temporary 
exclusion of a sectional owner would thus qualify as „law‟ and it would also be of 
„general application‟ since it would be applicable to all South African sectional 
owners.  
 
The second requirement, that a law must be reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, means that „a 
law‟ which restricts a fundamental right must do so for reasons that are acceptable to 
such a society.  This law must take into account all relevant factors, including the 
nature of the right,41 the importance of the purpose of the limitation,42 the nature and 
extent of the limitation,43 the relation between the limitation and its purpose,44 and 
less restrictive means to achieve the purpose, thereby emphasizing the importance 
                                                          
38
 In First National Bank of SA LTD t/a Wesbank v Commisioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA LTD t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 4 SA 768 (CC) para 110 it was held that 
neither the text nor the purpose of s 36 suggests that any right in the Bill of Rights is excluded from limitation 
under its provisions.  
39
 I Currie & J De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 6ed (2013) 155 and AJ Van der Walt Constitutional 
Property Law 3ed (2011) 73-74. 
40
 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 155-156. 
41
 S 36(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
42
 S 36(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
43
 S 36(1)(c) of the Constitution. 
44
 S 36(1)(d) of the Constitution.  
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of minimalising the invasion of rights.45  Furthermore, it must be shown that the law 
serves a constitutionally acceptable purpose and that there is proportionality 
between the infringement of the fundamental rights and the benefits it is designed to 
achieve.46 
 
Various arguments can be advanced to justify the permanent exclusion of 
recalcitrant owners from a sectional titles scheme.  Firstly, it must be kept in mind 
that this limitation is made to protect the property rights of those who are affected by 
the troublemaker.  Secondly, sectional ownership was introduced to cater for the 
social, economic and sociological needs of society.  The impetus was the provision 
of real property rights to a greater segment of the population and to thereby fulfill the 
psychological need for a home.47  The need for a home to be a place of safety 
justifies permanent exclusion.  This does not affect the perception that apartment 
ownership approximates home-ownership, because it is warranted by the demand 
for a final mechanism to permanently settle disputes, thereby restoring financial 
stability and social harmony in the sectional title community.  Thirdly, the 
                                                          
45
 S 36(1)(e) of the Constitution. 
46
 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 162-163.  In S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 104 
the Constitutional Court adopted the following approach in determining proportionality under s 33 of the interim 
Constitution (this applies with equal force to the interpretation of section 36 of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996): “The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary in 
a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an assessment based on 
proportionality.  This is implicit in the provisions of s 33(1).  The fact that different rights have different 
implications for democracy and, in the case of our Constitution, for 'an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality', means that there is no absolute standard which can be laid down for determining 
reasonableness and necessity.  Principles can be established, but the application of those principles to particular 
circumstances can only be done on a case-by-case basis.  This is inherent in the requirement of proportionality, 
which calls for the balancing of different interests.  In the balancing process the relevant considerations will 
include the nature of the right that is limited and its importance to an open and democratic society based on 
freedom and equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose to such a 
society; the extent of the limitation, its efficacy and, particularly where the limitation has to be necessary, 
whether the desired ends could reasonably be achieved through other means less damaging to the right in 
question.  In the process regard must be had to the provisions of s 33(1) and the underlying values of the 
Constitution, bearing in mind that, as a Canadian Judge has said, 'the role of the Court is not to second-guess the 
wisdom of policy choices made by legislator.”  The latter paragraph has become a standard reference when the 
Constitutional Court considers the legitimacy of limitation.  This was summarised as follows in S v Bhulwana 
1996 1 SA 388 (CC) para 18:  “In sum, therefore, the Court places the purpose, effects and importance of the 
infringing legislation on one side of the scales and the nature and effect of the infringement caused by the 
legislation on the other.  The more substantial the inroad into fundamental rights, the more persuasive the 
grounds of justification must be.” 
47
 CG Van der Merwe “Sanctions in terms of the South African Sectional Titles Act and the German 
Wohnungseigentumgezets: Should the South African statute be given equally sharp teeth?” (1993) 26-1 CILSA 
85 97. 
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comparative study conducted, at 7 5 3 2, shows that an action for permanent 
exclusion is a long process subject to strict requirements before the court is allowed 
to order the exclusion and that the offender has the opportunity to stop legal 
proceedings by ending his offensive behaviour before a resolution to expel him is 
adopted at the general meeting.  Furthermore, that permanent exclusion is regarded 
as a final measure which should only be adopted once all other sanctions have been 
exhausted provides protection for the troublemaker and guarantees that he will not 
be excluded prematurely and on spurious grounds.  Even where the recalcitrant 
owner‟s unit is sold at a public auction, he obtains the proceeds paid by the highest 
bidder at the sale.  Therefore, the permanent exclusion of a sectional owner from the 
sectional title scheme is not just a swift remedy, but a long process in which the court 
finally decides whether the exclusion is justified in the circumstances of the particular 
case.48 
 
Amending the Act to make provision for permanent exclusion is thus supported by 
sound societal reasons which gainsay some of the economic and dogmatic 
arguments raised against such an expulsion.49  Therefore, one can argue that 
permanent exclusion from the scheme serves a purpose that might be considered 
legitimate by all reasonable citizens in a constitutional democracy that values human 
dignity, equality and freedom above all other considerations.  Put simply, such a law 
might be considered reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom.50 
 
However, permanent exclusion from the scheme seems too extreme because it 
invades property rights further than it needs in order to achieve its purpose.  A more 
appropriate solution in the sectional title context would, therefore, be to deprive a 
troublesome owner and his family of the occupation and use of the apartment for a 
limited period of time, as discussed above at 7 5 3 3.  In chapter 6, at 6 5, we have 
seen that ownership is no longer regarded as an absolute exclusive right, but rather 
as a privilege which must be exercised in the public interest.  Ownership is still, 
                                                          
48
 C Mohr A Comparative Analysis of thePermanent Exclusion of a Troublemaker from the Apartment 
Ownership Community LLM mini thesis University of Stellenbosch (2010) 43-44. 
49
 See 7 5 3 2 above. 
50
 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 155 and Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 73-74. 
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however, a protected constitutional right which can only be radically affected in 
exceptional circumstances.  However, as long as the ultimate substance of 
ownership is not infringed, temporary deprivation of one of the entitlements of 
ownership, namely occupation and use of the object, should not be considered an 
unconstitutional infringement of ownership.51  The fact that the High Court in Body 
Corporate, Shaftesbury Sectional Title Scheme v Rippert’s Estate and Others52 
generally approved the idea that owners or occupiers should be deprived of their 
right of residence in a scheme for a limited period of time when they are guilty of 
persistent and deliberate contraventions of conduct rules or of non-payment of their 
levies adds weight to such an argument.53  This is a less restrictive means to achieve 
the purpose of ensuring strict compliance with the obligations of a sectional title 
scheme.  Therefore, I suggest, this indicates that such an amendment of the Act is 
more likely to pass constitutional muster when it eventually comes up for 
consideration by a court of law.   
 
In conclusion, I am not arguing that all is doomed when it comes to the enforcement 
of obligations in sectional title schemes.  However, what is clearly lacking is a 
measure of last resort where all other available measures have been exhausted 
without the desired results.  In final analysis, the existence of a sanction for the 
temporary exclusion of a sectional owner in the most serious cases would apply 
constant pressure on all the owners of a scheme to consider the consequences of 
non-compliance with the obligations imposed upon them.  Therefore, its deterrent 
and final effect cannot be underestimated.  Consequently, I suggest that the 
temporary exclusion of a recalcitrant sectional owner from the sectional title 
community is the most efficient and effective way to guarantee financial stability and 
social harmony in sectional title schemes throughout South Africa. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
51
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 9-41; see also CG Van der Merwe & L Muňiz-Argüelles “Enforcement of 
Conduct Rules in a Condominium or Apartment Ownership Scheme” (2006) Liber Amicorum Festschrift Tugrul 
Ansay 247 264-265.  
52
 2003 5 SA 1 (C). 
53
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